West Port Experiment

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CHAP. VI. Concerning what is to be accounted satisfaction, or satisfying.

The great question is, when a person appears, acknowledges his offense, and submits to a public rebuke, what is to be judged satisfactory, so that a Church judicatory may stop the process, rest satisfied, and admit the person to Church privileges as though the former offense had not been?

In answering this, we shall first show what is not satisfactory. Secondly, we shall show what a Church judicatory need not inquire into for this ecclesiastical satisfaction. Thirdly, we shall show what is necessary and satisfactory. Then we shall answer one or two questions for further clarification.

1. We say that every verbal acknowledgment of a fault, even though accompanied by a promise of amendment, is not sufficient. Such a profession may occur in either of the two cases formerly mentioned: first, where the person merely mocks Christ’s ordinance by making the profession; or secondly, where he has often relapsed after making similar professions, or at present continues in that same offense or some other gross evil. To regard such a profession of repentance as satisfactory would produce all the inconveniences already mentioned and would amount to a manifest taking of the name of the Lord in vain.

This may be gathered from the following consideration. Such a profession, under these circumstances, ought not to satisfy a brother in the exercise of private admonition. On the contrary, he ought all the more to take one or two others with him afterward, being the more offended by such hypocrisy. If those witnesses also meet with the same insincere profession, they may properly bring the matter before the Church, since they likewise cannot reasonably be satisfied with such mockery. Much less, then, ought the Church itself to be satisfied with it, because the Church more formally represents Jesus Christ and His authority. Consequently, mockery and contempt shown toward the Church constitute a far greater offense.

Nor ought our Lord’s words to Peter in Luke 17:3 concerning forgiving a brother seven times in one day—or elsewhere, seventy times seven—to be understood chiefly of such gross public offenses or of such plainly counterfeit repentance, for that is not repentance at all. Rather, those passages speak principally of private offenses, or of the first sort formerly mentioned, and of cases in which there appears to be genuine sincerity in the offender. Otherwise, one offense would merely be removed by another.

Moreover, in those passages our Lord regulates the private conduct of individual Christians, teaching them to forgive personal wrongs. He is not prescribing the public actions of the Church in her judicial capacity, as the judicious Calvin rightly observes on the passage.

Besides, the chastening and humbling of the offending party, the causing of others to fear, and the removing of the reproach brought upon Christ’s name through public offenses are the principal ends of Church discipline. If such empty professions were accepted as satisfactory, all these ends would be utterly weakened and overthrown, which would be most absurd.

If it is asked how such a dissembling and mocking profession may be discovered, we answer:

1. By something plainly evident in the person’s present gestures, words, expressions, or behavior, leaving no room for charitable judgment. When a man, as it were, says, “Hail” to Christ with one breath and in the next spits in His face, it is easy to conclude that his greeting was never sincere.

2. By comparing the present profession with the person’s former conduct. If he has often made similar professions and afterward been found to have been mocking even while professing repentance, his former behavior ought at least to make the Church slow to be satisfied unless some real difference now appears.

3. By words or expressions spoken in other companies during the very time that the public profession is being made. If statements are made elsewhere that plainly contradict the profession publicly offered before the Church, they cannot but demonstrate that the whole acknowledgment was merely a mockery.

4. When the fruit afterward proves contrary to the profession in the person’s habitual course of life, as has already been explained.

Indeed, if there is no convincing evidence of such hypocrisy, but the matter remains doubtful; or if a person who at one time behaved irreverently afterward appears in a more sober frame, we judge that in such cases determination ought to be suspended until subsequent conduct provides clearer evidence one way or the other.

CHAP. VII. Shewing what is not necessary to satisfaction. 

To the second point, namely, what is not necessary, or what Church-officers are not to inquire after in order to obtain an ecclesiastical satisfaction for removing an offense, we answer that the saving grace of repentance, or the person’s sincere godliness, is not to be investigated as the sole ground upon which they may rest satisfied.

For, first, this would require a Church judicatory, so far as possible, to determine the spiritual state and gracious condition of every offending person before they could be satisfied. That would be absurd, because the inward state of the soul is not the object of Church discipline, nor is there anywhere in Scripture where men are judicially called to determine another person’s spiritual condition.

Secondly, this would establish the principle that no one who has committed an offense should ever be restored and admitted to Church privileges unless he were judged truly gracious. This would necessarily imply that none ought to be admitted into the Church except such persons; indeed, that none ought to remain in the Church except such. For scarcely anyone lives without giving offense in one degree or another, sufficient at least to occasion private admonition. Such an admonition formally brings the matter under consideration. If nothing can satisfy except evidence sufficient to conclude that the person is truly gracious, then the consequence would be that people are to be excommunicated simply because they are not thought to possess saving grace and cannot demonstrate it.

Thirdly, every person restored after an offense would thereby possess the formal judgment of a Church judicatory declaring him to be converted. This would certainly prove offensive and become a stumbling block to many who are already too prone to build unwarranted confidence upon slight grounds.

Fourthly, such a requirement would place Church-officers upon the rack and become a continual torment to them.

For, first, God has given no infallible evidence in His Word by which one person may certainly know the gracious state of another. Shall that alone satisfy us which, by God’s own appointment, cannot certainly be known?

Secondly, God has not given men dominion over consciences so as to search or judge men’s inward ends, motives, and intentions, but only their outward actions as they appear. Since there is nothing in the outward action itself that can certainly demonstrate inward sincerity, because hypocrites may attain the same outward appearance, it cannot be the duty of Church-officers to determine that which it is impossible for them satisfactorily to determine.

If it is said that they ought to proceed according as charity leads them to judge the person sincere, we answer that proceedings in Church judicatories must be governed by such rules that, if a wrong judgment is made, the person injured may be able to demonstrate that the judgment was wrong.

But if the private opinion or charitable judgment of individual officers becomes the rule by which they decide, then suppose a judicatory wrongly admits one person or wrongly excludes another. There would then be no possible way of convincing them that they had judged incorrectly, because no one can judge another man’s inward charity or sincerity.

Again, if it is replied that charity proceeds upon evidences, then we ask what evidence is sufficient, in the judgment of charity, to account a person truly gracious, and without which he ought not to be regarded as such. If no such evidence can be identified, then the entire decision rests upon the private judgment and inclination of the officers themselves, which falls into the former absurdity. If such evidences do exist, then two difficulties immediately arise.

First, it will be exceedingly difficult to specify what those evidences are. Secondly, either those evidences are capable of being judicially demonstrated to exist in a person, or they are not. If they can be judicially demonstrated, then charity is no longer the rule of judgment, but an objective law; and we shall gladly acknowledge such a law whenever it can be discovered.

But if they cannot be judicially demonstrated either to exist or not to exist in a person, then there remains no possible method of correcting an erroneous decision. Everything is left to the conjectures and charitable opinions of individual men. How then can the following absurdities be avoided?

What if Church-officers should prove partial? Their charity may then become either too narrow or too broad. Can such variable personal judgments become the rule of procedure in Christ’s house? Yet Church-officers are men, and therefore subject to these very infirmities.

Again, suppose the person himself believes he has been wronged because the Church has judged him not to be gracious. Would it satisfy him merely to be told that the officers thought so? Surely not. Yet it cannot reasonably be maintained that, according to Christ’s order, Church-officers should pronounce sentence against an offending brother without being able to convince him of its justice. Neither can he demonstrate his sincerity to them in such a way as to compel their conviction. Thus the matter becomes forever incapable of determination, which is plainly absurd.

