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CHAP. VII. General Grounds Leading to Unity.

But now, it may be more difficult to speak particularly about what is actually the duty at such a time when a Church lies under rents and divisions. For though the general principle is granted, yet often it is difficult to determine the particular cure, and still more difficult sincerely to follow it. It is always easier to prescribe rules to others than to follow them ourselves, especially in such a case when spirits are in the heat and fervor of contention, whereby they are somewhat drunk with affection for their own side and prejudice against the other, and distracted, as it were, with a sort of madness in pursuing their adversaries, as that great and meek Divine Melanchthon expressed it, so that it is hard to bring affections that are in such a temper into captivity to the obedience of light.

And though we will not undertake to be particular and fully satisfying in this, wishing and hoping that it may be more effectually done by someone else, yet, having come this far, we shall, in an abstract manner, consider some things in reference to it and endeavor to set forth what we conceive to be the duty, especially of the Ministers of the Gospel who have an interest in such a Church; as also what may be required of others who may possibly think themselves less concerned therein. We shall keep this order: we shall lay down some general grounds, which we suppose to be granted; we shall premise some preparatory endeavors agreeable to the same; we shall speak negatively of what ought not to be done, or ought to be forborne; positively of the healing means called for in reference to several sorts of division, with some questions arising thereupon; and lastly, we shall consider the grounds that press the serious and condescending application of these or other healing means in such a case.

The first general ground, which we take for granted, is this: that by way of precept there is an absolute necessity of uniting laid upon the Church, so that it does not fall under debate whether a Church should continue divided or united, any more than it falls under debate whether there should be preaching, praying, keeping of the Sabbath, or any other commanded duty, seeing that union is both commanded as a duty and commended as eminently tending to the edification of the Church, and therefore is so frequently joined with edification. Nor is it to be asked by a Church what is to be done for the Church’s good in a divided way, thereby supposing a dispensation, as it were, to be given for division and for forbearing the use of means for attaining union; or rather, supposing a settling or fixing of division, and yet notwithstanding thinking to carry on edification. It is true that where union cannot be attained among orthodox Ministers who agree in all main things—for of such only we speak—Ministers are to make the best use of the opportunities they have, and in the meantime to seek the edification of the Church. Yet that men should by agreement establish a division in the Church or dispense with it, and prefer the continuance of division as more suitable for edification than union, we suppose is altogether unwarrantable. First, because that is not the Lord’s Ordinance, and therefore cannot be undertaken in faith, nor can the blessing be expected which the Lord commands to those who are in unity. Second, because Christ’s Church is but one Body, and this would be deliberately to alter its nature; and although those who deny this truth may admit of division, they cannot have union, that is, proper Church-union, which is union in Government, Sacraments, and other Ordinances, because union or communion in these results from this principle. Yet it is impossible for those who maintain the principle of the unity of the Catholic visible Church to own a divided way of administering Government or other Ordinances without implying either that one party has no interest in the Church, or that one Church may be many; and so that its unity in its visible state is to no purpose. This, then, we take for granted. And though possibly it is not attainable in all cases, because the fault may be upon one side, which possibly will not act unitedly with others, yet this is still to be endeavored, and every opportunity is to be taken for promoting the same.

The second ground which we suppose is this: that as union is always a duty, so, we conceive, if the men concerned will do their duty, there can be no division among orthodox Divines or Ministers which it is not also possible to compose, and union is therefore attainable. We are not speaking of composing divisions that are founded upon fundamental things, nor are we speaking of removing all differences, as if all men were to be one in judgment in every point of truth; there may be difference where there is no division. Nor, when we speak of men doing their duty, do we mean a complete attainment of everything in knowledge and practice, and that in a sanctified manner, though that ought to be endeavored. But it refers principally to doing their duty in reference to this particular matter of attaining union, a great part of which consists in outward and obvious things, which require neither sanctification in the person absolutely nor perfection in degree, some of which we may afterward mention. So that the meaning is, if we consider union in itself, apart from men’s corruptions—which will make the least thing impossible when they are active—it is a thing possible, according to the acknowledged principles by which sober, orthodox men usually walk, as experience has often proven, and as reason demonstrates in the particulars afterward to be given. This consideration ought all the more strongly to stir up the endeavor of this duty, although often through men’s corruption it has been frustrated.

Thirdly, we premise that in endeavoring after union and healing, men should not restrict it to a universal union in everything, in judgment and practice, but should resolve to have it with many things defective that require forbearance in persons who are united, which we may consider in these particulars. There may be difference of judgment in many things, I mean in such things as are consistent with the foundation and edification; and such forbearance should be resolved upon. To do otherwise would be to think either that men had no reason at all, or that their understandings were perfect, or at least of equal reach. There may be dissatisfaction with many persons, whether Officers or Members; and to expect a Church free from unworthy Officers or Members, and to defer Church-union on that account, is to expect the barn floor to be without chaff, and to frustrate the many commands by which this duty is urged. For certainly our Lord Jesus gave this command to His disciples when Judas was among them, and Paul gave it and practiced it when some preached out of envy, and when almost all sought their own things and not the things of Christ. And certainly, if people ought to conduct themselves toward corrupt Ministers who nevertheless do not destroy the foundation, as Ministers, performing the duties that become them in communion with such Ministers while they continue in that office, then certainly Ministers ought to maintain that communion with other Ministers which becomes their relations, seeing they are still Ministers in that respect as well as in the other. And if this corruption will not warrant separation in other Ordinances, neither will it warrant division in the ordinance of Government.

It may also be consistent with many particular failings and defects in the exercise of Government, such as possibly the sparing of some corrupt Officers and Members; the censuring of some unjustly; or the admission of some who are unfit for the Ministry, and such like. These indeed are faults, but they are not such as make a Church no Church; and though these have sometimes been alleged as causes of schisms and divisions in the Church in practice, yet they were never defended as just grounds of schisms and divisions, but were always condemned by all Councils and Fathers, and cannot reasonably be sustained. For otherwise no union could be expected here, unless we supposed that men who have corruption could not fall into these faults. It is not unlikely that some of these were present in the primitive Churches; something of this is suggested in Revelation concerning those Church Officers, in their tolerating Jezebel and the Nicolaitans to seduce the people and to commit fornication; yet neither separation nor division is called for or allowed, either among Ministers or people. Surely there were such corrupt acts of all kinds among the Jewish Church Officers; yet it is clear that Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea continued to govern jointly notwithstanding them, and yet cannot be counted accessory to any of their deeds. For men in such cases have opportunity, even when they are present, to discountenance such corrupt acts by not consenting to them and by testifying against them. By doing so, they may stand in the way of many wicked acts which, by dividing, they cannot do, which is sufficient for their exoneration both before God and men, as we see in the instances of Joseph and Nicodemus, who continued united in the Government and attended the meetings even when sentences were passed against those who acknowledged Christ, and orders were given for persecuting Him and them. Yet they are declared free because they dissented from and testified against the same. Their freedom and exoneration by virtue of their dissent while present is more solemnly recorded to their honor in the Gospel than if they had divided. And yet the unity of the Church now has the same ground, and no fewer motives to urge it, than it had then. Union may also stand with some defects in Worship, manner of Government, and rules that are necessary for good Government in a Church. It is likely that many things of that kind were defective in the Church of Corinth, where the Sacrament was administered so disorderly, there was confusion in many things of Worship, and some things were still to be set in order; yet nowhere does the Apostle urge union more than in these Epistles. Neither can it be thought that perfection in all these things is ever to be expected, or that union is to be delayed until such a time. If there are defects of that kind, it is union and not division that is to be looked upon as the commended means for correcting them.

If it is asked, then, with what kind of defects or causes of dissatisfaction may a union be formed, or what rules may be followed therein, we offer these considerations or rules. First, what cannot warrant a breach where there is union cannot warrantably be made the ground for keeping up a division. There are many miscarriages or defects which are truly gross, and yet will not warrant a schism. The reason is that repairing a breach is no less a duty than preventing one; and if it began upon such a ground, then continuing it upon the same ground is simply continuing in the same sin, and it cannot be thought that any party, by dividing upon an unjust ground, can afterward be justified upon that same ground. It remains, therefore, that if the ground was not sufficient at first to warrant a separation or division, it cannot afterward be sufficient to continue the same.

