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CHAP. X. What is to be done in order to Uniting.

Now we may be briefer in speaking of what is to be done in reference to particular differences, seeing that much may be gathered from the general principles already laid down, and it is not our purpose to enter into every particular. Yet we say:

1. It is the duty of such persons to seek union with one another, and for that purpose to offer and desire meetings and conferences, and to urge harmony upon one another. In that Council of Carthage, of which Aurelius was Moderator, they appointed that conferences should be sought with the Donatists, although they had been long in schism; and for that purpose they appointed Commissioners and gave them instructions to go from place to place and endeavor a settlement. Among these instructions were these: that their former schism and separation should prejudice no one; and that Ministers and Bishops should continue in their charges, if otherwise worthy, notwithstanding their former separation. This is observed not to have been without fruit in many places, as the acts and events are recorded by Balsamon. And this is according to the general rule of pursuing peace even when it seems to flee from men; while questions that may produce strife are to be avoided and fled from when they seem to pursue men, because, as Paul says in 2 Timothy 2:22 and following, The servant of the Lord must not strive, and so on.

On this ground we find that many of Augustine’s Epistles, directed to Donatists and others, are to this purpose, requesting friendly conferences. And when he had occasion to be in cities where Donatist Bishops were, he used to visit them and enter into friendly conference with them; and if there was any hope of progress, he wrote to others encouraging them to continue the same. This may particularly be gathered from Epistle 147, where he honorably mentions Promelianus in connection with the desire for a conference; and because he knew that the excessive vehemence of one Evodius, though on his own side, had offended him, he excused it, saying, among other things, Id hominis aetati ignoscendum est, and so on. He has something similar in Epistle 163, when he mentions Fortunius, with whom he had conferred, giving this testimony concerning him to those to whom he wrote: Quantum enim arbitror difficilime potestis invenire in Episcopis vestris tam utilem animum, & voluntatem, quam in isto sene perspeximus. Therefore he urges them to continue the conference that had begun, although he himself could not remain.

2. In conducting such meetings, respect should be had to union in the ordering of every circumstance. This applies, for instance, to the persons chosen: they should be men inclined toward peace, respected by the other party concerned in the Church’s differences, and free from the suspicions formerly mentioned, and such like, lest an intended union result in an even greater breach and division, as has often been seen in conferences among dissenting men. Special care should also be taken to express mutual goodwill in words and conduct, lest some harsh impression seize upon men at the very beginning.

Care should also be taken in choosing the subject that is first to be discussed. What may be thought most liable to misunderstanding, heat, or contention should be left until last; and what may be conceived as more acceptable to both sides should be begun with, so that, at least at the beginning, it may be known wherein men agree rather than wherein they differ. Possibly also, when union in fundamental things has been acknowledged, this may make way for moderating affections in other things that are less fundamental. This method was always urged by Bucer, Beza, and other Reformers who held conferences at first with the Lutheran party. For to begin with some point of Doctrine or particular practice in which the difference is greatest often disturbs men’s dispositions at the very outset and causes conferences to break off abruptly with still greater heat, as experience in those debates at that time made all too evident.

3. Such meetings for conference should be seriously and condescendingly used for the end intended. 1. Protracting the time or wrangling over circumstances should be avoided, as also tenaciousness and contentiousness about procedural formalities, and particular insistence upon contradictions concerning matters of fact. Such things do not become the gravity and seriousness of men aiming at such an end. Rather, the main business should be soberly and seriously undertaken, and that in a timely manner. For men should not meet to gain advantage over one another by such formalities, but to procure the good of the Church. 2. Accusations, or the objecting of personal faults against one another, or differences in particular matters, should either be altogether forborne or left until the last place. The principal matter should first be handled, and the particulars afterward ordered accordingly. 3. There should be condescension in following some circumstances even when they do not seem entirely reasonable, lest by the willful adherence of one party to a circumstance the intended end should be frustrated. Yea, sometimes even more substantial matters, at least until a better understanding has been produced, are to be yielded in when this can be done without sin, if doing so may contribute to carrying forward such a design. And we will almost always find that those who are most tender of the Church’s good are also the most condescending in all such matters.

Among other examples, we find this in that conference between the Catholics and Donatists at which Augustine was present, and which he records. Among other things, these points are clear. First, the Catholics not only sought the meeting, but also pressed that they should proceed to the main business, which the others sometimes refused, saying that it was not lawful for the children of Martyrs to meet with the children of apostate or wicked men; and sometimes, by procedural formalities and contentious questions, they prolonged the time in order to avoid the principal matter. Second, it is clear that the Catholics also condescended to many of their requests and yielded so far as to account them Bishops. At the outset they did not contradict, but conceded that Churches should be restored to those from whom they had been taken, if by doing so they might incline them toward union and soften them even by acts of kindness. Thus they insisted upon no merely circumstantial matter against them.

Such meetings have often been frustrated by vain wranglings of this kind, especially when numbers have been admitted without proper order and when each party has charged the other with former miscarriages, as Augustine observes in Epistle 163. Therefore he gives them this counsel: Neque nos illis debere objicere suorum scelera, neque illos nobis—neither ought we to object to them the crimes of their people, nor they to us those of ours.

And because the Donatists reproached the Catholics—as the orthodox are called throughout these debates—with being guilty of persecuting them, because they had proceeded to certain Sentences and had obtained commissions from the Civil powers against them to remove them from their charges—those times they called tempora Macariana, because of a particular person who was prominent in executing these measures—and because, on the other hand, the Catholics used to object against them, besides their schism, their headiness, irregular violence, and the like, because of the practices of the Circumcellions, who, having fallen away with the Donatists, went far beyond them into many absurdities; therefore, when Augustine presses for a conference in Epistle 203, he says, Tollamus inania objecta, nec tu objicias tempora Macariana, nec ego saevitiam Circumcellionum—let us put away these empty accusations: neither do you object against me the Macarian times, nor will I object against you the violence of the Circumcellions.

And in Epistle 107 he says that, in his conference with Fortunius, Placuit omnibus in talibus disputationibus violenta facta malorum hominum nobis ab invicem objici non debere—it pleased them all that, in disputes of this kind, the violent deeds of wicked men ought not to be mutually charged against one another. There is no small help or hindrance to a conference according as this counsel is followed or neglected, seeing that former incidents of this kind will often produce greater heat than matters of much greater importance in the principal cause itself.

4. To make these instances more particular, the matter concerning which the debate arises and which becomes the subject of conference may be distinguished, and so may be spoken to more clearly. It is either: 1. a difference in some doctrinal matter; or 2. some particular practice or personal miscarriage; or 3. something in Worship; or 4. something in Government, or such like.

CHAP. XI. What is to be done in closing doctrinal differences.

1. For doctrinal differences of judgment, there are three ways of composing them. It is to be remembered that the difference is not supposed to concern any fundamental matter.

First, by sober and serious conference, one party may bring the other to the same judgment with them; or both parties may give up something of their extreme positions and join in a middle opinion. This is the most solid union, when men come to think and speak the same thing, and sometimes it has been attained. Yet concerning this we say: 1. That all union is not to depend upon this, as has already been said. 2. It has very rarely been attained, especially when a difference has spread and rooted itself through debate and contradiction, seeing that even good men have both infirmity and corruption. 3. We say that public dispute, either by word or writing, has never proved very useful, even among good men, for attaining this end. Ordinarily such debates have heightened the controversy and engaged men more deeply in it. Therefore, if anything is likely to prevail toward this end, it is friendly and familiar conferences that open up the truth, rather than formal and stated disputations. For in such formal disputes men are, as it were, upon their guard and fully exercise their wit; whereas in the other there is greater opportunity to inform the judgment by a loving, grave, and serious manner of speaking the truth privately to others, especially to such as are respected for their gifts and ability, so that it may not be done in vain, as Paul expresses it in Galatians 2:2. It is observable that he speaks this in reference to his own method when he intended to demonstrate his agreement with the chief Apostles in the matter of doctrine.