Suppose further that he appeals to a superior judicatory. How could the inferior court defend its sentence? Or suppose the superior judicatory judges the man sincere. By what rule could either judicatory convince the other, if charity alone were the governing principle? Surely it cannot be imagined that Christ appointed Church discipline and censures—which are designed to preserve the unity of His Church—in such a manner as to establish unavoidable grounds of division. Again, would it not naturally provoke and irritate a man to have a judicial declaration pronounced that he is unregenerate? And would not such proceedings inevitably lessen the authority both of the sentences themselves and of those who pronounce them?

Finally, suppose that within the same judicatory some members possess a broader charity than others. What, then, is to be done in such a case? There is no possibility for one of them to convince the other. Indeed, would it not inevitably give rise to new offenses? One will readily judge the other either to be unacquainted with spiritual conditions or to be lacking in tenderness. For judging the sincerity of grace requires the exercise of spiritual discernment; and accordingly, as this discernment differs, so men are apt to estimate one another as Christians of greater or lesser stature.

Indeed, we suppose that there is scarcely anything in which a man’s own grace has more opportunity to manifest itself than in his discerning and judging the gracious state of another. Such a judgment presupposes acquaintance with, sympathy toward, and experience of sincere grace to a greater degree than preaching, prayer, or similar exercises ordinarily require. Certainly, it would be no small burden to Church-officers to be so frequently called upon, in effect, to demonstrate the reality of their own grace. On the other hand, if we proceed according to settled and objective rules, no such occasion for stumbling arises.

Again, do we not plainly observe that one man’s charity differs from another’s? If so, then different men, while sitting in the same Church judicatory and judging the very same outward case, would nevertheless proceed according to different rules, and those different rules might easily lead them to opposite conclusions. Such a result is plainly absurd.

Moreover, does not the charity of the very same individual often differ from what it was at another time? At one time he extends it more freely, at another less so, according to the frame of his own spirit, the dullness or confusion of his mind, or even according as he has some personal relationship, obligation, or prejudice concerning the individual before him. Such influences may secretly steal into his judgment and, as Scripture says, “blind the eyes of the wise” and “pervert the understanding of the just,” while he nevertheless sincerely believes himself to be judging impartially. Can such a shifting and uncertain rule be that which Christ has appointed for the government of His Church in the removing of offenses?

Furthermore, do we not know that men’s charity, in such cases, is often greatly influenced by the judgment of some highly esteemed person? Thus the very method that claims to give the greatest liberty actually imposes the greatest bondage. For in such a case a man commonly persuades himself that another person is sincere—or not sincere—simply because someone whose judgment he values has said so. Thus he proceeds implicitly, not acting from personal conviction or faith.

Or, on the other hand, he may entertain serious doubts whether others have judged rightly concerning the sincerity of the offender. He is then placed in a painful dilemma. Either he must act contrary to his own judgment and agree with the others, or he must judge differently and thereby appear to claim greater spiritual discernment than his brethren, implicitly charging them with error in a matter of spiritual judgment.

Nor is such disagreement comparable to ordinary differences in moral reasoning or natural understanding. Here the disagreement concerns a matter that is most purely spiritual and belongs peculiarly to the people of God, a matter of which natural men and hypocrites are altogether incapable.

What the Reverend and most judicious writer, Mr. Wood, has written in his Examination of Mr. Lockier’s Little Stone fully establishes this point also, namely, that the sincerity of true grace is not to be inquired after as the constitution or complexion (to use Mr. Lockier’s own expression) of visible members in the visible Church. For the very same reason that proves it improper to inquire into the sincerity of grace in determining who ought to be admitted into the visible Church proves it equally improper in the present case. The impossibility is the same in both. Therefore nothing further need be added for the confirmation of this point until Mr. Wood’s weighty and convincing arguments have first been answered.

CHAP. VIII. Holding forth what may be satisfying. 

The answering of the third question, to wit, what is to be accounted satisfying, and what is to be rested on in such a case by Church officers, will clear and confirm this more. Before we answer, we premise:

That a distinction is to be made between what is satisfying to a Church-judicatory, so as to admit an offending person to all privileges, as if the offense had not been, and what may be satisfying to halt further proceedings, and prevent excommunication. For, I suppose, a person’s satisfaction may not be sufficient as to the first, which yet may be sufficient as to the second, as (for instance) it may be thought of Simon Magus in Acts 8:24. He, after Peter’s rebuke, carried himself so that Peter did not proceed to cast him out; yet he may well be esteemed, notwithstanding such professed conviction, not to have had the full privileges of a Church member instantly. And this may proceed either from the grossness of an offense (such as that was), or the unsatisfying nature of a person’s satisfaction, or both; in which cases edification requires some time of trial, before there be a proceeding either to an excommunication, or to admitting to former liberties.

We would distinguish (which is akin to the former) between that which is not fully satisfying, and that which is altogether dissatisfying; for there may be a middle ground, as suppose, that a man by silence should accept a reproof, or in words and carriage express something which speaks neither seriousness nor mocking. We suppose it is hard instantly to judge that person either to be obstinate, or yet to have full access to all Ordinances.

To the question then we answer, that for full satisfaction, so as to have access to all privileges, there is required a sober, serious acknowledgment of the offense, with the expression of an unfeigned-like purpose to walk inoffensively, especially in reference to these former offenses; and where this is present, we say it is sufficient. When we speak of a sober, serious acknowledgment, we speak of it as it stands contradistinguished on the one side from sincere grace; for one may have this, and not have that. And as on the other side, it is distinguished not only from gross contempt and profane mocking, but from gross dissimulation appearing to be such, or from carnal indifference and unseriousness. By theologians, this is called moral seriousness, or sincerity (as it is distinguished from that which is gracious), and usually is in subtle legalistic hypocrites, and sometimes may be in some gross persons in temporary fits. It cannot be better expressed than it is by the forementioned worthy author Mr. Wood (Part I, p. 30), that is: that which is not openly and discernibly fake, histrionic, scenic, and hypocritical in that hypocrisy which is gross; but, all circumstances being considered by which ingenuity is estimated among men giving credit one to another, there appears no reason why the man may not and ought not to be esteemed, as to the matter, to think and purpose as he speaks—from whatever habitual principle it proceeds, whether from a saving principle, or whether from a common operation of the Spirit only. Thus far he.

If it be asked, how this seriousness may be discerned, it may again be inquired: How is a man accustomed to be thought serious in his pursuit after anything? I grant this is not only to be gathered from his words or carriage possibly at one time. But, 1. Will not seriousness, even in a particular matter, manifest itself in a man’s manner of urging it? 2. It manifests itself in a man’s using of fit means for attaining of it, which are suitable to that end. 3. By his carriage, abstaining from such things as may any way make his profession to be suspect-like. And 4. Not doing this for a day, or upon a particular occasion, but for a time continuing constant and earnest therein, with such affectionateness and earnestness in the necessary circumstances, that whatever be the motive that sways such a man, yet that he appears to be morally serious and thorough in the thing cannot be denied. So in this case, often there may be a conviction that persons are serious, and are affected so that we may expect they will endeavor really the preventing of such an offense, and yet we may not be able to judge them so convincingly sincere, because to that there is more required—to wit, a new decision whether that seriousness be moral only, or gracious, according to the principles, ends, motives, etc., which cannot be so evidenced externally as seriousness in general may be.