Second, such defects as do not make communion in a Church and in its Ordinances sinful will not warrant a separation or division from the same. It is acknowledged by all that there is no separation from a true Church in such Ordinances as men may communicate in without sin, although others may be guilty therein. Suppose, for example, that men have access to Government without such bonds and engagements, and such like, as may hinder their freedom in following the light of the Word in deciding whatever shall come before them, even though others should step beyond the same.

Third, men may keep communion with a Church when their calling leads them to it upon the one side, and they have access to the discharge of the same upon the other. If some acts belonging to a man’s station lead him to a united way of acting, as the duties of a settled Minister do, then he is obliged to follow the duties of his calling while there is no physical or moral impediment barring him from the same; and others being defective in their duty will not absolve him from his own duty, which he owes by virtue of his station.

Fourth, while the general rules tending to edification in the main are acknowledged, union is to be kept even though there is much failing in their application, because there are suitable means to make use of, and who knows but the sincere and zealous use of them may help in their application? If there is a failure therein, it is the deed of the person who misapplies them, and does not involve anyone else in that guilt; besides, by joint and united action, much of that misapplication may, through God’s blessing, be prevented.

Fifth, there may and ought to be union when the evils that follow division or schism are greater and more hurtful to the Church than the evils that may be supposed to follow upon union. I do not speak of evils of sin, for the least of these are never to be chosen, but of evils and inconveniences that may indeed be hurtful to the Church in themselves, and sinful in respect of some persons, yet are not so to all. Among such evils the lesser is to be chosen, because uniting and acting jointly in a Church-way belongs to the polity and Government of the Church, wherein Christian prudence is to have a principal hand. So that when things cannot be done simply as men would desire, they are to do as they may comparatively; that is, to choose and make use of what may be most edifying and least hurtful to the Church’s edification among all those means that appear probable and possible. Thus the conscience may have this testimony, that the way having the fewest inconveniences and the greatest advantages for edification was chosen; and though some inconveniences afterward occur, yet the conscience may be quiet upon this ground. Sometimes the Lord in His providence will order matters of Government so that no side can be chosen without inconveniences.

If it is asked, then, how men may discern the side to be followed in such a case when inconveniences threaten on every side, the answer is by observing which side has the most dangerous and destructive inconveniences, which inconveniences are most certain and inevitable, and which duty the command urges. Union has the advantage over division because it is a commanded means tending to edification, which division is not. Division has no fewer inconveniences following it, nor are they less destructive to the Church, than those of union in the case supposed. Schism is one of the greatest injuries that can come upon an orthodox Church, next to heresy in Doctrine, and therefore no particular evil can be weighed against it. The evils of division are most inevitable; the evils that follow union may, through God’s blessing, be prevented, but division itself is outside God’s appointed way.

When men may unite without personal guilt or accession to the defects or guilt of others, there may and ought to be union, even though there are failings and defects of several kinds in a Church. Men are accountable not for other men’s miscarriages, but for their own, and no such Church-state is to be expected as is free from defects. It cannot warrant a man to abstain from his duty because others do not perform theirs, while there is no sinful impediment lying in the way of his access to it. Such impediments may include these: if a person is required to condemn anything he thinks lawful in his own former practice or in the practice of others, or in some point of Doctrine, though extrinsic, if it is to him a point of truth; if he is required to approve the deed and practice of others which he accounts sinful, or to affirm as truth something he accounts an error; or when some engagement is required for the future which restrains him from any duty called for, or that may afterward be called for. These things involve persons in the sin of what is past and make them accessory to inconveniences that may come, defiling their conscience. Such entanglements are to be forborne; but where no such thing exists, there may be access to union, even where there are many public defects.

For attaining union, there ought to be large mutual condescension; that is, both sides ought to stretch themselves, not only to forbear what is sinful, nor only to condescend to what may be thought simply necessary, but condescension ought to be mutual and proportioned according as expediency calls for, with respect to the edification of the Church. Many infirmities of others are to be forborne, and things otherwise unreasonable in respect of those men with whom we deal ought, for the Church’s peace, to cause men to yield. If there ought to be condescension for private peace, much more ought there to be for Church peace and public edification.

In what may involve a man in sin, or in approving sin in others, there is no condescension beyond the utmost boundary of duty. Condescension should be mutual, so that one party does not expect full submission from the other, for that is dominion, not union. Even that party which seems most right in the matter, or to have authority on its side, ought nevertheless to condescend, and in some things to be the most condescending, because they are in some sense parents and strong; they ought therefore to bear with and cover the infirmities of the weak, and to conduct themselves seriously toward others whom they suppose to be in a distemper. Authority is given for edification, and it is not unsuitable for authority to condescend in order to attain its end. Often the most tender and sincere, and those who were upon the right side, have been the most condescending, while those who were in the wrong were most averse to condescension. Those who have condescended most in such things have been regarded as the greatest friends of the Church, even sometimes when their side was not as justifiable as the other.

From what has been said, we may lay down negative conclusions concerning the repairing of a breach among godly and orthodox men where a Church has harmony in the fundamental points, Faith, Worship, and Government, and where the flourishing of the Gospel is mutually intended. Division ought not to be removed in such a way as destroys or ruins either side, because that is not for the good of the whole. Every part and side in such a case is a part of the body, although it may not be very considerable, and it is no wisdom to cut off a member of the body to cure a distemper when gentler means might recover it. That way of uniting is not to be admitted, but shunned, which may prevent any Minister or member fit for edifying the Church from having access to do so. Union should be attempted with all due respect from each side toward the other, without any mark of disrespect. No merely authoritative means is the proper and only way of healing a divided Church; the remedy must extend to both sides. Authority is often declined in such cases, and when declined cannot accomplish the end; the remedy must suit the Church in its distemper, as a sick body is nourished with food suitable to its condition, sometimes pleasing the taste when more wholesome things will not be received. Both judgments must be informed and affections gained by prudent and affectionate means. Union is urged more by persuasions, entreaties, reasons, and the evils that follow the lack of it than by authority, and must be persuaded rather than commanded. Among such persons, private and particular condescension is most becoming to that respect which each owes to the other.

Fifthly, we premise that, even if sufficient condescension should fail upon one side, yet the other ought to condescend fully as far as is possible. For Church-union among Churchmen is no civil bargain in which to haggle, but what is possible is duty out of obedience to God, who commands peace in other things—and so much more in this—as far as is possible, or as far as lies in men. And respect is to be had for the Church’s good, whose advantage we should seek even though others are defective; and often such condescension gains more for the advantage of the Church, and for the commendation of the party condescending, than if there had been greater insistence upon one’s position, as we may see in that praiseworthy instance of Basil’s conduct, who insisted upon nothing, but absolutely laid aside what was contended for, without respect to his own right or injury, for the Church’s good. And often it is one party waiting for the other’s condescension, or taking occasion from their tenaciousness to hold firm themselves, that keeps the distance at its height.

Often in such debates as are among orthodox Divines and Ministers, it seems they might be removed if one party would condescend according to the qualifications and cautions formerly laid down; yea, it seems it would be safer for the Church’s good in such a case for either party practically to condescend to the way of the other than that division should be kept up upon such grounds. For it is not supposed here that there is any matter of Faith in question among such persons; often there was full harmony in the Confessions of Faith, as in the instances cited. There is no question concerning Government simply, nor concerning Councils and Canons; these also were acknowledged. None disclaimed the General Councils or their acts. The question often is not among them whether others should be brought to their opinion or not, I mean as to the point upon which the division turns; but often it is either upon some misunderstood expression of another, or an error in some lesser point of Truth. And in such a case there is that saying of the great Augustine: “Disputable errors, or uncertain faults, are not in their pursuit to be preferred to certain peace.” Or it is concerning some particular act of Government, or other miscarriages arising from misapplying rules, or not walking according to them, or something of that kind, as occurred in contrary Ordinations of orthodox men and such like. In these cases, we say—and it will be found from History—that it would always have been better for the Church if either side had practically condescended to allow the other to rule and govern, while personally keeping themselves free from accession to their guilt, whether of perverseness, negligence, or the like, than to have raised or maintained divisions upon such grounds. For often orthodox and otherwise blameless men have, by such divisions, been made factious and carnal in their conduct, and largely useless, who otherwise, had they been free from that temptation, might have proved sober and profitable; and when the temptation was over, they were found to be such.