We also find meekness and instruction joined together when there is any expectation of recovering someone from a difference, 2 Timothy 2:25; whereas convincing or disputing is more particularly applicable to those of whom there is little hope, out of respect for the edification of others. Hence we find the Apostles disputing with false teachers concerning some points of truth, but rather entreating and exhorting Believers to maintain peace among themselves notwithstanding lesser differences.

A second way of composing differences is, when such agreement in judgment cannot be obtained, to endeavor after harmony and maintain unity notwithstanding the difference, by mutual forbearance in the matters controverted. This, we will find, is of two sorts.

The first is, so to speak, total forbearance; that is, when neither side, even doctrinally in word, writing, or Sentences of Judicatories, presses anything that may confirm or propagate its own opinion or condemn the contrary, but both altogether refrain from the matter out of respect for the Church’s peace and for preventing scandal. In those things wherein they agree, they mutually follow the Apostle’s direction in Philippians 3:16, Walk by the same rule, and mind the same things, as if there were no such differences, waiting in these matters until the Lord shall reveal the same to them.

This way is safe when the doctrine concerning which the difference exists is such that forbearing a decision upon it neither hinders any duty to which the Church in general is called, nor endangers the salvation of souls through lack of clarity concerning it, nor, in a word, brings such inconveniences upon the Church as may arise from the unseasonable awakening and continued maintenance of differences and divisions. For the purpose of bringing forth every truth, or confirming it by any authoritative sanction, and so forth, is the edification of the Church; and therefore, when bringing it forward destroys more than it edifies, it is to be forborne.

Neither is it sufficient ground for insisting upon such decisions in preaching to say that what is preached for is truth and what is condemned is error. For, 1. It is not simply the lawfulness of the thing that is in question, but its necessity and expediency in such a case. Now, many things are lawful which are not expedient, 1 Corinthians 10:23. 2. In those differences that existed in the primitive times concerning meats, days, genealogies, and the like, there was truth or error upon one of the sides, as there is a right and wrong side in every contradiction of such a kind. Yet the Apostle thinks it more fitting for the Church’s peace that such matters should be altogether refrained from rather than insisted upon or decided in any way, at least publicly. 3. No Minister can bring forth every truth at all times; he must therefore make a choice. And I suppose some Ministers may die—and indeed all do die—without having preached every truth to the people, even every truth which they themselves knew. Besides, there are undoubtedly many truths hidden even from the most learned.

Neither can this be thought inconsistent with a Minister’s faithfulness, who is to reveal the whole counsel of God; because that counsel is to be understood of things necessary to men’s salvation and is not to be extended to every truth whatsoever. For we find the great Apostle explaining this in that same sermon, Acts 20:20: I have kept back nothing that was profitable unto you. This shows that the whole counsel of God, or the things which he showed them, means the whole of what was profitable for them, and that for no secondary consideration or fear whatsoever did he shrink from revealing that to them. It is also clear that there are many truths which are not decided by any judicial act; and, among other things, restraint in judicially deciding truths that are not fundamental has always been regarded as no small means of preserving the Church’s peace, just as the contrary has been a cause of division.

The third way—which is the second sort of the preceding way of composing differences—is mixed. This occurs when there is some dealing with such questions, yet with such forbearance that, although there is an acknowledged difference, there is nevertheless no schism or division, but these are seriously and tenderly prevented. Thus, on the one side, some may express their judgment in preaching and writing upon a particular question in one way, while others may do so differently; yet both may act with such meekness and respect toward those from whom they differ that it produces no breach, gives no just ground of offense, and hinders union in no other matter.

Or possibly the matter may come to be decided in a Synod, yet with such forbearance upon both sides that the decision proves no prejudice to union. Those who have the authority of the Synod on their side do not press it to the prejudice of the opinions, names, or consciences of the others, nor to their detriment in any respect, but allow them liberty to express their minds and walk according to their own light in such particulars. On the contrary, the others rest satisfied within the unity of the Church, without condemning those who differ from them or pressing them to condemn themselves. For in this way their liberty is in fact no less than that of those who have the decision of a Synod on their side.

Thus men may maintain communion and union in a Church even where, by the Judicatories thereof, some lesser and nonfundamental error, which also leads to unwarranted practices, has been authoritatively concluded.

We have a famous instance of this in the Church of Africa in the days of Cyprian, which has always been highly esteemed by the Ancients. There was a difference in that Church concerning the rebaptizing of Heretics and Schismatics after their conversion, or of such as had once fallen in with them. Cyprian and the greater part thought their first Baptism null, or that it had been made void by their fall; others, who were the smaller party, thought otherwise, and in this particular they were right. Meetings were held on both sides for the defense of their opinions. Also, in a Council of nearly three hundred Bishops, Cyprian’s position was judicially and authoritatively concluded.

Yet that Synod conducted itself in such a manner that it not only did not censure anyone who dissented, nor press them to conform in practice to its judgment, but also maintained the most intimate respect and familiarity with them, as may be gathered from what was formerly mentioned. On the other side, we do not find anyone in that Church making a schism on account of that erroneous judicial decision, although it was ratified by at least three several Synods. Rather, they were content to keep their consciences free by retaining their own judgment and following their own practice until time gave more light and greater opportunity to clarify that truth.

And we will hardly find in the writings of any age greater affection among brethren, or greater respect for peace, than existed in that Church at that time among those who differed. Nor is there any practice more highly commended throughout Church history and the writings of the Fathers than this practice, as may partly be gathered from what was formerly cited from Augustine.

And if we consider the case rationally, we will find that it is not impossible to maintain union in a Church where there is, in such a difference, an authoritative decision, even supposing that the side upon which the error lies is the side approved.

For, 1. There is no necessity for those who have authority on their side to press others to adopt their judgment or practice in such things. Neither can it be thought that such a decision can of itself satisfy every scruple, nor that men may follow it while doubting; nor, lastly, that controversies of this kind can bear the weight of troubling the Church by censuring those who may otherwise be faithful, seeing that sometimes even unfaithful men have been spared out of respect for the Church’s good, as has already been said.

And, 2. On the other side, such a constitution of a Church does not involve everyone who keeps communion in it in the guilt of that decision, if personally they are free from it. This is clear from the example of the Jewish Church, where undoubtedly many corrupt acts had been established, yet this did not make communion in Worship or Government unlawful where the matter and manner of a person’s own conduct were lawful.

Besides, the contrary principle would imply that no Judicatory could maintain union wherever there were contrary votes or a Sentence passed without unanimity, because that Sentence is certainly wrong in the judgment of those who think otherwise. If this were so, no Judicatory could be expected either in Church or State; for it cannot be expected that they will always be unanimous, or that the greater part will yield to the lesser and rescind their own act.

Moreover, suppose there should be a division over one difference: can it be expected that those who unite respectively upon the divided sides will afterward have no further differences among themselves? And if they do, shall there then be another division? And where will this end? Seeing, therefore, that men must resolve either to maintain unity where there are faults of such a nature or to have no unity at all, it is as well to maintain it at first as to be compelled to do so afterward.

The Orthodox urged this argument against the Donatists, who would not maintain union with them because of alleged corruptions in the proceedings of Judicatories and Ordinations, yet were themselves constrained to bear with such things among their own people, and particularly to receive and unite with the Maximinianists. These had once been rejected from their communion, although they were a branch of their own faction, because the Donatists saw that there would be no end of divisions if they did not resolve to tolerate such things among themselves. Augustine frequently asserts that they were never able to answer this argument when it was put to them; namely, why they would not allow the Catholics the same latitude in maintaining communion with them which they themselves had allowed to the Maximinianists, who were guilty of the very things they imputed to the Catholics.

We conceive, then, that even in such a case there may be union for carrying forward the principal work of the Gospel, notwithstanding such a circumstantial difference, if men otherwise seriously set themselves to it; and the general grounds formerly laid down confirm this.