What if any say that charity ought to judge such a man sincere, seeing it can have no more? Answer 1: What may be a person’s private thoughts upon these grounds we are not to determine; we only say that this acknowledgment comes not to be judged by a Church judicatory upon that account. And 2: These who desire more for the constituting of Church members require, beside this, evidences of the work of grace upon the heart, and expressions and narrations to that purpose. And indeed, if the accounting of a person to be gracious and sincere were the sole account upon which a person were to be admitted or restored to an actual right to the Ordinances, such a serious profession would not be sufficient for the convincing of Church officers of a person’s graciousness even probably. For that which is to be accounted a probable sign of saving grace must be that which, though it does not always hold and be convincing, yet for the most part does so; for if it does more ordinarily fail than hold, it cannot be called probable. But experience in all times will confirm this, that more frequently such a profession fails, and afterward the person is found not to be gracious; therefore it cannot be a probable sign, nor are we to account it such. We suppose that if all the Churches of Christ that have been gathered, and all the penitents that have been received, were compared together, it will be found that there have been many more hypocrites than sincere believers; yet in these cases this serious profession was called for. And though it might be pleaded that charity may construe the best of a person where the case is doubtful, yet (to speak abstractly of a sign) to account that a probable sign of sincerity, and such which ought to sway charity to account a person gracious, when yet it is clear in reason that such a sign is ordinarily but an evidence of moral sincerity, but not of saving grace, were against reason. For even in bodily diseases, that cannot be counted a probable sign of health, to ground a judgment of such a person’s liveliness, with which many more do die than recover. Nor can it be called uncharitableness because the profession is not so accounted; for it is charity here to account the person serious, and to think as he says, and not be dissembling therein, although it be not impossible for a dissembling person to come all that length in outward evidences and profession. But to believe that he is indeed so as he says or thinks is not a thing which charity is bound positively to conclude, but at the most, by judging nothing to the contrary, to forbear any judging of the party till time evidences more afterward. And I suppose there are few who have experience but know that there are many cases wherein they are fully satisfied to judge the person serious, and yet dare not determine of their sincerity and graciousness, yea, even as to the probability thereof, although they dare not deny but it is possible; yet durst they not found a sentence of absolution upon that as such to their own satisfaction, although upon the former account they can: which evidently shows that these two considerations may be separated.

Hence, the first does follow: that whatever be a private person’s account of such a profession, yet it is not considered by the Judicatory as the evidence of sincerity in their being satisfied with it. Because: 1. It can be no evidence thereof, as is said; and we would be necessitated then to say (if sincerity were the account upon which a Church judicatory were to be satisfied) that either they behoved to have that evidence proven and made evident to them, or they behoved to proceed without any certain, yea, or probable evidence. For certainly, that which gives a Judicatory warrant to proceed to declare a person to have right to any privilege must both be a thing that is relevant in itself, and evident in the proof thereof in reference to that party. But none of these can be said; therefore, the judging such a thing to be sincere is not the account on which they proceed. This cannot be said to be a certain proof of sincerity, yea, none will deny but it is difficult, if not impossible, for one to have infallible proof of another’s sincerity. Then it must be said that it is but a probable proof that can be given of sincerity. To which we reply: 1. That this profession formerly described cannot be called such, as has been shown. So it would follow that a Church judicatory does account a man sincere, and does admit him to such privileges as they ought to admit only such unto, and yet it was not made so much as probable to them that he was such. 2. Although it did probably evidence him to be such, yet that were not enough if that were the sole account upon which they were to proceed; because no judicial procedure in determining a man’s right will go upon probabilities, because the Law decides not upon a probable, but upon a real right. And indeed, if in this case sincerity were the ground of procedure, no man could judge but doubtingly and upon conjecture, and so could he not have peace afterward, because it was still uncertain to him whether he had determined warrantably or not. Yea, if it should be said (which yet will not be sufficient) that it may give a man peace if in his charity he accounts the person sincere, although indeed he be not so, this will not quiet the mind. For I put no question but experience will teach any that are tender that there are many cases that, if they were put to it, they durst not, even according to their own charity and opinion, determine of a person’s sincerity, so as to take upon them a decision in that, either by determining the person to be sincere or not, and so of his admission or seclusion to or from Church ordinances and privileges.

Second, the account upon which we admit, and the proof thereof also, must be proportionable and opposite to the account and proof upon which we debar; for binding and loosing are both of the same nature, acts of the same power, in reference to the same end, and the one of them answers to the other. Now, when we bind a man for a scandal: 1. It is not accepted as a ground of binding until it be proven and made evident, and not probably only; therefore, nothing can be the account upon which we can loose but that which may be evidently proven also. For it looks not suitable to bind a man upon clear evidence and to exclude him from a right, and to admit him again only upon probabilities and presumptions, much less where the proof does not amount so high. Again, 2. When a person is shut out, he is not shut out upon the account that he is unrenewed, or upon the account that such an act was not sincere, or that he appeared to be such; but he is shut out because it was scandalous to others and unbecoming the Gospel, even though the person’s sincerity should not be questioned. Therefore, by the rule of contraries, it follows that it is not sincerity which is the account upon which Church officers are to loose.

If it be asked then, under what notion or upon what account that moral, serious profession is to be accepted as satisfying? We answer: upon this account, as it is apparently serious and edifying, without determining whether it be sincere or not, but as convinced that by such a profession the prejudice and offense that came by the former miscarriage (and left a blot upon the Church, and a stumbling block before others) may be removed. So that, as it was unbecoming a Church member to commit such a scandalous sin, so now by such a serious profession, that blot of making Christianity to be accounted a fostering of profanity is wiped away, that stumbling block of his example is taken out of the way, so that this profession may be edifying to prevent the stumbling of any other upon his scandal, and the accepting thereof may look like a hopeful means of edifying the person for the time to come, and recovering him from that snare he was in. And so, as his scandalousness in these respects was the account upon which he was actually, or was to have been, sentenced, so oppositely thereto this serious profession—having a proportionable edification, or of itself a tendency to edifying in all the respects mentioned going along with it—is the account upon which it is accepted as satisfying, without determining of the sincerity thereof: leaving the person to answer before God for that, and before men to bring forth fruits meet for repentance, which was John’s way in dealing with such as came to his baptism in Matthew 3, upon whose sincerity we think it is clear that he did in no way decide; but of this enough. We come to confirm our answer.

For confirming of this—to wit, that such sober and serious profession of repentance is sufficient without further inquiry after the graciousness or sincerity thereof—we may consider these grounds:

First, if such a profession be sufficient for admitting members to the Church, then such is also sufficient for the receiving of offending members and continuing them in their former privileges; for no reason can be given why there should be greater rigidity for readmitting to the actual use of Church privileges a Christian after he has fallen into drunkenness, fornication, etc., than was requisite for the admitting of a Heathen, possibly guilty of these same sins beside. But the first is true, as is irrefragably and convincingly demonstrated by the forementioned worthy author Mr. Wood. Therefore, etc.