We may observe that, though in the primitive times there were various schisms and divisions concerning Synods and Government, yet we will find that these contests and divisions arose from the matter and particular acts and proceedings thereof, and that there was hardly ever a division founded upon the formal constitution of a Council or Synod; nor was much distinction made between declining their authority and declining the Acts or Censures passed by them. Concerning this we may observe these general points.

If the matter concluded by many Bishops and Churchmen was right and satisfactory, there was an acquiescing in its authority. If the matter was displeasing and hurtful, whatever its form and however great its number, its authority was not much respected, because authority consisted only in adding weight to those things, as we may see in the Arian Councils, which were often very numerous, and others also that were erroneous and otherwise corrupt. Although there was no formal declinature of them, or protestation against them as null, and though there were sometimes some dissenters in them, yet their authority was in no way confirmed by the absence of such Protestations or Declinatures. Sometimes we find worthy men appearing before and answering even most corruptly constituted Synods, as occurred in those same times; and although they were sentenced and deposed by them, yet they never esteemed those Sentences to have any greater authority on that account, as we may see in the case of Athanasius, Chrysostom, and many others. Sometimes they protested against Synods as null when they saw violence and iniquity prevail, as was done in the Council of Antioch in the case of Eustathius, and in the second Council of Ephesus by Flavianus and Anatolius. Sometimes also, upon a perceived danger and the designs of professedly corrupt enemies, Protestations were drawn up in writing beforehand, as in that Protestation which the Reformers in Germany issued against the Council of Trent after it was called, because there was no probable opportunity for Truth to have liberty in speaking and equity in judgment. And as Sleidan records it, they alleged Cyril as the first practitioner of this when the Arians prevailed. This, we may see, was their practice when they had to do with professed enemies: not insisting upon formalities, but upon what was material. And again, among themselves, the orthodox did not usually insist upon trying and scrutinizing the formal constitution of any of these Councils—for certainly, in such corruptions as were so universal, Synods corrupt in the majority of their members might have been held with all the formalities and solemnities that could be required in the external constitution of any lawful Synod—but when they had occasion to meet, they proceeded to do what was for the present good of the Church, condemning the substance of such corrupt Synods, which they accounted sufficient in such cases. And for differences among themselves, when they were of a right temper, they also endeavored to redress such particulars as needed correction, and to restore persons unjustly sentenced, and the like; whereby it appears that the substance of the matter, both in things of general and particular concernment, always carried the greatest weight.

Although such debates concerning Government seem easiest to remove, yet often, and almost always, they have been the most difficult to heal, and have been followed by the greatest bitterness and contention in the Church. For different Judgments simply, and also different Ceremonies and different practices in other things, may exist without direct opposition or counteracting, and may either be more easily borne or removed. But when it comes to Government—whose Sentence shall stand, whose Ordination shall be acknowledged, who shall have authority to decide such and such things, and the like—it is far otherwise. Hence it came to pass that men could maintain union and communion with others who differed from them in far greater points of Truth; but toward persons who did not acknowledge their Authority, or who acknowledged those who disputed that Authority, they could by no means so condescend. For in Government, men’s own particular interest is more concerned than in points of Truth, and that consideration imperceptibly steals in upon them. In Government the question is not only about what is past, but there is also fear of what may come. Hence men who have some testimony within themselves that they are not ambitious for Government, yet having developed a prejudice against others, become suspicious that if such persons had power, they would miscarry, not only in reference to them but in reference to matters of public concern. And therefore, in removing such a division concerning Government, the great difficulty is not so much to heal and remove what is past as to prevent the fear of what may come if such persons continue to govern. And this causes the result of such division to be that either they themselves, or those in whom they particularly have confidence, may have the weight of Government upon them. This may indeed be aimed at with some sincerity, because, being somewhat alienated by prejudice, they do not think it fitting for the good of the work, at least during that time, that any others should have such trust. And this caused the heat of debates in times of division to break out mainly in the ordination of Bishops and the planting of Churches, because by that means their interest in the Government was maintained, whereby there was afterward opportunity for the management of every other matter according as this succeeded.

CHAP. VII. General Grounds leading to Unity.

But now, it may be more difficult to speak particularly about what is actually the duty at such a time when a Church lies under rents and divisions. For though the general principle is granted, yet often it is difficult to determine the particular cure, and still more difficult sincerely to follow it. It is always easier to prescribe rules to others than to follow them ourselves, especially in such a case when spirits are in the heat and fervor of contention, whereby they are somewhat drunk with affection for their own side and prejudice against the other, and distracted, as it were, with a sort of madness in pursuing their adversaries, as that great and meek Divine Melanchthon expressed it, so that it is hard to bring affections that are in such a temper into captivity to the obedience of light.

And though we will not undertake to be particular and fully satisfying in this, wishing and hoping that it may be more effectually done by someone else, yet, having come this far, we shall, in an abstract manner, consider some things in reference to it and endeavor to set forth what we conceive to be duty, especially for the Ministers of the Gospel who have an interest in such a Church; as also what may be required of others who may possibly think themselves less concerned therein. We shall keep this order: we shall lay down some general grounds, which we suppose to be granted; we shall premise some preparatory endeavors agreeable to the same; we shall speak negatively of what ought not to be done, or ought to be forborne; positively of the healing means called for in reference to several sorts of division, with some questions arising thereupon; and lastly, we shall consider the grounds that urge the serious and condescending application of these or other healing means in such a case.

The first general ground, which we take for granted, is this: that by way of precept there is an absolute necessity of uniting laid upon the Church, so that it does not fall under debate whether a Church should continue divided or united, any more than it falls under debate whether there should be preaching, praying, keeping of the Sabbath, or any other commanded duty, seeing that union is both commanded as a duty and commended as eminently tending to the edification of the Church, and therefore is so frequently joined with edification. Nor is it to be asked by a Church what is to be done for the Church’s good in a divided way, thereby supposing a dispensation, as it were, to be given for division and for forbearing the use of means for attaining union; or rather, supposing a settling or fixing of division, and yet notwithstanding thinking to carry on edification. It is true that where union cannot be attained among orthodox Ministers who agree in all main things—for of such only we speak—Ministers are to make the best use of the opportunities they have, and in the meantime to seek the edification of the Church. Yet that men should by agreement establish a division in the Church or dispense with it, and prefer the continuance of division as more suitable for edification than union, we suppose is altogether unwarrantable. First, because that is not the Lord’s Ordinance, and therefore cannot be undertaken in faith, nor can the blessing be expected which the Lord commands to those who are in unity. Second, because Christ’s Church is but one Body, and this would be deliberately to alter its nature; and although those who deny this truth may admit of division, they cannot have union, that is, proper Church-union, which is union in Government, Sacraments, and other Ordinances, because union or communion in these results from this principle. Yet it is impossible for those who maintain the principle of the unity of the Catholic visible Church to own a divided way of administering Government or other Ordinances without implying either that one party has no interest in the Church, or that one Church may be many; and so that its unity in its visible state is to no purpose. This, then, we take for granted. And though possibly it is not attainable in all cases, because the fault may be upon one side, which possibly will not act unitedly with others, yet this is still to be endeavored, and every opportunity is to be taken for promoting the same.

The second ground which we suppose is this: that as union is always a duty, so, we conceive, if the men concerned will do their duty, there can be no division among orthodox Divines or Ministers which it is not also possible to compose, and union is therefore attainable. We are not speaking of composing divisions that are founded upon fundamental things, nor are we speaking of removing all differences, as if all men were to be one in judgment in every point of truth; there may be difference where there is no division. Nor, when we speak of men doing their duty, do we mean a complete attainment of everything in knowledge and practice, and that in a sanctified manner, though that ought to be endeavored. But it refers principally to doing their duty in reference to this particular matter of attaining union, a great part of which consists in outward and obvious things, which require neither sanctification in the person absolutely nor perfection in degree, some of which we may afterward mention. So that the meaning is, if we consider union in itself, apart from men’s corruptions—which will make the least thing impossible when they are active—it is a thing possible, according to the acknowledged principles by which sober, orthodox men usually walk, as experience has often proven, and as reason demonstrates in the particulars afterward to be given. This consideration ought all the more strongly to stir up the endeavor of this duty, although often through men’s corruption it has been frustrated.