CHAP. XII. What to do for union in points not doctrinall, but about matters of fact or personall faults

If the difference is not doctrinal, concerning a point of judgment, at least not only so, but concerns matters of fact, such as personal faults and corruptions, whereby one party is ready to object against the other concerning some past failings and miscarriages, then, through inconsiderate reproaches, pressing of Censures, or condemnation of what has been done, the Church’s peace may be in danger of being broken, and men may be likely to be torn and divided in their communion. Often such things prove exceedingly troublesome when men willfully or imprudently pursue them without respect to the Church’s peace.

This often occurred during times of darkness or persecution, when men, being in the dark and in a disturbed condition, were led away by temptation and overtaken with many faults, and sometimes, among other things, were made to jostle with and trample upon one another, as it were, not knowing what they were doing. And when this time was over, some were ready to criticize what had been done in the darkness and to quarrel with others for such jostling, when they had all been in such confusion. This indeed was common, but most unbecoming to grave men: to make that a ground of contention which had inadvertently been done by others in the dark, as the great Basil says, In nocturno tempore, & densis tenebris—in the nighttime and in thick darkness. Such contests are of four sorts.

First, sometimes there is, in general, dissatisfaction with the constitution of the Church because of the gross corruptions of its Officers and Members. This cannot be removed upon one side only, because tares cannot but be in the Church, and that visibly, as Cyprian says. It is removed, then, by meekness and tenderness upon the one side toward those who have withdrawn, and by the willingness of those who have withdrawn to return. When this has occurred, it has been a matter of gladness to the whole Church.

Among Cyprian’s Epistles, Epistle 50 in Pamelius’s edition, mention is made of Urbanus, Maximus, and others of the Church of Rome, who, being Confessors and imprisoned during the time of persecution, after their release found many grossly corrupt Members in the Church. Encountering the doctrine of Novatus, which commended separation to the godly so that they might enjoy more comfortable communion together, they were attracted by it and for a time separated from the communion of Cornelius and others of the Clergy, alleging that there could be no communion in a Church so badly constituted. But afterward, discovering the great harm that thereby came to the Church, they overcame their own affections and inclinations and, out of respect for the good of the Church, reunited with it. This was exceedingly welcomed by all, as both their Epistle to Cyprian and his Epistle to them make clear.

And as their fall shows that it is not impossible for zealous Ministers, who have resisted defection, nevertheless to be overtaken with such a fault, so their recovery provides a sweet example of Christian self-denial and tenderness for others to follow in a similar case. Their words to Cyprian are worthy of observation: Nos habito consilio utilitatibus Ecclesiae, & paci magis consulentes, omnibus rebus praetermissis, & Iudicio Dei servatis, cum Cornelio Episcopo nostro, pariter & cum universo Clero pacem fecisse, cum gaudio etiam universae Ecclesiae, prona etiam omnium charitate.

A second sort of such contests occurs when faults are alleged which either are not true or cannot be proved, although possibly they may be both gross and true. With both of these the Novatians and Donatists troubled the Church, insisting for a long time upon charging many crimes against particular men, especially Caecilianus and Hosius, which they were never able to establish, although they alleged that such faults were concealed by the Catholics and that those guilty of them were not to be communicated with.

In this case the Orthodox took three courses to remove such a difference.

1. They pleaded for forbearance from reopening such contests and exhorted men rather to maintain union than to risk breaking it upon such grounds; and so, as Augustine says, ut quaedam incerta crimina pro certa pace Deo dimitterentur, Contra Epistolam Parmeniani, book 1, chapter 3—that certain uncertain crimes should, for the sake of certain peace, be left to God.

2. If men could not acquiesce in this, they admitted the matter to proof, over and over again, so that it might be decided by lawful trial. We find this in the former instances: the same case of Caecilianus was repeatedly tried even after he had been acquitted. It is true that the Donatists did not acquiesce, but separated, for which reason they were always regarded as very gross Schismatics. Yet lawful trial is in itself a way in which men may satisfactorily acquiesce.

3. A third way was sometimes used when divisions were likely to arise from dissatisfaction with a particular person against whom matters could not judicially be established so as to provide grounds for a Sentence, and yet possibly there was not such full satisfaction with him in every respect that retaining him would not risk a breach where the people were offended by him. In such a case, without judicially proceeding against or Censuring him, they interposed with the Bishop that he should yield his place, and wrote to the people that they should choose another.

Thus, in that Council of Carthage, Canon 91, letters were written to Maximianus, called Episcopus Bagiensis, and to the people, that he might yield the Bishopric and that they might choose another. Yet there is no mention of any accusation having been established against him, or of any Sentence, but simply that, for the good of the Church, Synodo placuit, and so forth. Mention is made elsewhere in history of a Bishop of that place and name who had been a Donatist and afterward returned to the communion of the Church; but whether this is the same man, or what precisely was the cause of this appointment, is neither certain nor of great importance to the present matter.

A third sort of contests of this kind occurs when crimes are gross and clear, and men are either justly liable to Censure or have already been Censured. Some persons, possibly honestly minded, may be drawn into supporting them because those censured have gained their sympathy and supplied them with misinformation and prejudices. They may thus be brought to endeavor either to prevent Sentences against those who justly deserve them or to have such Sentences removed. In this case we find a threefold way of composing the difference.

1. An endeavor was made to demonstrate to others the justice of such a Sentence when it had been misrepresented. Thus, when Basilides and Martialis were justly deposed by a Synod in Spain, they, by false pretexts, persuaded the Clergy of Rome to support them and write for their restoration, which greatly offended the Bishops of Spain. They therefore wrote to Cyprian and those in Africa for advice. These, being assembled in Synod, approved the deposition and advised them not to readmit the men, because no such persons who had a blemish and were not holy ought to minister in holy things. They advised them rather to bear with Stephen’s mistake, who through ignorance and misinformation had been led to side with such men. Thus Cyprian records it in his Epistle to the Church of Spain, Epistle 68. In this way the schism was stopped, and the Churches continued to acknowledge the lawfully ordained Bishops who had succeeded them. The readmission of such men would neither have been lawful in itself nor accomplished the end of obtaining peace in those Churches where the people had been offended by their conduct.

2. A second way was used when the men were orthodox and profitable, though failing grossly in some particular matter, yet were supported by others in the Church. In such cases Synods, for the sake of concord, did not always insist upon maintaining such Sentences, as was formerly illustrated in the case of Hosius. Augustine also, in Epistle 164, approves the decision not to Censure one Optatus, lest a schism should thereby be occasioned because many adhered to him.

3. We also find a third way: when men had been Sentenced, and some continued to support them while others opposed them, those who had been Sentenced were sometimes brought to submit themselves, and so the division was removed. It was so in that heated contest which continued for a long time between the Bishops of Rome and the Church of Africa in the case of Apiarius, Bishop of Sicca, and others. Having been deposed by the Synod of Carthage, he was pressed upon the Africans for readmission by the Bishops of Rome, which those in Africa would by no means permit. At last, those who had been Sentenced came to acknowledge the Sentence, whereby the division was stopped.

A fourth sort of contests or divisions concerning matters of fact occurs when both sides have had their failings in a time of darkness and temptation, some in one way and some in another, and afterward, when they have had some relief, they begin by mutual reproaches to endanger the Church’s peace, one casting up this fault against another, and the other in turn reproaching him with another.

The most satisfactory way taken to prevent this is when both sides, acknowledging their own guilt to one another, forgive one another and join cordially together for the good of the work. In the debates with the Donatists there is much mention, with great commendation, of the practice of a Synod called Concilium Cirtense, in which the members mutually confessed their faults and, as Augustine says in the conference formerly cited, Sibi invicem ignoscebant ne schisma fieret—they forgave one another, lest a schism should arise.

And from the purpose of the Catholics in urging that example, and from the vehemence with which the Donatists denied it, it would seem that they regarded this as a most excellent and satisfactory way of removing differences among godly men: that everyone acknowledges his own fault and, rather than reproaching the other, forgives him, endeavoring to have the remembrance of past miscarriages forgiven and buried in oblivion rather than continually mentioned.