Second, it may be supposed that a gracious man, of whose graciousness there is no question in the charity of any, falls into some scandal; what is to be accounted satisfying in him must be satisfying in others. Now, it is not any conviction of the graciousness of his state that can be satisfying in this case, nor yet is that the account upon which we can proceed, because that is never questioned even when he is under the offense. If it be said it must be the sincerity and graciousness of his particular act of repentance, answer: 1. It is difficult to give judgment of the state of the person, but more difficult to give judgment of the graciousness of a particular act. 2. Suppose such a person had a particular acknowledgment so circumstanced as is formerly described in this moral sincerity, would not that be sufficiently satisfying? And if it be satisfying in one, in reference to a particular offense, why not in another? Because: 1. There is one rule given by Jesus Christ to all. 2. The removing of one offense relates to the offense given, and not to the state of the person who gave it. Therefore, if that satisfaction be sufficient to remove that particular offense in one, it must also be so in reference to another; because the question here is not what may be sufficient to evidence a person to be gracious, but what may be sufficient in a person to remove such a particular offense. If it be said that it is accepted of that gracious person as satisfying because he is accounted to be gracious, it may still be urged: The question is not whether the person be gracious, but whether that act of repentance of his be so or not? For it cannot be denied but a gracious person may have acts of hypocrisy, and in particular acts be carnal. Either then such a person must be excluded though he be gracious, and in this respect seriously does profess repentance (which were hard to do), or he must be upon that profession admitted, and so that must be sufficient for Church satisfaction, as is said.

Third, that which ought to satisfy a Brother in private, or after his taking of two or three witnesses with him, and which may be accounted a hearing of a private admonition—that sort of repentance ought to be satisfying to the Church officers. Because “tell the Church” succeeds to the contempt of private admonition, and therefore they are to obtain by their interposing of authoritative rebukes what the other did not obtain, and so they are to rest satisfied when that is obtained, as the gradation in Matthew 18 is clear; hearing of the Church being, in respect of the effects, that same which hearing of the private admonitions is, to wit, the obtaining of satisfaction. But the former is true, to wit, a Brother ought to rest satisfied with such a sober, serious profession and acknowledgment as gives him ground to judge him really affected for his offending, and under a purpose to abstain and amend for the time to come. And who will say that a Brother in such a case can rationally complain of another as not having had his admonition? So neither can the Church proceed further when her admonition has that weight, seeing there had been no access for her judicially to have admonished if so much had formerly been obtained. And if it may be said that such a private admonition so successful did gain the offending Brother, is not that same to be said of the Church’s admonition having that success? And when he is gained, are not they to rest satisfied? And yet we suppose that none will say that by “gaining” in that place real conversion is intended, and that a private Brother should insist to the uttermost till he be satisfied in that.

Fourth, we may argue thus: if such a profession, and a person’s amendment in the manner spoken, be the hearing and gaining that is intended in Matthew 18, then are Church officers to be satisfied therewith. But the former is true, as appears thus: the Church’s satisfaction must be in respect to her speaking; her speaking to the party must be with respect to the complaint made to her by a particular person; that complaint, again, must have respect to what offended him, which is some particular act having offense with it, and it was not the ungracious state of the person (for so the words, “If thy brother offend thee,” etc., import). Now, from the first to the last, such satisfaction as is described may be satisfying in reference to such a particular offense, and be sufficient for removing the same and restoring the person to the esteem and condition which formerly he was in; and therefore it is to be accounted as satisfying by the Church. And if more were to be inquired for, it were to make the satisfaction beyond the offense, which were unjust.

Fifth, that which may be accepted as a satisfaction from an Heretic, as the satisfying fruit of a public admonition, cannot be refused as satisfaction in other cases; for if circumspectness and rigidity are to be used in any case, it is in this. But a serious acknowledgment of an error and an abandoning of it indeed is to be accepted for Church satisfaction from an Heretic, and as the fruit of a public admonition, and he in that respect is supposed to be gained; therefore, etc. That this is to be accepted from him may be gathered from Titus 3:10: “A man that is an heretic, reject after the first and second admonition.” Where these things are clear: 1. That an Heretic that continues so, and hears not the Church, is to be rejected. 2. That an Heretic renouncing his errors after admonition, and not continuing such, is not to be rejected, and so is not to be accounted an Heretic or under that scandal of heresy; and therefore his disclaiming of it is to be accounted satisfying as to the Church officers. Otherwise it would follow that although he renounced his heresy in that serious and morally sincere manner, yet were he still to be dealt with as such by the Church, except they were satisfied in the sincerity of his grace, which is contrary to Paul’s direction and the end of that public admonition—which is not given him because of his unrenewed state, but because of his heresy. Now, that being taken away and satisfied by his submission, the admonition must be acknowledged to be satisfied, and so he is neither to be dealt with as an Heretic, nor as obstinate, but as one who has heard the Church’s admonition.

Sixth, from 2 Thessalonians 3:6, 14, 15, we may gather the same; for we have these things clear: 1. That there were some there who walked disorderly as to some particular acts. 2. That the Apostle accounts that disorderly walking to be scandalous, and judicially to be taken notice of if it be not removed. And 3. What that satisfaction is which removes the same is expressed by him in verse 14: “If any man obey not our word by this epistle,” etc. So that it was actual amending of what was scandalous, and thereby giving obedience to his direction, which was so to be accounted. And in that case, a brother offending was neither further to be noted, nor to be esteemed scandalous, without any further inquiry to be had of the graciousness of his state, or the principle, ends, or motives of his obedience.

Seventh, it may appear thus: that which may remove reproach from the Ordinances, and offense in reference to those that are without, is to be accounted satisfying; because that is one of the ends of Discipline, to stop the mouths of such as are without. Now as it is not anything within, or the want of sincerity, which does offend them and open their mouths, so this morally sincere and real change (to speak so) is sufficient to satisfy them—at least, it cannot be said that they can reach further. This argument alone, we acknowledge, might not seem to be cogent; yet considering that what is offensive is some external thing having a proportionable offensiveness both to those that are within and also to those that are without, and a thing is offensive because it is apt to offend such, there ought therefore also a proportionableness to be between what removes an offense in reference to both.

Eighth, if we consider the proper object, nature, and end of the key of Discipline, as it is abstractly considered as contradistinct from the key of Doctrine, we will find that no more by it can be expected. For: 1. Its proper object is somewhat that is scandalous, and so it reaches only to restrain, regulate, and judge the outward man, or somewhat in the outward conversation firstly, though the fruit of that has a further look mediately. The key of Doctrine again, or the Word, reaches in, and becomes a judge of the thoughts and intents of the heart; and to make Discipline judge the inner man in this respect were to confound these two keys which the Lord has made distinct. And therefore, if Discipline has any influence upon the inner man savingly, it is but mediately by condemning his outward practices and him as such, or making directions, reproofs, etc., in the Word more weighty. 2. The key of Discipline does only shut from outward privileges, and does not shut from any spiritual interest in Christ, but as it concurs to confirm some threatening in the Word, which debars many from saving promises and the things contained in them, which Discipline may admit to outward privileges. 3. There is a difference in respect of absolution also: to wit, the Word, when it absolves, it does absolve from the curse of God, and gives access to the promises and a title to the things promised; Discipline again does but absolve from outward Censures and restraints, and does but give right to Church privileges. 4. There are different conditions and qualifications upon which these two keys bind and loose: for the Word opens to none but upon condition of sincere faith and repentance, and absolves none but real Believers, pronouncing all unbelievers to be under the curse; again, Discipline (as such) cannot shut out men from external privileges because they are not regenerate and sincerely gracious, and so in that respect it must have a different condition of shutting men out, or it must consider them upon another account in excluding them from Church privileges than the Word does in excluding them from saving promises—to wit, it considers them as scandalous and unbecoming the Gospel, whatever their state be, and so it may censure Believers, as the key of Doctrine may shut out the most subtle hypocrite which the other cannot reach. Therefore also must it be a different account upon which Discipline does admit or restore men to outward privileges and absolve men from outward Censures than that upon which the Word does admit to saving privileges. And seeing this last is sincere faith and repentance, the other must have somewhat different from this, upon the account whereof it gives right, which can be no other thing than the moral sincerity mentioned. 5. Upon these differences follows another (which does confirm all the former): to wit, a diversity that is in the manner of binding and loosing by these two keys. For when a Minister uses the key of Doctrine, he does exclude from heaven and saving privileges but conditionally, and he can warrantably exclude no particular professor absolutely. So no Minister can absolve absolutely by the key of Doctrine, but conditionally—to wit, if the person believes that he speaks unto; for it runs on these terms: “If thou believest, thou shalt be saved.” But again, in the exercise of the key of Discipline it is not so: no Church judicatory does debar a man from privileges conditionally, if he believe not, but absolutely he is debarred because of some present scandal; and although the person were or should become a real Believer, yet he continues bound from outward privileges by the key of Discipline until that scandal be removed. So when they receive any into Church communion, they do not absolve them from their former Censure and give them right to Church privileges upon condition they believe, but absolutely that Censure is removed, and they are admitted unto these privileges.