Thirdly, we premise that in endeavoring after union and healing, men should not restrict it to a universal union in everything, in judgment and practice, but should resolve to have it with many things defective that require forbearance in persons who are united, which we may consider in these particulars. There may be difference of judgment in many things, I mean in such things as are consistent with the foundation and edification; and such forbearance should be resolved upon. To do otherwise would be to think either that men had no reason at all, or that their understandings were perfect, or at least of equal reach. There may be dissatisfaction with many persons, whether Officers or Members; and to expect a Church free from unworthy Officers or Members, and to defer Church-union on that account, is to expect the barn floor to be without chaff, and to frustrate the many commands by which this duty is urged. For certainly our Lord Jesus gave this command to His disciples when Judas was among them, and Paul gave it and practiced it when some preached out of envy, and when almost all sought their own things and not the things of Christ. And certainly, if people ought to conduct themselves toward corrupt Ministers who nevertheless do not destroy the foundation, as Ministers, performing the duties that become them in communion with such Ministers while they continue in that office, then certainly Ministers ought to maintain that communion with other Ministers which becomes their relations, seeing they are still Ministers in that respect as well as in the other. And if this corruption will not warrant separation in other Ordinances, neither will it warrant division in the ordinance of Government.

It may also be consistent with many particular failings and defects in the exercise of Government, such as possibly the sparing of some corrupt Officers and Members; the censuring of some unjustly; or the admission of some who are unfit for the Ministry, and such like. These indeed are faults, but they are not such as make a Church no Church; and though these have sometimes been alleged as causes of schisms and divisions in the Church in practice, yet they were never defended as just grounds of schisms and divisions, but were always condemned by all Councils and Fathers, and cannot reasonably be sustained. For otherwise no union could be expected here, unless we supposed that men who have corruption could not fall into these faults. It is not unlikely that some of these were present in the primitive Churches; something of this is suggested in Revelation concerning those Church Officers, in their tolerating Jezebel and the Nicolaitans to seduce the people and to commit fornication; yet neither separation nor division is called for or allowed, either among Ministers or people. Surely there were such corrupt acts of all kinds among the Jewish Church Officers; yet it is clear that Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea continued to govern jointly notwithstanding them, and yet cannot be counted accessory to any of their deeds. For men in such cases have opportunity, even when they are present, to discountenance such corrupt acts by not consenting to them and by testifying against them. By doing so, they may stand in the way of many wicked acts which, by dividing, they cannot do, which is sufficient for their exoneration both before God and men, as we see in the instances of Joseph and Nicodemus, who continued united in the Government and attended the meetings even when sentences were passed against those who acknowledged Christ, and orders were given for persecuting Him and them. Yet they are declared free because they dissented from and testified against the same. Their freedom and exoneration by virtue of their dissent while present is more solemnly recorded to their honor in the Gospel than if they had divided. And yet the unity of the Church now has the same ground, and no fewer motives to urge it, than it had then. Union may also stand with some defects in Worship, manner of Government, and rules that are necessary for good Government in a Church. It is likely that many things of that kind were defective in the Church of Corinth, where the Sacrament was administered so disorderly, there was confusion in many things of Worship, and some things were still to be set in order; yet nowhere does the Apostle urge union more than in these Epistles. Neither can it be thought that perfection in all these things is ever to be expected, or that union is to be delayed until such a time. If there are defects of that kind, it is union and not division that is to be looked upon as the commended means for correcting them.

If it is asked, then, with what kind of defects or causes of dissatisfaction may a union be formed, or what rules may be followed therein, we offer these considerations or rules. First, what cannot warrant a breach where there is union cannot warrantably be made the ground for keeping up a division. There are many miscarriages or defects which are truly gross, and yet will not warrant a schism. The reason is that repairing a breach is no less a duty than preventing one; and if it began upon such a ground, then continuing it upon the same ground is simply continuing in the same sin, and it cannot be thought that any party, by dividing upon an unjust ground, can afterward be justified upon that same ground. It remains, therefore, that if the ground was not sufficient at first to warrant a separation or division, it cannot afterward be sufficient to continue the same.

Second, such defects as do not make communion in a Church and in its Ordinances sinful will not warrant a separation or division from the same. It is acknowledged by all that there is no separation from a true Church in such Ordinances as men may participate in without sin, although others may be guilty therein. Suppose, for example, that men have access to Government without such bonds and engagements, and such like, as may hinder their freedom in following the light of the Word in deciding whatever shall come before them, even though others should step beyond the same.

Third, men may keep communion with a Church when their calling leads them to it upon the one side, and they have opportunity to discharge the duties of that calling upon the other. If some acts belonging to a man’s station lead him to a united way of acting, as the duties of a settled Minister do, then he is obliged to follow the duties of his calling while there is no physical or moral impediment barring him from the same; and others being defective in their duty will not absolve him from his own duty, which he owes by virtue of his station.

Fourth, while the general rules tending principally to edification are acknowledged, union is to be kept even though there is much failing in their application, because there are suitable means to make use of, and who knows but the sincere and zealous use of them may help in their application? If there is a failure therein, it is the deed of the person who misapplies them, and does not involve anyone else in that guilt; besides, by joint and united action, much of that misapplication may, through God’s blessing, be prevented.

Fifth, there may and ought to be union when the evils that follow division or schism are greater and more hurtful to the Church than the evils that may be supposed to follow upon union. I do not speak of evils of sin, for the least of these are never to be chosen, but of evils and inconveniences that may indeed be hurtful to the Church in themselves, and sinful in respect of some persons, yet are not so to all. Among such evils the lesser is to be chosen, because uniting and acting jointly in a Church-way belongs to the polity and Government of the Church, wherein Christian prudence is to have a principal hand. So that when things cannot be done simply as men would desire, they are to do as they may comparatively; that is, to choose and make use of what may be most edifying and least hurtful to the Church’s edification among all those means that appear probable and possible. Thus the conscience may have this testimony, that the way having the fewest inconveniences and the greatest advantages for edification was chosen; and though some inconveniences afterward occur, yet the conscience may be quiet upon this ground. Sometimes the Lord in His providence will order matters of Government so that no side can be chosen without inconveniences.

If it is asked, then, how men may discern the side to be followed in such a case when inconveniences threaten on every side, the answer is by observing which side has the most dangerous and destructive inconveniences, which inconveniences are most certain and inevitable, and which duty the command urges. Union has the advantage over division because it is a commanded means tending to edification, which division is not. Division has no fewer inconveniences following it, nor are they less destructive to the Church, than those of union in the case supposed.

Schism is one of the greatest injuries that can come upon an orthodox Church, next to heresy in Doctrine, and therefore no particular evil can be weighed against it. The evils of division are most inevitable; the evils that follow union may, through God’s blessing, be prevented, but division itself is outside God’s appointed way.

When men may unite without personal guilt or accession to the defects or guilt of others, there may and ought to be union, even though there are failings and defects of several kinds in a Church. Men are accountable not for other men’s miscarriages, but for their own, and no such Church-state is to be expected as is free from defects. It cannot warrant a man to abstain from his duty because others do not perform theirs, while there is no sinful impediment lying in the way of his access to it. Such impediments may include these: if a person is required to condemn anything he thinks lawful in his own former practice or in the practice of others, or in some point of Doctrine, though extrinsic, if it is to him a point of truth; if he is required to approve the deed and practice of others which he accounts sinful, or to affirm as truth something he accounts an error; or when some engagement is required for the future which restrains him from any duty called for, or that may afterward be called for. These things involve persons in the sin of what is past and make them accessory to inconveniences that may come, defiling their conscience. Such entanglements are to be forborne; but where no such thing exists, there may be access to union, even where there are many public defects.

For attaining union, there ought to be large mutual condescension; that is, both sides ought to stretch themselves, not only to forbear what is sinful, nor only to condescend to what may be thought simply necessary, but condescension ought to be mutual and proportioned according as expediency calls for, with respect to the edification of the Church. Many infirmities of others are to be forborne, and things otherwise unreasonable in respect of those men with whom we deal ought, for the Church’s peace, to cause men to yield. If there ought to be condescension for private peace, much more ought there to be for Church peace and public edification.

In what may involve a man in sin, or in approving sin in others, there is no condescension beyond the utmost boundary of duty. Condescension should be mutual, so that one party does not expect full submission from the other, for that is dominion, not union. Even that party which seems most right in the matter, or to have authority on its side, ought nevertheless to condescend, and in some things to be the most condescending, because they are in some sense parents and strong; they ought therefore to bear with and cover the infirmities of the weak, and to conduct themselves seriously toward others whom they suppose to be in a distemper. Authority is given for edification, and it is not unsuitable for authority to condescend in order to attain its end. Often the most tender and sincere, and those who were upon the right side, have been the most condescending, while those who were in the wrong were most averse to condescension. Those who have condescended most in such things have been regarded as the greatest friends of the Church, even sometimes when their side was not as justifiable as the other.