For good men, being still only men, ordinarily have failings on both sides; and denying this provokes others to insist upon those failings all the more, whereas acknowledging them puts an end to the reproaching of men with the same. And ordinarily it may be observed that the best men would rather mention their own faults in their acknowledgments than hear those faults mentioned by anyone else.

Beza, in Epistle 23, gives similar advice to a Church that had fallen into division: Utinam utraque pars acquiescere malit, quam si curiose nimium & φιλονεικῶς quis sit in majori culpa, inquiratur—would that each party would rather be content to come to peace than inquire too curiously and contentiously which of them bears the greater blame.

CHAP. XIII. What to do toward uniting in divisions arising from diversity of circumstances in external administrations, and especially arising from Church-government.

A third matter that occasions divisions is diversity in Worship, Ceremonies, or things relating to the external administration of Ordinances, when some follow one way in Preaching, administering the Sacraments, Catechizing, and so forth, and others another. This ordinarily breeds wrangling and has often troubled the Church, as we see in the controversy about Easter and Ceremonies. It is not our purpose to dwell upon this, because ordinarily such debates involve some alleged lawfulness or unlawfulness in the thing contended for, and are to be counted among those contentious debates which the men of God are to avoid. And also, because these things have often been fully and clearly discussed, we shall only say concerning them:

1. As there is a necessity of tolerating some difference in Doctrine, so there is also a necessity of bearing with some differences in circumstances concerning the external manner of Worship and the like. Men should not quickly take offense at every difference, nor be displeased by it, provided it does not proceed from an affectation of singularity, unfaithfulness, or some other corrupt motive. And we will find great condescension among the greatest men, both ancient and modern, in things that are not sinful in themselves, for preserving union in the Church. Thus far the Apostle’s practice of becoming all things to all men will warrant. Zanchi, in an Epistle concerning this matter, gives both many examples and reasons for such conduct.

2. We say that men, especially in a time of division, should by all means endeavor to keep to the established and approved way that has been used and continues in use in a Church in such administrations. For the less men insist upon particular manners of doing these things, the more simplicity they use, and the less they differ from what is most ordinary and approved, the less danger there will be of division arising from them. Such division commonly arises from multiplying such circumstances; changing what is old or introducing some new manner; condemning the way and manner used by others as if it contained some great absurdity; or pressing one’s own way, even in circumstantial matters, upon others. These and similar things are to be avoided. Indeed, there is no way to peace in such matters but by forbearance; for it is easier to forbear introducing some new thing than to make others alter what is old, unless there is some substantial reason in the matter requiring such a change.

The great and ordinarily the most bitter contentions in a Church, as was said before, concern things belonging to Government. These are of many kinds and have their own corresponding remedies when blessed by God. We shall give instances of five kinds of contests in this matter. The first concerns the form of Government. The second concerns the formal constitution of Church Judicatories. The third concerns the matter enacted or determined by them. The fourth concerns particular miscarriages and abuses of power in Government. And the fifth concerns the persons who ought to govern, or to whom the Government belongs, and whose determinations are ultimately to be obeyed.

For the first, debates concerning the nature and form of Government may be considered doctrinally, and so they constitute a difference of judgment. Some think one form of Government lawful, while others reject that and maintain another. If this difference is fairly conducted, it need not produce division in the Church, as was indicated in the preceding discussion.

2. It may be considered practically; that is, when men not only differ in their judgment, but act accordingly, pursuing opposite designs as if they were two parties, each seeking to bring the one Church under itself, while neither acknowledges the other. This cannot exist without division. For the ground of all union and communion in the visible Church in all the Ordinances of Christ is the unity of the visible Church, as Augustine urged even in ancient times. Therefore ecclesiastical union must be established and maintained in a Church by unity in its Government. For although there may be forbearance and a kind of peace where the unity of the visible Church is denied, or where there are divided Governments that are not subordinate to one another, yet there can be no Church-union, nor communion in the Ordinances of Word, Sacraments, and Government, which results from the former and necessarily presupposes it.

We dare not and cannot offer any directions for establishing union here except that men should unite in one form of Government capable of extending to the whole body, and that it should be a Government allowed by Christ. Otherwise it can be no true union, because such union would not be a duty, as union itself is.

If it is asked, What kind of Government is most likely to be that in which men ought to unite? Answer: We do not intend to digress into a doctrinal debate; yet these characteristics may be given of it.

1. It must be a Government capable of extending to and reaching the whole body. For one principal end of Government is union, Ephesians 4:3, 10, 11, and following, and the removing of offenses which produce divisions, Matthew 18. And this union is not to exist merely in this or that particular part of the body, but throughout the whole, 1 Corinthians 12, that there may be no schism in the body. Therefore the Government must extend to all, or at least be capable of doing so.

2. It should be suitably fitted to remove those causes that produce divisions, for there cannot be union in a Government that is not fitted for this purpose. Therefore it must be capable of purging corrupt teachers and the leaven of corrupt doctrine out of the whole Church, or any part of it. Hence, both in Scripture and in the primitive times, and throughout the Church’s history, there has continually been a joint authoritative concurrence for removing these causes of evil wherever they appeared.

3. It must be such a Government as has unity among all the Governors for this end, and thus it must correspond to the unity of the body. Hence, in the Epistle to the Galatians, Paul commits the remedying of that evil to them all jointly, as being one lump, without respect to their subdivision into particular Churches. And if this Authority did not imply unity among the Governors wherever they lived, and a capacity to act unitedly when occasion required, there could be no authoritative means of removing such evils from the Church, nor sufficient weight in the remedy applied.

4. It must be a Government in which there is coordination among the Governors, because in this way not only is the union of the Church established, but her communion is represented. To place the Government in one person, as the Papists do in the Pope, does not establish union in Government, which implies a mutual and proper coordination and association of one with another. Whatever union they may claim for such a system, it is really only tyranny, such as the most arbitrary ruler may possess when by violence he appears to suppress all divisions beneath him; neither can such a body properly be said to be united in him.

And we see in the primitive times, even after Bishops and Patriarchs had been introduced into the Church, that the supreme Government by which union was maintained still resided in a mutual coordination and combination even of such Bishops, Metropolitans, Patriarchs, and others, acting in a united and joint manner. From this it plainly appears that such a Government as men are to unite in must extend to the body, or at least be capable of being so extended, and must consist in a coordination and association of many Church officers together. Such subordinations as destroy this coordination and equality must therefore be removed before there can be a united Government for preserving the union of the Church, because the supreme Government and decision must reside in many; and many of different degrees and positions cannot be united in the same manner as those who are of the same order, so to speak.

Yet we think that where such union in Government cannot be attained, men who have liberty to follow their duty without entangling their own consciences ought to do so with all tender respect to the edification and union of the Church in which they live, and should make the best use of their particular circumstances for that end. But seeing that the wisdom and goodness of God have made it our lot in this Land to live under a Government to which the above-mentioned characteristics well agree, it is hopeful that, if we conscientiously adhere to its principles as we ought, we may, yea, shall unite in the Lord.

Secondly, supposing that men agree concerning the same supreme Government, namely Councils and Synods, there may nevertheless be some debate concerning their formal constitution: What is to be accounted a rightly constituted Synod, and what Synod ought to be acknowledged as such?

It cannot be denied that there is a right and a wrong in this matter, that there are rules to be observed, and that in fact these rules may sometimes be broken even where there is no fault in the substance of what is determined. It is also true that we sometimes find worthy men questioning the constitution of Synods and declining them, as was formerly mentioned, refusing to appear before them until certain persons were removed from them. Thus Chrysostom and forty-two Bishops with him acted in reference to that particular Synod at Chalcedon. Sometimes also their Acts were declared void because the meetings were insufficiently numerous. Balsamon gives as an instance the case of one Johannes Amathuntus, whose deposition was declared null because all the Bishops of Cyprus had not been convened for his trial, though they might have been, and because, by strict reckoning, there was one fewer present at his deposition than was required by the Canons.

Yet concerning this we say:

1. It will be found very difficult to identify such defects in the constitution of a Synod as will render the Synod itself null apart from consideration of the substance of its proceedings, seeing that there may be many defects which do not imply this.