If it be asked, what is the reason of this difference between these two keys? Answer: It is, first, because the ground upon which we loose and bind with the key of Discipline is something obvious to men’s view, wherein they may warrantably judge and proceed, and therefore that is done absolutely. But in the key of Doctrine it is not so; for men cannot tell who really believe and who not, and it cannot by judicial proofs be made out; therefore they cannot bind or loose but conditionally. Secondly, God has committed the outward man to be the object of Discipline, but the inner man and conscience is reserved to the Word and Doctrine, and men have not gotten authority over consciences and hearts. Therefore, what concerns the outward man and outward privileges may be determined absolutely; but what concerns the conscience and inner man, only conditionally, because He has reserved the absolute decision of that to Himself. Therefore there is a sixth difference also: the Word may and does bind indefinitely—that is, persons so and so qualified, without making application in binding or loosing to individual persons, and does not so bind or loose but conditionally, as is said. But Discipline strikes at individual persons, and as such does not otherwise affect; for suppose an indefinite sentence of excommunication against persons so qualified to be pronounced, it debars none from Church privileges as it is such, and for what influence it has further, it is as it comes under the key of Doctrine, which does bind or loose such, but not as it is under the key of Discipline, and that for the reasons mentioned.

From these grounds we may see how warrantable and necessary it is to put a difference between saving grace, which is the condition upon which the key of Doctrine absolves, and serious profession, and a fair, inoffensive carriage, which is the condition upon which the key of Discipline absolves. And we may see also what absurdities would follow the confounding of these. And indeed we see no other way how these two keys may be kept distinct but this.

To sum up this from what is said, we may, ninthly, conclude: if every simulated profession be not sufficient, and if gracious sincerity be not to be inquired for, then this moral sincerity and amendment is to be accepted as satisfying, and that which properly Church judicatories are to inquire into, for a fourth cannot be conceived. But the former is truth. Therefore, etc.

Lastly, that which was satisfying for giving access to the Ordinances among the Jews after uncleanness must be satisfying now for removing of offenses; but such a serious profession was satisfying then. For: 1. It cannot be denied that there was a separating of some for uncleanness from the Ordinances, and it is at large and strongly made out by that learned vindicator of Church government and Discipline, Mr. Gillespie, that there was separation for moral uncleanness. But however, ceremonial uncleanness did then prove ground enough of exclusion, because so the Law of God had appointed it, even as now He has appointed other gross sinners to be cast out. 2. It is clear that there was some satisfaction required, as washing, offering of sacrifices, and such like, before they could be admitted. 3. It cannot be said that a mocking, palpable, irreverent manner of performing these things would have been accepted by the Priest, but would have been more offensive; nor yet can any say that inquiry was made after their end, principles, or the graciousness of their act. So the assumption is clear. Neither can the connection of the minor premise be denied, if we consider: 1. That there was no less moral holiness called for from the Jews than from us. 2. That there was as great external strictness for keeping up the sanctity of external Worship. 3. If we consider that their Ordinances and ours are materially the same. 4. If we consider that Christ, even in respect of the external administration of His Kingdom and Discipline, is not more rigid or restricted in His admitting to privileges now than then—yea, that He is even in that more condescending to us under the days of the Gospel. 5. If we may reason from the Lord’s manner of admitting unto His Church then to His admitting unto the Church now upon the same qualifications that were satisfying then, then we may also conclude from what was satisfying then for the admitting of persons excluded, unto the admitting of them now. And this is fully made out, beside others, by worthy Mr. Wood in that forecited solid and learned Treatise, and before him (to which he relates) by learned Mr. Baxter in his dispute with Tombes.

CHAP. IX. Concerning what is to be done, when men appear neither serious nor obstinat.

It may now be asked, what is to be done in reference to those who, after some gross offense, can neither be counted thus serious, nor yet obstinate? Answer: such cases may be frequent, concerning which we say: first, that it is neither fit altogether to absolve them, as being fully satisfied, nor yet to proceed to the highest sentence with them, nor to leave them altogether without a rebuke. But in the second place, we say that it is fit to proceed to rebuke them according to the direction in 1 Timothy 5:20. Because: 1. This rebuke may be a means, through God’s blessing, to humble them and to restrain such an offense. 2. It is also useful in reference to others, although the man’s own carriage and acknowledgment be not every way satisfying; for the Apostle’s direction to rebuke him openly respects more the offense past and the fruit that may follow to him and others, than any present satisfying frame in the person to be rebuked.

When it is found meet thus publicly to rebuke, the circumstances and manner are to be adverted to. 1. Although the designating of a particular place be not in itself necessary, nor in every case expedient, yet for the solemnity of the reproof, it is not unsuitable—it being such as is rather accommodated for the edification of the whole Congregation, than otherwise pointed at as a place of penance or punishment, or yet as a mark of reproach, and such like, which wrongs the nature of Christ’s Ordinance; and circumstances should be so ordered that the appearance of that may be avoided. 2. It should be gone about with much gravity and reverence in respect of all that are concerned. The Minister especially is to carry weightily and authoritatively, having words fitted for the edifying of the Congregation, the humbling of the person, the convincing of both, and for the credit and weight of Christ’s Ordinance before all. The party rebuked should mind whose Ordinance it is, and be suitably affected as the receiving of a particular rebuke from Jesus Christ calls for. The onlookers also should be grave, having respect to Christ’s Ordinance, tenderness to the person offending, but indignation at the offense; and this should be testified by their carriage, so that thereby the authority and solemnity of all may have the deeper stamp upon the person. And for attaining of this, something should be gravely spoken to the hearers regarding their use thereof, according to the case; and it may be that some address to God in prayer together, in reference thereto, before or after the rebuke, would not be useless for that end.

If it be asked whether speaking in public by the person rebuked is always necessary, answer: 1. Although it may be often useful and expedient, yet in ordinary rebukes for ordinary scandals, where no contempt has preceded, we conceive it not simply necessary. First, because though the rebuke be clear in the Word, yet this is not, by the same evidence, always required. Second, their appearing to receive it has an implicit assent to and acceptance of it. Third, the effect of the rebuke is rather to be gathered from their after carriage, for it has with it an obliging weight to them, and a virtual certification before the people, whether they express anything or not. Besides, everyone cannot edifyingly speak, and in that case, the Minister’s rebuke is appointed to edify others and to remove that offense from them.