From what has been said, we may lay down negative conclusions concerning the repairing of a breach among godly and orthodox men where a Church has harmony in the fundamental points, Faith, Worship, and Government, and where the flourishing of the Gospel is mutually intended. Division ought not to be removed in such a way as destroys or ruins either side, because that is not for the good of the whole. Every part and side in such a case is a part of the body, although it may not be very considerable, and it is no wisdom to cut off a member of the body to cure a distemper when gentler means might recover it. That way of uniting is not to be admitted, but shunned, which may prevent any Minister or member fit for edifying the Church from having access to do so. Union should be attempted with all due respect from each side toward the other, without any mark of disrespect. No merely authoritative means is the proper and only way of healing a divided Church; the remedy must extend to both sides. Authority is often declined in such cases, and when declined cannot accomplish the end; the remedy must suit the Church in its distemper, as a sick body is nourished with food suitable to its condition, sometimes pleasing the taste when more wholesome things will not be received. Both judgments must be informed and affections gained by prudent and affectionate means. Union is urged more by persuasions, entreaties, reasons, and the evils that follow the lack of it than by authority, and must be persuaded rather than commanded. Among such persons, private and particular condescension is most becoming to that respect which each owes to the other.

Fifthly, we premise that, even if sufficient condescension should fail upon one side, yet the other ought to condescend fully as far as is possible. For Church-union among Churchmen is no civil bargain in which to haggle, but what is possible is duty out of obedience to God, who commands peace in other things—and so much more in this—as far as is possible, or as far as lies in men. And respect is to be had for the Church’s good, whose advantage we should seek even though others are defective; and often such condescension gains more for the advantage of the Church, and for the commendation of the party condescending, than if there had been greater insistence upon one’s position, as we may see in that praiseworthy instance of Basil’s conduct, who insisted upon nothing, but absolutely laid aside what was contended for, without respect to his own right or injury, for the Church’s good. And often it is one party waiting for the other’s condescension, or taking occasion from their tenaciousness to hold firm themselves, that keeps the distance at its height.

Often in such debates as are among orthodox Divines and Ministers, it seems they might be removed if one party would condescend according to the qualifications and cautions formerly laid down; yea, it seems it would be safer for the Church’s good in such a case for either party practically to condescend to the way of the other than that division should be kept up upon such grounds. For it is not supposed here that there is any matter of Faith in question among such persons; often there was full harmony in the Confessions of Faith, as in the instances cited. There is no question concerning Government simply, nor concerning Councils and Canons; these also were acknowledged. None disclaimed the General Councils or their acts. The question often is not among them whether others should be brought to their opinion or not, I mean as to the point upon which the division turns; but often it is either upon some misunderstood expression of another, or an error in some lesser point of Truth. And in such a case there is that saying of the great Augustine: “Disputable errors, or uncertain faults, are not in their pursuit to be preferred to certain peace.” Or it is concerning some particular act of Government, or other miscarriages arising from misapplying rules, or not walking according to them, or something of that kind, as occurred in contrary Ordinations of orthodox men and such like. In these cases, we say—and it will be found from History—that it would always have been better for the Church if either side had practically condescended to allow the other to rule and govern, while personally keeping themselves free from accession to their guilt, whether of perverseness, negligence, or the like, than to have raised or maintained divisions upon such grounds. For often orthodox and otherwise blameless men have, by such divisions, been made factious and carnal in their conduct, and largely useless, who otherwise, had they been free from that temptation, might have proved sober and profitable; and when the temptation was over, they were found to be such.

We may observe that, though in the primitive times there were various schisms and divisions concerning Synods and Government, yet we will find that these contests and divisions arose from the matter and particular acts and proceedings thereof, and that there was hardly ever a division founded upon the formal constitution of a Council or Synod; nor was much distinction made between declining their authority and declining the Acts or Censures passed by them. Concerning this we may observe these general points.

If the matter concluded by many Bishops and Churchmen was right and satisfactory, there was an acquiescing in its authority. If the matter was displeasing and hurtful, whatever its form and however great its number, its authority was not much respected, because authority consisted only in adding weight to those things, as we may see in the Arian Councils, which were often very numerous, and others also that were erroneous and otherwise corrupt. Although there was no formal declinature of them, or protestation against them as null, and though there were sometimes some dissenters in them, yet their authority was in no way confirmed by the absence of such Protestations or Declinatures. Sometimes we find worthy men appearing before and answering even most corruptly constituted Synods, as occurred in those same times; and although they were sentenced and deposed by them, yet they never esteemed those Sentences to have any greater authority on that account, as we may see in the case of Athanasius, Chrysostom, and many others. Sometimes they protested against Synods as null when they saw violence and iniquity prevail, as was done in the Council of Antioch in the case of Eustathius, and in the second Council of Ephesus by Flavianus and Anatolius. Sometimes also, upon a perceived danger and the designs of professedly corrupt enemies, Protestations were drawn up in writing beforehand, as in that Protestation which the Reformers in Germany issued against the Council of Trent after it was called, because there was no probable opportunity for Truth to have liberty in speaking and equity in judgment. And as Sleidan records it, they alleged Cyril as the first practitioner of this when the Arians prevailed. This, we may see, was their practice when they had to do with professed enemies: not insisting upon formalities, but upon what was material. And again, among themselves, the orthodox did not usually insist upon trying and scrutinizing the formal constitution of any of these Councils—for certainly, in such corruptions as were so universal, Synods corrupt in the majority of their members might have been held with all the formalities and solemnities that could be required in the external constitution of any lawful Synod—but when they had occasion to meet, they proceeded to do what was for the present good of the Church, condemning the substance of such corrupt Synods, which they accounted sufficient in such cases. And for differences among themselves, when they were of a right temper, they also endeavored to redress such particulars as needed correction, and to restore persons unjustly sentenced, and the like; whereby it appears that the substance of the matter, both in things of general and particular concernment, always carried the greatest weight.

Although such debates concerning Government seem easiest to remove, yet often, and almost always, they have been the most difficult to heal, and have been followed by the greatest bitterness and contention in the Church. For different Judgments simply, and also different Ceremonies and different practices in other things, may exist without direct opposition or counteracting, and may either be more easily borne or removed. But when it comes to Government—whose Sentence shall stand, whose Ordination shall be acknowledged, who shall have authority to decide such and such things, and the like—it is far otherwise. Hence it came to pass that men could maintain union and communion with others who differed from them in far greater points of Truth; but toward persons who did not acknowledge their Authority, or who acknowledged those who disputed that Authority, they could by no means so condescend. For in Government, men’s own particular interest is more concerned than in points of Truth, and that consideration imperceptibly steals in upon them. In Government the question is not only about what is past, but there is also fear of what may come. Hence men who have some testimony within themselves that they are not ambitious for Government, yet having developed a prejudice against others, become suspicious that if such persons had power, they would miscarry, not only in reference to them but in reference to matters of public concern. And therefore, in removing such a division concerning Government, the great difficulty is not so much to heal and remove what is past as to prevent the fear of what may come if such persons continue to govern. And this causes the result of such division to be that either they themselves, or those in whom they particularly have confidence, may have the weight of Government upon them. This may indeed be aimed at with some sincerity, because, being somewhat alienated by prejudice, they do not think it fitting for the good of the work, at least during that time, that any others should have such trust. And this caused the heat of debates in times of division to break out mainly in the ordination of Bishops and the planting of Churches, because by that means their interest in the Government was maintained, whereby there was afterward opportunity for the management of every other matter according as this succeeded.

CHAP. VIII. Some preparatory endeavours for uniting.

Although we have been somewhat lengthy in these general considerations, because several matters have arisen along the way, yet we conceive that they may be useful to the point, and that we may make quicker progress afterward in resolving this great question: What is an orthodox Church, divided within itself over some circumstantial truths, so to speak, or over contrary practices and actions, yet still agreeing in the fundamentals of Doctrine, Worship, Discipline, and Government, and maintaining mutual esteem for one another’s integrity—what, I say, are such persons called to do for healing that breach? In reference to this, these things, or this method, should be followed.