2. It will be difficult to gather from Church history, the writings of the Ancients, or the Canons of Councils what was regarded by them as an absolute rule by which to proceed in such a case. Their practices in this respect are so various that it appears they always gave greater weight to the substance of the matter than to the formal constitution.

3. Accordingly, we find their practice to have been this: when the matter was sound and profitable, it was accepted and the Synod was reverenced, although it possessed less formality and consisted of a smaller number. Thus the Councils of Sardica and Laodicea, and certain particular Provincial Synods, have always possessed great authority because of the substance of their decisions, whereas more numerous Synods, possessing more formalities, have never been so highly regarded or reckoned among the General Councils, although their numbers were far greater than many of the others.

4. When they came to determine anything after the close of corrupt Synods, they did not ordinarily sift their formal constitution, but examined and condemned the substance of their decisions, repealed their Sentences, and accounted them null from the beginning—not because they questioned the Authority of those who had pronounced them, but because they had acted unjustly. This may be seen in the cases of Athanasius, Eustathius, Chrysostom, and Ignatius, who followed Chrysostom in the same See. All their depositions were accounted null because of the unjust violence employed in them.

5. We say, then, that it will hardly be observed that consideration of the constitution of a particular Synod has itself been the origin or ground of division among godly and orthodox men who agreed in the same Truth, Form of Government, and Rules for constituting Assemblies or Synods. Rather, wherever Declinatures or Protestations are mentioned, we will ordinarily find: 1. that the party declined was palpably corrupt in fundamental doctrines; or, 2. was palpably pursuing that general corrupt design and exercising violence against particular persons in service of it; and, 3. that this occurred only after many evidences of such corruption and violence had appeared, as is clear from the former examples of Declinatures. We find Synods initially acknowledged, and yet, upon the discovery of their corrupt designs and violence, afterward declined and protested against as null, as happened with that second Council at Ephesus. From this it appears that, had their proceedings been acceptable, their constitution and authority would not have been called into question.

If it is asked, supposing that a difference concerning the constitution of a particular Synod, and a division upon that account, should arise among godly and orthodox Divines who agree in the same Truths, Form of Government, general Rules for constituting Synods, and so forth, what should be done for union in such a case?

Answer: It would seem that there should be little need to give directions here, the difference being so narrow. Certainly many of the Ancients, and also many of our Reformers and eminent Divines who have groaned, and still groan, under many grievous pressures, corruptions, and divisions in the Church, would have considered, and would still consider, it a great mercy to have the difference reduced to such a point and to exist between such parties. Yet, seeing it is all too possible for men to insist upon such a difference, we conceive that it is no such thing as should make union between the differing parties impossible. We say, therefore:

1. Such persons should consider how little usefulness and weight, with respect to the principal work of edification, there is in the thing controverted, whichever way it is decided. For, first, declaring such a Synod valid or null with respect to its constitution does not corrupt any point of Truth, introduce any new Form of Government, or alter any Rule concerning the agreed Form. For the question is not in thesi, What is the form and rule according to which a Synod ought to be constituted? That is already agreed upon. The question is simply whether this particular Synod agrees with that Rule. Respect for the Rule leads the one party to say that they cannot approve it, and the other to say that they cannot condemn it. And is it of great importance to the principal edification of the Church to say that it is valid or invalid, considered abstractly, or supposing that it should never be determined at all?

2. We say that it is not of great importance even to Government itself to say that such a particular Synod is rightly or wrongly constituted. For although a Church cannot be without Government, nor can Government itself be cast aside, yet a Church cannot suffer much merely by questioning the constitution of one Synod, even supposing that Synod to have been rightly constituted, when the question is considered apart from the substance of its decisions. If its decisions are warrantable, they possess weight in themselves apart from the consideration of the Synod’s constitution; and if they are not warrantable, the fact that they were enacted by a lawfully constituted Synod cannot make them warrantable.

Again, on the other side, accounting a particular Synod rightly constituted when it was not cannot greatly harm the Church where the Rule itself is acknowledged. For, first, this does not alter the nature of the matter determined. Second, it does not alter the proper manner of constituting Assemblies, because one particular failure in applying the Rule cannot render a Church incapable of observing that Rule in the future, especially if care is taken that no precedent is drawn from that example so as to impose some new meaning upon the Rule.

3. We say that, if any debate is of such a nature that a decision concerning it may safely be forborne, this may certainly be accounted such a debate: namely, whether a particular Synod was rightly constituted or not. For if greater corruption and inconvenience are feared, then there are more substantial matters upon which to debate and differ. If no greater corruption follows, but there remains opportunity to establish a united Government by which these suspicions may be removed, then it seems unsafe to hinder that union, and the fruit which may follow from it, by continuing to dispute about what is past.

But, to consider such a difference more closely, we may view it in two ways: 1. as it implies a difference in judgment; and 2. as it produces a difference in practice.

First, as it implies a difference in judgment, there certainly ought to be forbearance, seeing that such things are often involved in so many difficulties and contradictions concerning matters of fact that it is impossible, by exhaustive debate, to convince either party to assent to the other, especially where heat and prejudice have in some measure fixed and preoccupied the judgment. Certainly forbearance here cannot be inconsistent with the duty of Ministers, even if there were no such motive to persuade them to it.

By forbearance we understand:

1. That neither party should peremptorily press the other either to acknowledge the validity or the nullity of such a constitution.

2. There should be a forbearance from publicly debating it, or from anything that may occasion such debate, such as pressing the Acts of that Synod when no other ground supports them except the Authority of the disputed Synod. And we conceive, incidentally, that this occasion may be prevented by mutual condescension, or by a joint authoritative enactment that such and such things as may afterward prove useful should have force for all—not by virtue of the former constitution, if that is disputed, but by virtue of the present appointment—and so both parties may agree in the substance of the matter.

3. Condemning others for approving or disapproving the former constitution should be forborne; and seeing that the question is so small and comparatively inconsiderable in itself, it should not be odiously aggravated or continually insisted upon.

Secondly, considering the difference as it relates to practice, something is to be forborne and something is to be done.

1. As to forbearance: whatever might involve either party in a matter of fact contrary to their judgment should be abstained from. This forbearance in practice should be as broad as the forbearance in judgment, so that, as Cyprian says in another case, differing brethren may both retain their own judgment and practice in such matters according to their own free determination, so far as such restraints are concerned.

Neither can this forbearance disturb anyone’s peace. For if such things are indifferent, and although lawful are nevertheless not necessary, the preservation of the Church’s peace and the prevention of the offense that would otherwise follow are sufficient grounds for abstaining from them out of respect for the consciences of others. If the thing is necessary, then indeed it is not to be forborne, nor is such forbearance pleaded for here. Yet doing the thing upon the authority of that disputed Synod is not itself necessary; rather, the substance of the thing, or some other uncontested ground, may provide sufficient warrant for doing it.

2. As to what should be done, we conceive it to be this: endeavors should be made to establish some united and uncontested Authority by whose authority necessary things may be done, without infringing upon the authority of what is past in respect of those who acknowledge it, and also without requiring those who question the former authority to rest the weight of the matter upon it.

We conceive that, when this is done, neither is any conscience constrained nor is anything necessary for the Church’s good omitted. Yea, by this means there is opportunity unitedly to seek the Church’s edification without prejudice arising from the former contention. For by laying this new foundation subsequent to the former one, the Church is carried beyond that stumbling block and enabled to leave it behind. Therefore there is no reason to fear encountering such a difficulty, but rather all the more reason to make speedy progress when men may pass beyond it and leave it behind them.

This was the way taken by the Ancients in the primitive times, even when Synods in this respect might have been said to have been corrupted. When God gave opportunity, they set themselves to rectify the substance of the matter and to do concerning it whatever was fitting for the good of the Church, without raising the question of the nullity of the Synod’s formal constitution or continually insisting upon it.