Yet there are two cases especially wherein we think this is expedient and necessary unto edification. 1. When either by the atrocity of some offense, or continuance in contempt, a person has been in process toward Excommunication; or when there is a relapse after a former rebuke. In such cases it is for the edification of the people to know upon what grounds the Eldership halts from proceeding; and engagements publicly and explicitly taken on before a Congregation are often more weighty to the person. And if there be a failing, there is the greater evidence against them for after proceeding.

Suppose there has been some sentence binding or shutting out the person formerly; in that case, we conceive speaking in public to be necessary for confirming the people in their love to him again, which was hazarded by his former evident fall, and an implicit accepting of a reproof is not sufficient in such a case.

There may be also other cases: as suppose one has been carried away with error, which he has frequently vented before men, or in some such case where it may be edifying to have it from the party’s own mouth, especially if the person be in such a frame, or of such ability, that by so doing he may edify. But this is to be decided by the prudence of the overseers.

If it be asked again, how is he to be accounted of after this rebuke? We answer: even as by some competent continuance of time he discovers the seriousness or unseriousness of his profession. So that if he relapse, he is the more inexcusable and to be proceeded with in due manner; but if he reform himself and carry himself to the view of others seriously, he is not to be accounted as scandalous, because it cannot be said that he has refused to hear the Church in that public admonition. A public rebuke does not of itself bind anyone and shut them out as scandalous (yea, it gives not ground for it if obstinacy follows not); but if it be listened to and received, it prevents that, it being a right satisfying part of Christianity to admit of and to improve a rebuke. Yet we think it incumbent on Church judicatories, after some competent time, to inquire into the after carriage of such, and so accordingly to determine whether they have satisfyingly accepted of the admonition or not. And therefore the person so rebuked ought to have such a sentence before he can plead full admission to all privileges, if at the time his profession was not satisfying. This is useful for the person’s benefit, when he knows he is still to be looked upon in a special manner as a sickly member of the body. And it is also agreeable to reason; for if when a private person gives an admonition he is to judge of the fruit of it, whether it be satisfying, and if the Church judicatory, when they admonish judicially, are to weigh whether the effects be satisfying or not—so by the like reason, when an admonition is publicly given, ought they to inquire what has followed, and if that be satisfying or not.

If it be asked whether in no case an offender may be brought immediately to the public except by the former steps, and upon supposition that these be fruitless, answer: it may be in these two or three cases: 1. When the offense, being of a gross nature, is public and open, so that many are in hazard of being infected, in that case a private rebuke would not be sufficient, because respect is to be had to the good of others. And so in some cases, even though as to the person’s own conviction and carriage a Church judicatory may be satisfied, yet there is a necessity for the reason foresaid of a public rebuke. Yet every offense that is known to more than one is not to be accounted an offense of this nature. Because from that word of Christ, “Take with thee two or three witnesses,” etc., it is evident that even after those are made acquainted with the scandal, it is not public except obstinacy follow. Yea, it would appear that such a scandal might be known to others, when yet one private person might only admonish; and if the admonition were accepted, halt further proceedings. And in case the fact be denied, then he is thereafter to bring two or three joint witnesses, who may convince the party offending of the truth of the fact as well as of the nature thereof, by their joint testifying that the party offended had reason to seek satisfaction in such a thing. Otherwise, if that were only a private offense which is known to one, supposing the party offending to deny the fact, there were no opportunity for an offended brother to pursue the same, and by witnesses to make it out, if his private admonition should be rejected. And this may be one reason also why those two or three are called witnesses, whose part is to confirm the matter of fact, as the Law cited there to that purpose demonstrates. Nor is it always necessarily thus public when it is made known to a Church officer or a Church judicatory, because in that case even they may find it more edifying to admonish privately than publicly; and it is their part rather to hinder the spreading of a scandal than to make the same needlessly more public. An offense, then, that is to be accounted public—that is, which is so in respect of its notoriety or publicness, and such as is not the object of private admonition, but whereof a Church judicatory is immediately to take notice—may be considered in respect of its first instant or in respect of some following circumstance; for what is required in the nature of the sin itself has been spoken to already. It is public in the first respect: 1. When it is done before so many as probably cannot be satisfied with private admonition, so that thereby there is a hazard to many of being scandalized. 2. It is public when it seems to be done with contempt and a high hand, as if a person were owning the same. Thus a scandal that has fewer witnesses may be accounted public, when another, it may be, actually known to as many, is not to be accounted such, because in this case there is no access to private admonition, the person being like a swine, ready to turn on the admonisher. Thus, suppose Absalom’s incest had not been actually known to many, yet the very circumstances of his doing it openly, and purposely that it might be known, made it of a public nature. Thus sometimes it is more necessary to take notice of an offense committed in a public place, though, it may be, few know the same, than of a thing done more privately, because as to them it might have been public to many; and it shows a humor and corruption that is beyond private admonition when a thing is so circumstanced. 3. Sometimes offenses will have a horror and an indignation awakened against them, even in respect of such circumstances. As to be drunk, lascivious, and such like are offenses; but to be so in a market-place, or in public streets, even supposing it to be on a day when few actually see it, awakens an indignation in the hearts of sober men, as being an affront to Religion and Order, and inconsistent with Christianity and Civility, much more than if it had been in a private place, or privately; for that is “before the Sun” to do so, as Zimri’s act was, which provoked Phinehas’s zeal. 4. An offense is public when it is generally accounted to be a certain truth, and not a suspicion only—as being a thing in its evidence known to so many (besides what is reported to others) that it cannot be supposed that an ingenuous mind can have opportunity to deny or evade the same, without some indignation in the hearts of those who know it. 5. Sometimes an offense is to be accounted public when, though it may be many are not witnesses thereof, yet many are in hazard of being infected thereby: as suppose those witnesses to be such as cannot rest quiet in a private satisfaction, but they have either spread it, or are in hazard of spreading it, and, it may be, long afterward they make it a ground of reproach. In this case it becomes a scandal not only to the first witnesses, but also to those to whom it is reported; so that although it was not at first public, yet it becomes so by the rumor thereof. This infectiousness may also proceed from the time wherein it is committed, the person who commits it, the nature of the fact that is committed (which may more readily ensnare others than facts of some other nature), and from those also before whom it was committed; therefore in such cases it is necessary that public notice be taken thereof.

Therefore, in the second place, we said that some offenses not very public in respect of the fact, yet may, by some concurring circumstances, be such that the bringing of them into public may be necessary for the edifying of the Church at such a time; then that way is to be taken. As suppose: 1. That such a sin is in some places scarce counted a sin. Or, 2. If it be secretly and frequently in use among others. Or, 3. If the person found guilty be generally suspected of loose and untender walking in such things, although particulars be not public. Or, 4. If they be under false pretexts of tenderness, ready to seduce others to something sinful, or in the like cases. In which, though the fact be not so public, yet the scandal, or hazard, and the benefit of a rebuke are public; and therefore that way is to be followed, because they are necessary for the edifying of the Church, which is the end wherefore public rebukes are appointed. The same may be said of atrocious, horrible crimes, which being but known to few, yet are not to be, nor cannot be passed with a mere private admonition—such as witchcraft, incest, etc., which are defiling sins, the bringing whereof into public honors God, the avenger and discoverer of such works of darkness. Suppose also that the evidencing of something may serve to remove some former prejudice—as if it had been thought that an innocent person had been father of such a child, or actor of such a murder; if God brings it about that those who truly are guilty are discovered, it is not to be kept secret, because it is the removing of a former stumbling block, and may keep others from sinning in misjudging an innocent person, and it also glorifies God, whose wise way is to be observed in such dispensations.