All, especially Ministers, should walk under a deep impression of the dreadfulness and terribleness of such a plague. It is likely that, if God were regarded as angry with a Church and with Ministers in such a time, men would be in a better condition to speak about healing. Some time, therefore, should be spent in allowing that consideration to sink deeply into the soul, that the Lord’s hand may be recognized in it. The many sad consequences of division should be represented to the mind, and the heart should be seriously affected and humbled by them, as if sword, pestilence, or fire were threatened; yea, as if the Lord were spitting in Ministers’ faces, covering them with shame, threatening to make them contemptible, blasting the Ordinances in their hands, loosening the girdle of their loins and weakening their authority among the people, tearing down the hedges to let in boars and wolves to spoil the vines and destroy the flock, and, in a word, threatening to remove His candlestick. So that Ministers or other persons in such a case have not only men who oppose them to regard as angry with them, but they have the Lord Himself to regard as their adversary, whose anger has thus divided them. The failure to observe this makes men more confident under such a judgment. Whereas, seeing it is a plague, men—even those who suppose themselves innocent as to its immediate cause—ought to humble themselves under the mighty hand of God with respect to this, as with respect to other plagues.

Men should also look upon it as a snare. O how many temptations accompany such divisions, especially for Ministers; and how many afflictions, crosses, and reproaches follow after them! Might it not make a Minister tremble to think about the matter of divisions, that now, besides all his former difficulties and straits, there is a snare and trial in everything? In every sermon that he preaches there is this danger: lest his own affection steal in under the appearance of zeal for God, making him hotter and more vehement against those who oppose him in controverted matters than he ordinarily is in things more nearly concerning the glory of God; and lest, by discovering his carnality, he make his Ministry contemptible before others. When he hears that he is in danger of being irritated by contradiction, and even when there is no contradiction, he is in danger of placing less weight upon what might be for his edification simply because it is spoken by one who differs from him in such and such things. When he is in any Judicatory, there is a temptation waiting upon the slightest mention of such matters to disturb everything and make such meetings scandalous and burdensome. By this, almost all conversation becomes heartless and comfortless; the most intimate brother is either suspicious or suspected; judgments concerning men’s sincerity and integrity in anything are, for the most part, grounded upon their interests, as if men thereafter had no conscience against sinning; sympathy among brethren fails, and so on. And may not these and many similar things make Ministers circumspect in such a case, so that they may be slow to speak about what may foment division, and wary of venturing upon snares? Alas, it is very unlike this when men use more confidence and liberty in judging, speaking, and acting, and with less tenderness, in times of division than at other times. And if men were once deeply impressed with the fear of sinning through the occasions of division, they would be much more disposed to speak of union.

Ministers and others should soberly withdraw to examine their own spiritual condition and see whether they have kept their own vineyard; and particularly, before the Lord, put themselves to these questions: 1. How have they prized union with Him, and have they studied to be and abide in Christ, and to keep themselves in the love of God? 2. Is there any ground of controversy in their present course or former practice that may have had influence in provoking the Lord to smite them in general? Or, 3. And especially, have they, through negligence and unfaithfulness, imprudence, heat, passion, tenaciousness, undue attachment to other men and too much unwillingness to displease them, prejudice against and lack of charity toward others, or the like, been in any way accessory to bringing in this evil? For this reason they should take a view both of the sins that procure it, and of the evils that dispose toward it and increase it, which were formerly mentioned, and should be impartial and thorough in this. For it is preposterous for men to meddle with removing public differences while they do not know how matters stand with themselves.

When that is done, there should be repentance suitable to what is found, together with extraordinary humiliation and secret prayer to God, not only for themselves and their own particular condition, but for the public condition, and particularly for the healing of that breach, that thereby God would spare His people and not suffer His inheritance to become a reproach. It is no small help toward union to have men in a spiritual, detached, and mortified frame; for we are sure that, even if it does not remove the difference, it will in great measure moderate the division, restrain the carnality that usually accompanies it, and dispose men to be more impartial in hearing what may lead further toward healing.

Men should not stop at this, but, as they have opportunity and are led by their places, they should endeavor soberly, warily, and seriously, by speaking, writing, solemnly appealing, and otherwise, to commend union to those who differ; yea, even those who differ should commend it to those who differ from them. We see the Apostles do this frequently in the New Testament, and not only in general to Churches, but some persons are particularly urged by name, as in Philippians 4:2. And in the primitive times, Bishops and Churches who were not themselves engaged in the division wrote seriously, and sometimes sent some of their number to Churches and eminent persons who were divided, and often their intervention proved effective. When that difference between Augustine and Jerome had risen to some height, Augustine pressed himself upon the other in order to produce a better understanding and to lessen the difference, and he prevailed with him; and by their mutual apologies and better understanding of one another, they came, notwithstanding their difference, to have much respect for one another. For this end Polycarp came from Asia to Rome to stop the division about Easter, and this prevailed so far that the division was stayed for a time. Also, men, especially those of the same judgment, should deal with others with whom they agree, urging them to be condescending, seriously appealing to them; and when they exceed, they should rebuke them for the Church’s good. This is often of great weight. Frequently, those who appear most prominently in a difference will be hotter and carry matters further than less-engaged men of the same judgment will allow, and such persons ought not to be silent in such a case. Thus Irenaeus, although of Victor’s judgment in the matter of Easter, nevertheless boldly remonstrated with him for his vehemence in pressing it to the hurt of the Church’s peace, charging him to forbear and to pursue union notwithstanding; which act of his is still highly commended and, as Eusebius observes, regarded as answering well to his name.

Serious and sincere thoughts of union should be settled upon, and union itself should be deliberately pursued as the great duty, so that endeavors do not principally tend to strengthen one side, exonerate themselves, or gain advantage over others, and so on, but to make one out of both. Therefore, when one means or opportunity fails, another should be attempted; neither should men grow weary or faint in this, although it often proves a most discouraging work.

Men should endeavor all this with tenderness and respect toward men’s persons, actions, and qualifications. For often the beginning of a division lies in the alienation of affections between certain persons, which afterward disposes them to judge harshly both of one another’s opinions and actions. And indeed, often the real difficulty lies here: men’s affections are not satisfied with one another, and this causes them not to trust each other. Hence we see that in Scripture the commendation of love, and of honoring others and preferring them in honor to ourselves, is ordinarily joined to exhortations to union or reproofs of division, as in Philippians 2, Ephesians 4, Matthew 18, and elsewhere. And we see in the primitive times that, when no other means could cure schisms, one party showing respect to another, or to some eminent leader of the opposing party, even perhaps after his death, sometimes allayed the division and drew those who formerly shunned communion to join with them. It is particularly observed that, when at Constantinople some had continued separated from the Bishop’s Government and from the Church there after Chrysostom’s deposition for thirty-five years, and were called Johannites, Proclus, who after some interval succeeded in that See, by recording Chrysostom’s name among eminent persons, making honorable mention of him, bringing his body from the place where it had been buried in exile, and burying it honorably at Constantinople in the great Church of the Holy Apostles, so appeased and won those who had rejected all the intervening Bishops that they immediately acknowledged him and joined with the Church. The same is also said to have brought an end to that schism at Antioch arising from Eustathius’s removal, when Callandion the Bishop returned his body honorably for burial and went out with his party to receive it solemnly some miles from the town. Those also who, out of respect for Eustathius, had continued separated from the succeeding Bishops for more than a hundred years, seeing the adverse party now put honor upon him, from that time forward joined with them. Both of these are recorded in the fifth century. And if respect shown to dead men can so powerfully engage affections, certainly mutual respect and evidences of confidence among living men should carry much more weight. This giving of respect should be manifested in these and similar ways.

1. There should be respectful mention, in speech or writing, of the persons and concerns of those who differ, especially such as are most eminent and leading among them.

2. Good interpretations should be put upon their ends, intentions, and sincerity, even in actions that are displeasing.

3. Men’s opinions and actions should not be loaded with gross absurdities and extreme aggravations, especially in public, because that only tends to make them odious and stands in the way of a future good understanding, when one has represented another as so absurd and hateful a person.