Indeed, to do otherwise seems to place too much weight upon the authority or constitution of a Church Judicatory, as though, when it is regular in every formal respect, this could add something to the substance of its decision or ought to carry weight where the matter itself is not approvable. This has been avoided by Orthodox Divines, both ancient and modern, who have always looked principally to the substance of what was determined or decided.

If it is asked, What was ordinarily done in cases where the Authority seemed to have been declined? From what has been said, the answer may be gathered: both sides satisfied themselves with rectifying the matter in which there was any grievance.

Therefore, first, it will hardly be found that, when such a Declinature was expressed in one Synod, any mention of it was made in the next ensuing Synod which rectified the matter; rather, they immediately proceeded to rectify the matter itself.

Second, we will find that, where there was no express Declinature, this did not in any way strengthen a corrupt Authority, nor hinder its condemnation any more than in other Synods where such a Declinature had been made. Therefore, not so much weight should be placed upon whether a Declinature exists or not. Its continuing does not weaken Authority where Authority truly exists; and its removal, or its never having been made at all, does not add Authority where Authority is lacking, because Authority must stand or fall according to its own intrinsic grounds and warrant.

And we conceive that it is not suitable either to the Authority of Christ’s Ordinances or to the nature of His Courts that either the removal or the continuance of such a legal formality should be rigidly pressed. Such insistence involves proceedings in Christ’s Courts in too many subtleties borrowed from human laws. Moreover, supposing that a corrupt constitution may exist without such a formal Protestation, excessive emphasis upon the Protestation seems to give too much advantage to the corrupt constitution, as though there were less opportunity afterward to condemn it merely because no Protestation had been entered.

On the other side, supposing that a lawfully constituted Synod should be declined, as the Synod of Dort was lately declined by the Arminian Remonstrants, pressing too vehemently for the removal of that Declinature seems in some measure to suppose that the Synod’s constitution is less valid if the Declinature is allowed to stand.

This is to be understood only in the case presupposed, namely, where the question is not concerning the authority of Synods simply, but concerning the constitution of this or that particular Synod. The first—that is, questioning Synodical Authority itself—has been regarded as intolerable in all ages, because it strikes at the root of Church Government and Order, without which the Church cannot subsist. But the second, which acknowledges the same Government in general, acknowledges the Rules for its Constitution, and professes respect for that same Authority, is not in itself so intolerable, because it still presupposes that the Church possesses power and that the exercise of that power is necessary.

Hence we find that in the primitive times they utterly condemned appeals from Synods simply—that is, abandoning their judgment in order to resort to another Judge as more proper than, or superior to, such Synods. There are several Canons in the Councils of Africa threatening Excommunication against those who decline their Authority and appeal to Rome or to any foreign power as a superior Judge.

Yet we also find that the Councils allowed appeals from a smaller number to a greater, or from particular Councils to a general one. Yea, they allowed appeals from their own particular Synods to a more general hearing by others in the Province; and even allowed appeal to adjacent Provinces in cases where corruption might exist within one particular Province. This was enacted in the Council of Sardica, and Bishops are requested by several Canons not to regard this as derogatory to their authority, because it was entirely consistent with respect for Church Authority and Government in itself, and tended only to prevent or remedy excesses and abuses in its exercise—which, in itself, if it is not abused, is not evil.

CHAP. XIV. What is to be done in order to union about divisions concerning doctrinall determinations.

The question may concern the matter enacted by some Synod, even when there is no objection against its constitution; that is, when the matter approved by it is unsound, or when a truth is condemned, or at least is judged to be so. We are not here speaking of matters that are fundamental, but of such as are consistent with soundness of judgment in the main and with piety in those who may be upon either side. Such were the debates concerning the rebaptizing of Heretics and Schismatics, or concerning admitting them into the Church by confirmation only, and questions of that nature which may arise among orthodox men.

I suppose it would be good if judicial decisions concerning such things were not multiplied. Yet, supposing that such decisions have been passed, something should be said concerning them. Such determinations are of two sorts.

First, some are merely doctrinal. Of this kind are questions concerning the object of Predestination, the order of God’s Decrees, and such like, and possibly others of even lesser importance than these. Since these are merely doctrinal and imply no diversity in practice or Worship, there is easier access to union notwithstanding such differences, provided there is the mutual forbearance formerly mentioned, so that no one is constrained to acknowledge what has been enacted merely by virtue of such a decision.

For such a determination in a matter of Doctrine is only ministerial and declarative. Therefore, as one man may bear with another who expresses his own judgment in some things differently from him, and possibly differently from the truth also, without immediately dividing from him or greatly contending with him, so ought he to bear with a Synod and not divide from it upon that account, provided he has liberty to declare his own judgment and the reasons for it, and otherwise to conduct himself in such a way as may keep him free from the guilt which he apprehends. In the same way, a Synod ought to bear with particular men who differ from it. But by adding the second kind there will be occasion to speak more fully.

The second kind consists of such determinations as contain not only a doctrinal decision but also some practical consequences following from it. These may again be distinguished in several ways.

1. They are either such consequences and practices as imply division and opposition, or such as imply diversity only. Some consequences imply division or separation. Suppose, for example, that a Church Synod should enact that no persons should maintain communion with those whom they judge not to be godly, nor join with them in Ordinances, nor so much as sit down with them; or that persons who think otherwise could not lawfully be ordained Ministers or admitted to that office, as appears sometimes to have been determined in very numerous Synods of the Donatists. Indeed, while such Sentences remain in force and are executed accordingly, union cannot be attained upon such terms.

Again, some practices imply no division in Worship or Government, but only something which possibly is in itself unwarrantable, such as the practice of rebaptizing, which was determined and enacted by several Councils in Africa. This kind of determination may be considered either as peremptory and exclusive—that is, allowing none to act otherwise, nor permitting any to be admitted to the Ministry and Ordinances who will not undertake to do so—or as moderated, so that although it sets forth such a determination concerning the practice, it does not peremptorily press others beyond their own light. Of the first sort were the peremptory Acts of the Western Church concerning Easter, holy days, and other ceremonies. Of the latter sort were those Acts of the Council of Africa concerning the rebaptizing of Schismatics, in which none were pressed beyond their own judgment.

Again, such consequences and practices as follow Church determinations may either be presently necessary to be practiced and matters of daily practice—as, for example, if a Church should make constitutions concerning the administration of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper by mixing with their essentials certain corrupt ceremonies and additions—or they may be practices that are merely supposable and possible, while it may be exceedingly improbable, at least for the future, that there will ever be occasion actually to put them into practice.

For example, there may have been some present necessity that gave occasion for such a determination, which possibly may never recur. Suppose a Church should determine that a converted Jew or Turk should not be baptized in the same manner as others are baptized, but in some other way. It may be that there was some Jew or Turk to be baptized when that determination was passed; but that particular occasion having passed, there may be little probability that there will ever again be opportunity to put the same determination into practice, although this is not absolutely impossible. There is a great difference between these two cases; and in effect this latter case, when the occasion for it has passed, looks more like a doctrinal determination than something actually practical.

Further, we may distinguish such practices in another way. Some are positively enacted to be practiced by an authoritative Act, ordaining that in such possible cases the thing must be done in that manner; that is, when such a case occurs, men are bound to follow the determination and Ministers are accordingly to act. Other determinations do not ordain any particular practice but merely declare such a thing to be lawful. Suppose, for example, that a Synod should declare that a Minister might lawfully baptize a Jew in the manner formerly mentioned, without peremptorily ordaining that it must be done so. This is still more properly a doctrinal decision than a positive ordinance.

We may yet add one further distinction. A determination may declare such a thing lawful for Churchmen in some ecclesiastical matter. Suppose, as sometimes occurred during the primitive persecutions, that upon some question from certain Ministers it should be enacted that in such and such circumstances Ministers might flee, sell the Church’s goods, or employ certain means for their escape and deliverance, which others might possibly think unlawful.

Or the practice in the supposed case may belong to Magistrates or men in civil stations. Suppose, upon questions from Magistrates or others asking whether it were lawful to permit Jews to dwell in certain places merely for civil commerce; or whether they might eat and drink with an Ambassador of the Khan of Tartary; or assist the Chinese against the Tartars; or other such cases which, apart from the particular occasion that gave rise to the question, might never occur again.