Although a fact be not public, yea, in some cases although it be not true that there has been any ground of offense given, yet: 1. If the report of such an act be publicly rumored; Or, 2. If such presumptions thereof be public, which are ready to leave the impression of the thing; Or, 3. If the fame or rumor of such a thing has come to such a height that either it is believed by many to be true (and that by such who are neither too simply credulous without all presumptions, nor malicious or infected with prejudice in reference to the person); Or, suppose that a person is accounted to be habitually in secret evils, the ripping up whereof might be edifying—in such and such like cases, a Church judicatory is at the first instant to meddle with, and inquire into the same. Because, although possibly there may be no ground, yet the offense is great, and may stumble many as if it were so; and the neglecting thereof cannot but be offensive, whereas inquiry therein is useful, whether the rumor be grounded or not. But in this there should be great tenderness and prudence used in considering both upon whom, by whom, and upon what occasion the report is raised and entertained, and whether delving therein be edifying or not.

Upon supposition that private persons be defective in giving admonitions, or following them before a Church judicatory, and yet there be pregnant presumptions of miscarriages in such and such persons, although they be not public; or suppose, through fear, ill-grounded affection, or other carnal respects, others should concur to keep from public view the offenses of some person, to the stumbling of themselves, in becoming partakers of their sin, and to the prejudice of others: I say, in such like cases, a Church judicatory is to inquire into the carriage of such a person, and to put others to declare and testify therein, although they be not complained of, and although the scandal be not so every way obvious. Because admonition is needful both for the good of the person offending, and of others also; and when private persons become defective, Church officers are bound rather to interpose immediately than to suffer such a person to continue under sin, to the hazard of himself and others. For they must either do it, or it is to be left undone, which would be a stumbling block to many, and strengthen wickedness exceedingly, in case untender men happened only to be accessory to the knowledge of the offenses of each other (as often it is). Yet though it be necessary for a Church judicatory to interpose, it is not always necessary to bring the matter to a public rebuke; but as from consideration of the thing, person, or other circumstances, it shall be thought fit to rest in a private admonition or not.

From which we may see the necessity of prosecuting parties, and leading witnesses (in case the matter be denied) without any particular accuser or informant: because in such cases, either public scandal of the thing, the nature of the Church officers’ oversight, or the edification of the body (which they are to prefer to everything) require that such a thing or person be put to trial.

CHAP. X. Clearing whether in Church-processes an Accuser be alwayes necessary.

If it be asked, concerning an accuser, whether it be necessary in all Church processes that one, under such a consideration, be fixed before there can be proceeding against any party in reference to trial, we answer in these assertions:

Assertion 1. It is not always necessary in every case that there should be a formal particular accuser, as may appear from the cases formerly instanced. For that any offense or offender should pass without being taken notice of (especially if offenses be continued in) is contrary to the end for which Church censures are appointed; and yet neither de facto is there always an accuser where there is an offense, nor de jure can any be constrained to be an accuser. Therefore it is necessary that in some cases there must be a process without an accuser, in this way of inquiry.

Assertion 2. Where an offended Brother follows Christ’s way in pursuing of an offense, he is not to be accounted an accuser formally, as the term of accusation is accustomed properly to be taken. Because: 1. To accuse often is a thing that may be omitted, but this kind of pursuit is laid on as a necessary duty. 2. To accuse respects some particular wrong and injury usually, and the following thereof imports a prejudice and hurt to the party accused. But this which respects offense without any particular injury proceeds from love, tends to the advantage and recovery of the party, and so properly cannot be called accusation. Yea, 3. When a person has followed the second step, and made out his private admonition by two or three witnesses, when he comes to the Church with them, neither of them can be accounted accusers any more than when he did privately speak to the person, or after that to those witnesses. Because all is duty, and a piece of that Christian mutual communion that brethren and members of the same body owe one to another, and to the body in common. Yet is he who so enters a complaint obliged to make it evident to the Judicatory; and if he has rightly performed the second step, and made it appear before two or three, there is no hazard or difficulty in this; but if he has failed in that, he ought not to have proceeded to this.

Assertion 3. We say that to have a formal accuser seems not so well to agree to the nature of ecclesiastical processes, and looks more like a civil Court. For: 1. If the offense be public, there is no accuser needful, as is said. 2. If it be private, no accuser is to be heard but in the ordinary method, because Christ’s Ordinance is not to be subservient to men’s passions, or to be the means of their seeking revenge for injuries. And therefore in some cases, though an accuser would undertake the pursuing of some process against a person where neither the scandal is flagrant, nor the party accused (after private admonition and conviction) obstinate, in that case the accusation might be rejected. Because so the accuser looks not like a Brother that is stumbled seeking the gaining of the other and his own satisfaction upon that account, but rather like a person that is irritated, vindictive, or malicious, to whose humor Church officers ought not to give way; neither does such an accusation become Christ’s Court. Yet, if the thing be indeed scandalous, Church officers are to inquire therein, and not to slight any means of evidence which may be had, lest profane persons’ mouths be opened. But that contentious and wrangling way of following processes by particular accusers against particular persons, as is accustomed in other Courts, we conceive in no way becomes the gravity and convincing way that ought to be in this; and we suppose in experience it is not often found to be edifying, but rather engenders hatred, prejudice, contention, and such like, which is altogether contrary to Christ’s scope.

Again, on the other side, there may be no particular accuser against the person, and yet it may be necessary that he be tried, as has been said.

Assertion 4. There may be some cases in which it is expedient to admit an accuser, and not to admit a process without one. As suppose one were under no ill report, and yet some gross scandal were imputed to him which was not of such fame, or had not such presumptions, as to give ground for a Church judicatory immediately to interpose, and the scandal being of such a nature as the trial thereof could neither be omitted nor closed in private: in that case, suppose one should complain of the Church’s negligence in the same, asserting the evidences to be clear, and offering to make them out. In such a case, I say, the Church can hardly refuse to hear him, lest they be thought partial; nor is there ground, nor is it fit for them immediately to pursue it. Therefore an accuser is expedient: so that, upon the one side, the Church’s impartiality may be vindicated in refusing the complaint of no sober man, nor the uttermost of any trial that in well-grounded reason they may expect; and, on the other side, that the mouths of some needless and too importunate complainers may be stopped, and they themselves found censurable, if either without cause they traduce the Church officers as negligent and partial while there is opportunity to make out before them such a truth if it be truth, or if precipitately and inconsiderately (if not maliciously) they have tabled a scandal against another as a public scandal which they cannot make out, and so have needlessly troubled a Church judicatory in such a matter, and sinfully wronged their neighbor.