4. All personal reflections should be avoided, as also slighting answers, disdainful words and salutations, and such like. On the contrary, there should be love, familiarity, and tenderness; and if there has been any reflection or bitterness giving occasion for misunderstanding, yea, even if it has been unjustly apprehended, there should be condescension in removing it. I have heard of a worthy person who, being led away in an hour of temptation, was afterward treated coldly by many of his former friends, whereby he was, as it were, provoked by discontent to defend his deed and resent the disrespect of such persons, which almost grew into a breach. But having occasion to meet one who was most opposed to his present way, who notwithstanding all of it lovingly and familiarly embraced him as before, without mentioning any such thing, it is said that his heart melted immediately under conviction concerning his former opposition, and so any further progress toward a breach was prevented, when he saw that there was still access to the affections of the most eminent of those from whom he differed.

5. There should be expressions of mutual confidence in one another, which should appear not only in personal respect, but also with respect to the Ministry of those from whom they differ, endeavoring to strengthen and confirm it. This was what endeared Basil to Eusebius, that even while he differed from him, he endeavored to make his Ministry weighty among the people.

6. Respect should be shown to men of that judgment and side, where the difference is of the kind here supposed. They should be helped and furthered, and counted, notwithstanding that difference, if otherwise qualified, fit for trust and charge. For this does not merely engage one particular person, but the whole party, and holds forth confidence in them notwithstanding the difference. The contrary course disobliges and irritates all, because it implies that all holding such an opinion or practice are unworthy of charge or trust, which no man can easily bear. And it in some measure necessitates them, in their divided condition, to seek some other way of entering, and increases their distrust of those who, at least in their judgment, manage matters so partially and prefer the strengthening of a side to the edification of the Church. Any differing party can scarcely interpret it otherwise, seeing they themselves have some persuasion of their own integrity in the main work.

7. There should even be mutual visits and fellowship, both civil and Christian, as there has been before; yea, rather these should be increased. For if men have some confidence that others love their persons, respect them as Ministers, and esteem them as Christians, they will be more easily induced to trust the others as such also.

8. If reflections and bitterness are expressed by some—as even good men are too ready, in the liberty of debate, to exceed in this—yet there should be no answering in the same way. Luther is censured for exceeding in this, even by those who loved him. And it is a most excellent warning that Calvin gives to Bullinger and others, when thus provoked by him, in Epistle 57: either that they should not answer such a paper at all, or, in answering it, should remember that they had a most eminent servant of Christ to answer, and therefore should not be provoked by his vehemence, seeing he also had corruptions. Thus Calvin expresses his own resolution: Etiamsi me Diabolum vocaret, me tamen hoc illi honoris habiturum, ut insignem Dei servum agnoscam, &c.—even if he should call me a devil, I would nevertheless give him this honor, that I would acknowledge him as an eminent servant of God. It is upon this same ground that Augustine and others, though most zealously opposed to the schism of the Donatists, yet because they remained sound in the Faith in other things, mention such of them as were sober with great honor and behaved toward them very brotherly. Augustine in particular used to visit their Bishops if he was traveling elsewhere for Ordination or other affairs, and some of them likewise used to visit him, whom he entertained most kindly, always seeking to improve such occasions for producing a better understanding, as may be gathered from instances cited out of his Epistles before and after this. Sometimes also, when he wrote to some of them, he desired them to write back to him so that he might acquaint his people with both their writings and his own; and if they returned no answer, that thereby he might constrain them toward reasonableness. Yet, he says, this should be done Discessum militum, after the soldiers had departed, so that it might appear he did not intend to make them odious. He also observes that a principal thing which made the Donatists unwilling to yield to union was a suspicion that the Catholics would still persecute them if they had opportunity. Speaking of a Conference in Epistle 163, he says, Dictum erat quod adhuc nostri eos persecuturi essent—it had been said that our people would still persecute them—which he rejects at length, showing from Ephesians 4 that they had learned to maintain union with forbearance. Elsewhere also, as in Epistle 147, he excuses the excessive vehemence of the expressions of some who were on his own side in that difference. All of this shows the great necessity of recovering affections in pressing union, and how far men ought to condescend in reference to this, both with respect to what is past and for preventing what may be feared.

Then Ministers should not only in their own practice, but in their Doctrine and otherwise, stir up others to the practice and life of Religion. We always find the Apostle using this method after his exhortations to union, pressing them to work out their salvation with fear and trembling, and so on. And in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus, when he dissuades Ministers from foolish and jangling questions, strifes, and contentions, this remedy is either premised or added afterward: that they should press Believers to be zealous for good works and careful to maintain them, Titus 3:8–9; that they should follow after love, righteousness, faith, and peace with those who call on the Lord out of a pure heart, 2 Timothy 2:22–23. For when either Ministers or Professors are exercised and occupied with these things, there is little room for other matters. Then also they discern the necessity of union more clearly, are themselves more disposed toward it, and others are more easily induced to unite with them. Besides, it is never in such things that godly and orthodox men differ, but in turning aside from them. Therefore, much heat in particular differences often carries with it a decay and lukewarmness in more practical matters; while, on the contrary, zeal in these substantial things ordinarily allays and moderates heat and fervor in the other.

It is fitting that there should be solemn addresses to God for direction and guidance in the way toward this end; for He is the God of peace and ought to be acknowledged in removing this great evil of division. Hence the Apostle joins prayers for peace to his exhortations toward it; and we are commanded to pray for Jerusalem’s peace, even Church-peace no less than Civil peace. It may be that the neglect of this is one cause why sound, godly, and peaceable men, who love the welfare of Zion, nevertheless continue divided and cannot discover means of healing: that thereby the necessity of the Lord’s interposition may be discerned, that there may be deliberate and particular addresses to Him for this very thing, and that men may neither undervalue the matter nor their adversaries in it, so as not to account it a rod, seeing that it is God with whom they have to do; nor be content to lie under it without aiming and dealing to have it removed by Him, as we would deal for the removal of any temporal plague, or expect a blessing upon the Gospel.

CHAP. IX. What things are to be forborn in order to uniting.

Having laid down these general helps, we are now to consider what is still to be forborne and abstained from in reference to union. For, as divisions ordinarily arise and are fomented by doing and pressing certain things in which others cannot concur, or to which they cannot come up, so when such things are abstained from, there is nearer access to union. At the least, this stops the impetuousness of division and makes it look more like a difference, which, considering human infirmity, is neither so intolerable in itself nor so hurtful to the Church. Besides, therefore, what has already been said concerning abstaining from personal reflections, or anything that may irritate persons or parties, or foster jealousy or distrust among them, of which something has already been touched upon, we shall add these further considerations.

All things that contribute to weakening the reputation of others, or to producing a harsh impression of them in ourselves or in others, should generally be forborne; such as repeating reproachful reports, even though they are true, much more if they are merely reported, yea, even listening to such things with any delight; endeavoring to awaken dissatisfaction in others against those who oppose us by such reports, solicitations, and the like. These are condemned in the conduct of private persons, and are causes of continuing such differences—for where there is no talebearer, strife ceases, Proverbs 26—much more among Ministers, who ought not to walk as mere men. Great care should also be taken concerning those who may have influence upon advice, counsel, and resolutions tending in that direction, lest secret whisperers, who may really have some further alteration in the Church in view, and may be embittered against honest men precisely because of their honesty, should nevertheless insinuate themselves with eminent men on both sides, and so carry on the division and frustrate the union. For instance, some who were not altogether purged from Arianism, and were embittered against honest Bishops such as Athanasius, Hosius, and others, insinuated themselves into one side of a debate and kept the controversy going against faithful men. So Epiphanius was entangled by Theophilus of Alexandria to oppose Chrysostom under the pretext of another difference. Sometimes again, on the other side, those who inclined toward the Novatians did not lack influence to strengthen the opposing party and keep them at a greater distance from the other, as being gross in receiving Traditores, as they called them, into their fellowship. Sometimes men who had been justly censured, or who feared censure from faithful Bishops, spread calumnies against them and made them odious even to other orthodox men under the pretext of their pride, arrogance, unsoundness, and such like. Sometimes again, time-serving men, by flattering Magistrates, carried out their revenge against faithful Bishops by keeping up divisions against them, pressing sentences of deposition and such like under the pretext of other faults. By this means the Church’s peace has often been marred and her divisions continued, as is clear in those schisms and divisions at Constantinople, first with reference to Chrysostom and afterward with reference to Ignatius, who, by a faction in the Church, was deposed in reality to please the Emperor, whose incestuous marriage he would not approve as they did. Therefore, I say, in removing differences and resolving duties in reference to union, there is great need of circumspection in examining and choosing whose counsel is to be given weight. For not all men love peace, neither do all sincerely seek the good of the Church, and many are not without their own prejudices and grudges against particular eminent persons, which, where men are not very self-denied and mortified, will easily steal in to frustrate a public good under the pretext of particular respect for the person whom, by doing so, they stir up.