Now suppose such a case were decided affirmatively by a Church Judicatory, and a breach followed upon it and continued even after the case itself was no longer likely ever to arise in practice, merely because of the former decision. And so with the rest of the preceding suppositions, the question is to be asked whether, and in what manner, union may respectively be attained in them.

These distinctions being premised, we come accordingly to consider how union may be established where division continues upon such grounds.

In reference to all of these, we say generally that, provided peremptoriness and self-willedness are excluded—which are expressly prohibited in a Minister—it is not impossible to attain union among faithful, sober, and orthodox men who acknowledge that mutual condescension and forbearance are necessary. This will appear as we proceed through the particular steps. In doing so, we may refer to the former general grounds already laid down and therefore be briefer in examples and reasons, because this discussion has extended beyond our intended length.

And also, because Verbum sapienti satis est—a word is sufficient for the wise—and especially because those who are concerned in these matters do not need to be instructed or persuaded by us concerning their duty, many of whom the Lord has eminently used to teach, convince, and persuade others. We shall only, as in the rest of this discussion, offer some things for their consideration which may occasion the remembrance of what they already know and awaken the zeal and affection which they possess to act accordingly.

To come, then, to the first sort of determinations, which are doctrinal, it may appear from what has been said that there can be no just ground of division upon that account. For in such things a Church may bear with particular persons, and particular persons may likewise bear with a Church.

It is not to be thought that all orthodox Divines are of the same judgment in everything decreed by the Synod of Dort, particularly concerning the object of Predestination. Yet the Synod did not create division by Censuring those who differed, nor have those who differ from that determination broken communion with the Church. Rather, they have maintained communion, and the Church’s union has not thereby been interrupted. Yet those who apprehend themselves to be right cannot but think the others to be in error.

And if this forbearance is not allowed, there can never be union in the Church unless we suppose that all must necessarily be of the same judgment concerning such things and that there should never be a decision in a Church except where there is absolute harmony. For suppose the majority decides rightly: those whose judgment was condemned would nevertheless, according to their own light, be obliged to divide, seeing that in their own judgment they are right.

It is true, I suppose, that it is not simply unlawful or harmful to truth for a Church Judicatory, out of respect for the Church’s peace, deliberately to waive a ministerial decision without thereby wronging the substance of the matter. Suppose those in Africa, for the sake of peace, had waived their judicial decision concerning the necessity of rebaptizing in such a case; or those who determined the contrary might have waived their decision. Neither party would thereby have injured its own opinion.

Or suppose that, in the decisions concerning Easter upon both sides of the controversy, either side had withdrawn its decision and left the matter in practice to men’s own discretion without any judicial determination. I suppose this would not have wronged the truth, whichever side possessed it. Indeed, considering what is written in the histories, something like this may be gathered.

For, first, it is clear that there were determinations upon both sides, and particularly that the Western Church and those who joined with it determined that the Lord’s Day must necessarily be observed for distinguishing Christians from the Jews.

2. It is also clear that Polycrates, with many Bishops in Asia, judicially condemned that practice, appointing the fourteenth day of the month to be observed. Thus both decisions could not necessarily stand together.

3. It is also clear that the way taken to settle the difference when it had been brought to this point was that judicial decisions should be waived and men left to their own discretion to observe whatever day they thought proper, whether in the Eastern or Western Church. Upon this union followed. Polycarp communicated with Anicetus at Rome upon these terms: Ut neuter eorum sententiam suam urgeret aut defenderet, as the Centuriators record from Irenaeus—that neither of them should press or defend his own opinion. Upon this peace followed notwithstanding the difference.

The controversy broke out again more strongly in the time of Victor. Although Irenaeus agreed with Victor’s judgment, he nevertheless vehemently urged him not to trouble the Church by pressing such a determination, and very seriously remonstrated with him concerning it. He also wrote to the other party so that both sides might forbear pressing such decisions and the matter might be left to men’s discretion without prejudice to the Church’s union, as had formerly been practiced.

This is clear from Church history. And that statement of Sozomen, book 7, chapter 19, is weighty: Frivolum enim, & quidem merito, judicarunt, consuetudinis gratia, à se mutuo segregari eos qui in praecipuis religionis capitibus consentirent—they judged it, and rightly so, most frivolous that those who agreed together in the principal points of Religion should separate from one another merely because of a custom.

And although this matter was not in itself a controversy expressly decided in the Word, at least as the question was then stated, yet, considering their own understanding of it and the grounds which they alleged for their positions, it was not an insignificant matter to them. Victor’s peremptoriness, when he afterward refused to be persuaded away from that second determination, is condemned by all as being the ground of the schism that followed.

Indeed, in such cases where two parts of a Church are divided, possessing authorities independent of one another, and there are contrary determinations concerning the same question, it seems convenient and necessary for peace either that both should waive their decisions, or that both should permit the decisions of the other to stand and have force only for those who acquiesce in them and willingly acknowledge them.

Again, where there is nothing resembling equality between two parties, but the division exists within the same Church between a greater and a smaller number, and the greater number will not be persuaded to remove their determination, it is in no way sinful for the smaller number to join with them notwithstanding that determination, provided their own freedom and liberty are safeguarded, as was formerly said. Yea, it seems expedient that they should do so for the good of the Church.

1. Because it is not readily to be expected that men who possess such an advantage will yield to those who do not.

2. There may be serious inconveniences if a smaller dissenting number should require a Church to waive formerly determined truths, though possibly not fundamental, merely because they are dissatisfied with them and do not regard them as truths. Such a course may also strengthen others in schism, as though they could not maintain union and communion with a Church in which anything contrary to their own judgment had been determined.

3. It seems most agreeable to reason that, in concessions that involve no sin, the smaller number should yield to the greater.

4. By doing so, this accidental confirmation of an opinion arising from having the majority of a Church or Synod on its side is left open to the other side if they should afterward become the majority.

Hence we generally see that the minority yields to the greater number—if not pressing for the removal of such a decision is to be called yielding—even when the majority was wrong. Thus, in that case in Africa, those who differed did not press for the rescinding of the determination, provided they retained their own liberty. Nor did those who then possessed the majority impose any restriction that would prevent the others from rescinding their determinations if they should afterward come into a position to do so. Both sides maintained peace for the time.

And afterward, in the days of Augustine, we find Councils of the Church of Africa determining the exact contrary concerning that question of Baptism, while still maintaining peace and communion among themselves, although the authoritative decision always stood upon the side of the majority.

CHAP. XV. What shall be done in order to union about such decisions, as have practical consequents following thereon.

To come to the second case, namely, concerning such decisions as have some practical consequences following from them: for the sake of a briefer answer, we shall lay down these Assertions.

Assertion 1. In such practices as are directly opposed to one another and necessarily imply division in the cases mentioned, there can be no union or communion expected. We see this in all the cases where such things have been practiced, as among the Novatians, Donatists, and the like. There may be more or less heat and bitterness between men who differ in this way, but there cannot be union, because such determinations and practices draw a line and build a wall of separation between one side and the other, and so cause one side to be accounted as not belonging to the same body.

Assertion 2. Where the consequences imply only some difference, or are not peremptorily pressed, they do not necessarily imply division, as we see in the cases of Africa and others formerly mentioned. Sozomen, in the chapter cited, gives many examples of diversities of this kind among Churches without any breach of communion, and says that such diversity is inevitable, because Neque easdem traditiones per omnia similes, in omnibus Ecclesiis, quamvis in omnibus consentiant, reperire possis; that is, You will hardly find the same traditions alike in every respect in all the Churches, even though they agree in all things that are substantial. And, in effect, such determinations are to those who do not acknowledge them much the same as doctrinal determinations, and men are accordingly to conduct themselves concerning them.