For a process in such cases where it cannot be made out is scandalous; therefore, if a person rests not satisfied so as to abstain until he has trial put to the utmost, he is to be dealt with as a scandalous person, lest men take liberty, under the pretext of pursuing offenses, to defame others and abuse the Ordinance of Christ. And though it be just in such a case that he be materially dealt with as unjust accusers are accustomed to be in civil courts, yet this does not only flow from the consideration of such a person’s being a formal accuser, but from the nature of the deed, which is scandalous in such a measure, and that publicly, and therefore is to be restrained, whether the person takes on himself that formal consideration or not, lest yet, upon the matter, he continue publicly and importunately to press the pursuit. And we conceive the imposing of the title of accuser in such a case, or the making of it necessary that one take on himself that formal notion, is rather for convenience to restrain men’s inordinateness, and stop their mouths, and to add weight to the matter of the sentence if they fail, than as being simply necessary for making such a person to be accounted scandalous if he comes short.

CHAP. XI. Concerning what is to be done when the complaint is of some Injury is done to the complainer. 

There is one case yet to be inquired into: viz., how to account of a particular person his complaining of or pursuing an offense which carries with it a particular injury unto himself? As suppose that such a person did calumniate him, calling him false, covetous, hypocrite, thief, or such like, or did imprecate curses upon him?

Answer 1. If the way laid down were followed, and a public complaint made the last step, it may be there would be few of these complaints. Of this we have spoken already. 2. Although such injuries have with them a spiritual hurt also, and so indeed are real stumbling blocks to the spiritual state of the party injured, yet:

First, it is hard for men injured singly to abstract the scandal given them from the injury done them, and so to follow the offense with respect to their own and the other’s edification as to entertain no thoughts of revenge in the pursuing thereof. For certainly, often it is the reparation of a wrong, and to vindicate folks’ own name and credit, rather than edification, which in such cases is aimed at. Therefore we find ever the most irreligious, carnal, and proud persons hottest in such a pursuit, and with greatest difficulty to be satisfied; and the satisfaction intended by them is not any Christian gaining often, but some public shame, or such like. And therefore if that follow, although the person fall over again into many other scandals that are worse, or others shall sin more grossly, yet that stirs them not, neither are their complaints in such cases heard of.

Second, we find that such a case has often great difficulties with it, and readily much heat and carnalness; yea, in things that are personal between parties, it is more difficult for them to abstain from carnalness, or the appearance thereof, and also for Church judicatories to walk so as not to be thought partial to one of the sides, and so by intending the removal of one offense, more may be given. Therefore we would suppose such a procedure to be suitable to Christ’s order and ordinance:

That as much as may be, these personal things may be waived by private persons themselves who are so offended. Certainly men lose not by condescending in their particulars, and it may afterward tend more to the convincing of the party and others, and to the vindicating of themselves, that they forbear (at least, till the fervor be abated, both in them and in the offending party) than by kindling of their own passions by the passions of others, to hazard upon more sin and offense.

When such things occur, it is fit that Church officers should endeavor to compose and to remove them privately; yea, if any complaint come in a person’s heat, that yet notwithstanding, means be used to compose and allay the same; and if that fail, that the scandal be brought to public rather by the Eldership itself than by the party offended. Because so the thing, as scandalous, may be more abstractly considered, the person more easily convinced, and the heat of parties prevented, which often mar the beauty of the Ordinance, and so there is nothing overlooked that ought to be redressed.

If persons will needs enter their own complaint, then it should be inquired: First, whether it be really the injury to their name or outward condition that sways them? Or if it be the offense, that is, the stumbling block that goes along therewith, and is ready to hurt their spiritual estate, that does move them? This question is fit for curbing of carnal humors, and keeping the Ordinance of Christ from being abused and made subservient to men’s sinful passions. If it cannot be hidden that it is the injury which affects them, then should they be admonished for that, and remitted to follow their injury otherwise, and to pardon it as to any vindictive humor; yet the thing, as it is scandalous, should be still followed without them. Second, it should be inquired if they followed the private steps? And, third, what sort of satisfaction they aim at, and if it be the party’s gaining that they seek with their own satisfaction?

Sometimes there arises a new difficulty in such cases: as suppose one complained of for calumniating another should offer to make good his word, or what he has said. In such a case it is difficult for a Church judicatory to carry rightly: if proof be refused, the slanderous mouth is not stopped; and to admit it seems neither pertinent nor profitable to any Church end. This sometimes is one of the evils of making Church judicatories the stage of men’s passions. Yet in such a case we say:

That whether the thing be true or not, the casting of it up at such a time, and with such circumstances, was offensive; and therefore no following proof can exempt the offender from being accounted scandalous, because the end of bringing forth that was really the hurt of his brother, and neither private nor public edification.

Some manner of offered proof is indirect (as also some sort of slandering): as suppose one would complain of another as guilty of theft or some other sin, and give for the ground thereof some instances of corruption or deceit in their trade of merchandising, or taking some advantage by law or other ways, to the hurt of another. These are causes and matters wherein properly Church officers are neither fit nor called to decide; and the event thereof depends upon some civil contest, therefore are not meet to be admitted as the ground of a complaint or proof in a Church judicatory. Again, some manner of proof is more direct: as suppose one would prove by witnesses direct theft upon another. Yet considering that Church judicatories are not to be subservient to men’s passions, as has been said, and also that their end ought ever to be edification, and there being no probable ground to expect it in such a process, we conceive it were fit altogether to waive such contests. For, though there be a shaming of offenders allowed in Church discipline, yet it looks harsh to make it the means of bringing civil shame and infamy upon any. Because such a blot, as to be accounted or declared infamous, even as to civil things, is a civil punishment; and therefore is not to be the effect of a Church judicatory properly, although we will not deny but by accident these may be sometimes necessarily joined.

It may be asked, what if an offending party appearing professes repentance for their fault, etc., as has been desired, and should yet refuse to give obedience to such things and in such manner as is thought fit to be done by the Church officers for the removing of the offense?

Answer 1. It is not likely that any who are serious in their profession of repentance will stand on such a thing; and where that is, it is too probable an evidence of their dissembling, if some convincing reason cannot be given by them for swaying to that refusal. 2. Their disobedience is either in material things, or such as are but circumstantial. Again, it is either done with contempt, or with professed continued respect and a desire to satisfy. As for instance, some may refuse to receive a public rebuke where edification requires it, or to acknowledge their offense to an offended party; or they may be willing to appear, and willing to acknowledge their offense, but differ as to the time, place, manner, etc.

For the first: though a Church judicatory may wait for a time, yet can they not in some cases dispense with them, because otherwise they are not heard, nor is the end obtained; and therefore may process proceed, especially if that disobedience looks contemptuous.

For the second sort of disobedience—to wit, in the manner or circumstances of giving satisfaction—although in this also those who are serious to have offenses removed will not readily stick, yet if it be so, there is a difference between this and the former, if there be no discernible evidences of contempt in it. And in this, no question, Church judicatories have a greater latitude to do as may edify; wherein they are especially to take notice of these things:

First, that by too much rigidity in circumstances, they seem not unnecessarily to wrong them, or to lay too much weight of satisfaction upon such formalities. Second, that by too easy passing from such, they do not strengthen any to follow that example for the time to come. Third, that even in circumstances there be an equality in reference to these same scandals in all persons.

And if there be hazard in reference to any of these by condescending to alter or forbear a circumstance in a public rebuke, we conceive it is safer to abstain from that forbearance, and not to yield it; and yet not simply upon that account to pursue a process, but to continue dealing with the person while either he be convinced and brought, for the good of order and edification of the Church, to yield, or there be more clearness to do otherwise.