Sleidan notes this as the cause of that unreasonable and unnatural division which broke out and grew in Germany, almost to the undoing of Religion there, between the Elector of Saxony and Maurice, who afterward became Elector. Certain counselors who were not well affected toward Religion, but favored the wicked course of Henry, whom Maurice succeeded, and who for that reason hated the Elector and those who were eminent for Reformation, having now taken on a profession and insinuated themselves into Maurice’s counsels and affection, found some already existing cause of dissension in other particulars and so kindled and fostered it until they brought the division to such a height that one part of the Protestants was engaged with Antichrist and his followers to destroy the other. Yet this was carried on so secretly that the difference was never stated upon the real ground which such men actually intended.

Men also should take heed to the counsel of those who are not so nearly concerned in the Church’s divisions, as, for example, those belonging to another Church, or men who are not so immediately concerned in the debates and in the effects that follow from them. Thus, in that Council of Carthage, they enacted that tenderness should be used toward the Donatists, and means employed to reclaim them; and for that end they acknowledged their Ministers, though ordained in schism, to be Ministers, although the Church of Rome wrote otherwise to them and acted otherwise themselves. Such things should be carefully considered. Sometimes also there are a sort of persons who do not desire union; for, as there is an itching after new doctrine in some, so there is an itching after divisions and changes in others, who may nevertheless be sound in doctrine. Such persons are to be watched carefully in this matter.

Men should avoid judicially engaging in such differences, either by passing decisions pro or contra concerning them in Judicatories, or by censuring, or marking with reproach, those who differ from them. For, first, this makes the division itself more difficult to remove. Second, it engages both sides more deeply, becomes an obstacle to withdrawing when men would otherwise do so, and greatly heightens the difference. In that difference between Cyprian and Stephen, and other Bishops of Rome, concerning the rebaptizing of those who had been baptized by Heretics and Schismatics, it is observed that Stephen pressed for the condemnation of Cyprian’s position, censured those who held it, and refused communion with such as joined with Cyprian in his opinion. Cyprian, on the contrary, did indeed call Synods and give judgment, but neither pressed any man into his opinion or practice nor censured any who differed from him in such a matter. Because of this, his conduct is greatly commended by the Ancients, especially by Augustine against the Donatists—not because Augustine thought Cyprian right on the matter, for he expressly rejected that and maintained the contrary opinion, but because Cyprian conducted himself in his opinion with such tenderness toward the Church’s union and peace.

We shall observe two or three passages from Cyprian and Augustine concerning this. In his Epistle ad Jubaianum, Cyprian says: Haec rescripsimus, inquit, nemini praescribentes aut praejudicantes quo minus unusquisque Episcoporum, quod putat faciat. Et ne quisquam pellendus à caeterorum consortio videretur (dicit) nos quantum in nobis est propter haereticos cum collegis & Coepiscopis nostris non contendimus, cum quibus divinam concordiam & pacem tenemus. And a little afterward: Serventur, inquit, à nobis patienter & leniter charitas animi, collegii honor, vinculum fidei, concordia sacerdotii. These words, and many others, are cited by Augustine in De Baptismo, book 6, chapter 17. And in another place, after citing this same final sentence and other words, and giving the Apostle’s reason from 1 Corinthians 11, “If any man will be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the Churches of God,” Augustine shortly afterward gives this approval of Cyprian’s conduct: Majus quippe in eo robur virtutis eminuit, cum ista quaestio nondum discussa nutaret, quod aliter sentiens quam multi collegae, tantam moderationem obtinuit, ut Ecclesiae Dei sanctam societatem, nulla schismatis labe truncaret, quam si omnia non solum veraciter, sed etiam pariter sine ista virtute sentiret; De Baptismo, book 5, chapter 17.

Augustine says this even though Cyprian’s opinion had been confirmed by several Councils of Carthage. This shows what influence such abstinence has upon the Church’s peace, and it is all the more observable because Cyprian used this forbearance when he had the generality of the African Church, and the authority of its Councils, on his side, and was also provoked by the vehemence of his opponents and by their censuring those who held his opinion. Yet he forbore, not because he doubted the soundness of his judgment, but because he respected the Church’s peace. Even then he wrote sweetly in many Epistles and also a particular treatise pressing the unity of the Church; for which reason he is eminently esteemed by all sober and judicious men as an excellent pattern in such a case.

In such cases, when union is desired, men should abstain from deliberately and publicly propagating their opinions. This is not intended to restrain a man from soberly, Christianly, and necessarily vindicating himself in a proper way. But there should be abstinence from: 1. all unnecessary activity principally intended for strengthening a party; 2. publishing things in print for that purpose when there is no usefulness to the Church’s good; 3. making motions in Judicatories that awaken party spirit; 4. insisting upon such matters in public preaching; and lastly, when there is some necessity to speak or write concerning such things, all reflections and provocations should be abstained from. Yea, it is fitting that sometimes every word spoken or written upon one side should simply be passed over by the other without reply, for peace’s sake.

For, first, the more broadly such differences spread, the deeper root they take, and the more they increase party spirit among the people. Second, they irritate men further and keep them from thinking of peace. Third, the memory of these things is apt continually to disturb men’s minds. Therefore, some of the most eminent men have wished that all papers pro or contra in such differences might be buried. For one difference begets another, and one paper draws forth another, no one being willing that his adversary should have the last word. Often also such papers carry a controversy into a succeeding generation, for whom it would have been better if many of these things had never been written. Such writings also often edify few; they merely make Church-division a greater subject of discourse and Ministers more contemptible. They frequently contain many contradictions of one another which, especially in matters of fact and in mutual reflections, cannot easily be cleared, and this greatly detracts from the honor of the Ministry.

It is recorded of Constantine that, when at the Council of Nicaea many opposing papers concerning differences among Bishops were presented to him, he took them and, after gravely admonishing the Bishops for contending among themselves, would not have any one of them read, but said that he would cover those infirmities which they were bringing to light by their contradictions with his purple. This way also has been followed for stopping divisions in various Reformed Churches.

All contrary acting should be abstained from, as in Elections, Ordinations, or the like, because these fix the difference, as with a nail, as may be gathered from History. It would often have been better for the Church’s good if either one side had suffered the Bishop ordained by the other simply to possess the place, or if none had been ordained at all, than that opposing Ordinations should have taken place. For by such means the Church became divided even in communion, and such particulars have always been very difficult to compose and exceedingly instrumental in continuing a breach. They also led men in Congregations to become factious and to seek to gain persons and affections to their own party.

All separate and divided meetings should be avoided, whether the separation is total with respect to all Ordinances and communion in general, as divisions among orthodox men have sometimes come to such a height, or whether it is partial, as in Government, Sacraments, or any of these. For by this not only is the way prepared for a total separation, but a divided form is thereby imposed upon the one Church, and occasion is given for one party to condemn the other and so to produce further strife. Especially, it habituates men to think of themselves as not belonging to one body, and, as it were, erects one Church or altar against another, as the Fathers were accustomed to speak. It thus becomes a visible line of division and really makes the difficulty of uniting still greater, because before union can be restored, that partition must be pulled down. It is fitting, therefore, that either all such occasions of Fasts and the like, in which all cannot join, should be forborne, or that they should be so ordered that there may be union in them.

Such acts and principles as impose restraint upon either side, making others incapable of Church-trust or the like, or declaring them to be so, should be prevented; and if already established, they should be orderly removed. For such things set up a partition between the two sides and heighten the difference beyond its proper nature. They also reveal much prejudice and alienation of mind, and they seem to constrain men into a union, which is never right if it is not voluntary. Hence we see that the great friends of peace have always endeavored to prevent or remove such things, as is clear in the instances of Polycarp, Irenaeus, and Cyprian, who did not merely endeavor to remove Censures but even to remove the grounds of censurability from persons who differed in this manner. This is also very obliging to the opposing party. In Augustine’s Epistle 163, which is much to this purpose, mention is made of one Cenethlius, a Catholic Bishop, who, Augustine says, was much esteemed by the Donatists, Quod constitutionem datam contra eos, compresserit, & effectum habere non siverit—because he restrained a constitution that had been issued against them and did not allow it to take effect.