Assertion 3. In such practices as may arise daily because occasions for them frequently occur, union is more difficult, though not impossible, than in cases where the occasion for putting the determination into practice is improbable. For where there is no present occasion to practice the same, it appears most unwise to introduce or continue a more certain and greater evil in the Church in order to avoid something to which men may never actually be put.

And suppose the case is already past and may probably never recur: it is more conducive to the Church’s good, by refraining from approving such an act and by not becoming involved in its apprehended guilt, to restore the communion of the Church for preventing a greater harm. For that communion continues to be a duty and is necessary to edification; and the disputed act, being past, ought not to become the occasion of a present and continuing division, as was formerly said.

If it is said, How can there be union in such a case upon the principle supposed until—as one side may say—those who have decided and acted corruptly repent; and—as the other side may say—those who have unjustly divided from the Church and wronged its authority acknowledge their offense, without which there can be no union?

For answer to this we say:

1. What if neither party is ever brought to repent or acknowledge an offense? Shall the Church in such a case never attain union? Repentance implies conviction, and conviction implies information and clarity in the judgment that such a thing is wrong. Now, seeing it is often impossible to bring men to one judgment concerning such a matter, must union therefore be impossible until men are of one judgment? This has already been disproved.

2. What if this had been the mind of the Churches and Servants of God from the beginning of the world? There would never have been public ecclesiastical peace nor private Christian peace, for they were never all of one judgment. To assert or write what is supposed to be an error is proportionately a sin and an offense just as judicially determining it is; and therefore this principle would imply the necessity of repentance even in such cases before peace could be attained and differences reconciled. Shall we then at once condemn the generations of God’s People who, without proposing, or at least without pressing, such acknowledgments, have maintained peace and union among themselves?

3. This would undermine all the former grounds that plead for union with forbearance and similar means, which, I suppose, cannot warrantably be done.

4. This way either makes union still more impossible or, if union is attained in some measure, makes it both less hearty among the parties themselves and less profitable to others, as has formerly been shown.

5. We are not principally to regard in this matter the particular conduct or deserving of individuals—which possibly would not be thought of great importance by others who are not engaged in the controversy—but the Church’s good is to be regarded, and what that good requires, as may be gathered from what has already been said.

And if Church Censures—such as requiring public repentance or acknowledgment of an offense—are sometimes to be abstained from even in reference to openly corrupt teachers, out of respect for the union of the Church and for preventing the stumbling of those who are weak and prone to divide or miscarry if such persons should be Censured, as we see in Paul’s abstaining from Censuring the false teachers in Galatians 5 and 2 Corinthians 10, spoken of in the former part, much more are Censures of any sort to be abstained from upon that ground in the case here proposed, considering both the nature of the matter and the persons who differ.

Hence we may see what condescension has formerly been used in such cases when union has been concluded or proposed, even in matters possibly of greater importance than those now supposed: Sine detrimento honoris, aut charitatis; that is, without prejudice to reputation or charity.

6. We therefore say, in opposition to that objection, that union is to be sought by endeavoring to join together in what promotes the good of the Church, and by burying resentment concerning one another’s wrongs, rather than—as Beza says in the formerly cited Epistle to Grindal concerning division—making too curious and, as it were, contentious an inquiry into who is most at fault, and thereby bringing the matter to such a point that the whole body cannot be saved except by cutting off some of its members.

7. We add: if repentance is necessary, will anyone think that division is the way or means of attaining it? Division rather embitters men and confirms them respectively in their own opinions and opposition, as has formerly been said.

There will now be little difficulty in answering concerning the last two cases, namely, when the decision is simply a declaration of the lawfulness of a thing, without any positive appointment that such a thing should actually be put into practice, and so forth. For if, upon the former grounds, union may be attained and division removed in the preceding cases, it may much more readily be attained in this one—especially where the matter determined concerns practices which would actually be performed only in some extraordinary case by Civil Powers.

For in such cases men may more easily condescend to forbearance than in matters of greater necessity and importance. And there can be very little prejudice alleged as likely to follow upon the Church—to be weighed in the balance against the Church’s peace—either by agreeing that such a determination should be waived, or by allowing it to stand with the qualifications formerly mentioned.

It is true that obstinate insistence upon the smallest particular, and a peremptory refusal to condescend concerning it, will produce a breach and schism and make union as impossible as if the greatest matter imaginable were the ground of separation. Yet it would seem that, in the case presupposed, especially when the last three considerations are taken together, judicious, sober, and godly men should very easily be induced to condescend to one another, with the qualifications formerly mentioned, for the Church’s peace.

For:

1. The matter, although there is a right and wrong in it, is nevertheless among the least of those truths that may be accounted as relating to the foundation.

2. It concerns a matter most unlikely ever to arise in practice and which possibly may never occur.

3. It is a determination, or exercise of Church power, that has very little influence upon Church matters, seeing that it positively ordains nothing.

4. It concerns something largely external to the Church, which might have been put into practice, and ordinarily is put into practice, without the Church’s intermeddling in it either pro or contra. It therefore seems unsuitable that a determination concerning such practices should be greatly contended for when neither the continuing of the decision can procure the practice concerning which it speaks, nor the removal of the decision hinder that practice.

5. Supposing the qualifications formerly mentioned, allowing such a decision to stand does not strengthen the affirmative opinion, because it imposes no bond or obligation upon others who do not of their own accord acquiesce in it. Nor does it give grounds for alleging such a decision against anyone except those who are themselves persuaded by the substance of it.

Therefore, seeing that it has no force to bind any more persons than would be bound by the substance of the matter even if the decision did not exist, neither can it imply that this is simply the judicial decision and judgment of the whole Church. It amounts only to this: that it is the judgment of the majority for the time, while it is not acknowledged by others, who are not to be constrained by that determination to alter either their judgment or their practice any more than if the determination had never existed. This is a necessary qualification of the forbearance formerly mentioned. And if the decision were waived, these same particulars would remain true.

Again, upon the other side, removing that decision does not strengthen the negative position, for such a reconciliation is not intended to strengthen either side; nor does allowing the decision to stand weaken the negative position. For, according to the qualifications formerly mentioned, not only can no Censure follow upon it, but even with respect to the Determination itself, although it is not formally removed so as to cease being a decision in itself, it is nevertheless no binding decision upon those who dissent from it, nor can it be alleged against their opinion any more than if it did not exist.

Thus its force extends only to those who approve its substance, and it binds only such as account themselves bound. If men account themselves bound, removing such a decision will not release them; and if they do not otherwise account themselves bound, allowing it to stand in such a case will not bind them.

Therefore, in effect, we suppose it is hardly imaginable that there could be a lesser ground of division, provided that the qualifications necessary for union in cases of greater importance are granted here. Certainly we know of no instance in which division was continued upon a lesser ground, whichever side we consider. For, with respect to its effectiveness and weight in producing any result, such a decision is for the future virtually as though it had never existed.

And we are sure that those great Divines who so earnestly pursued and so greatly desired union would have considered themselves happy if they might have attained it by condescending and yielding either to the one side or the other in such a case.

And although the moderate Divine Bucer was thought to thirst after peace in the Church so vehemently that some zealous men said that, out of love for it, he was almost ready haurire faeces—to drink down the dregs along with it—yet I am confident that, had the state of the controversy been reduced to such a narrow point, concerning such a matter and among such men as have formerly been supposed, he would not have been so charged even by the most rigid, although for the peace of the Church he had drunk down all the dregs that might have been in both cups, provided the qualifications already mentioned were observed.

For I suppose that either removing or allowing such a decision to stand, under the foregoing qualifications, will be found inconsistent neither with any Confession of Faith, even the fullest that has ever existed in any Orthodox Church; nor with the Fundamentals of Religion laid down in any Catechisms or writings of any sound Divines; nor with those Constitutions and Acts which have been regarded as necessary to be enrolled among the Acts of any Council or Synod. Nor, so far as we know, will it be found to have been the matter of debate even in the most contentious times among Orthodox Divines.

It would seem, then, that if there is any latitude that may safely be allowed for one party to condescend to another for the good of the Church, it must certainly be in the case presupposed.