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CHAP. XVI. The remedies of divisions, arising from misapplication of power in ordination of Ministers, and admitting to, or debarring from, communion.

The fourth matter of controversy concerning Government is ordinarily some misapplication of that power, or what is apprehended to be so, in particular acts. As, 1. Ordaining such as were not thought worthy. 2. Deposing others, as was thought, unjustly. 3. Admitting to, or debarring from, communion without sufficient grounds respectively, and similar cases.

Upon the first ground arose the great schism of the Donatists, because of the Ordination of Caecilianus, whom they regarded as a Traditor. Of this sort also were the schisms that frequently occurred at Antioch, Constantinople, Alexandria, and other places, because some were ordained to the dissatisfaction of others. Sometimes the dissatisfaction was well grounded because the persons ordained were not worthy; sometimes it was groundless. But often it resulted at last in double Ordination and Separation.

Great care is needed to prevent these things, so that no just ground of dissatisfaction is given by the Ordination of an unworthy man at such a time, nor any opposite Ordination undertaken that would fix a schism in place, because such things are more difficult to remove, as has been said. Yet, supposing them to have occurred, these general considerations may be proposed for healing the division.

1. We will not find an Ordination easily accounted null, even though performed in a schism, as all the examples make clear. Yea, the Orthodox did not hesitate to account the Bishops and Presbyters ordained among the Donatists to be truly such, because they had the essentials of Ordination and had been ordained by Church Officers.

2. We suppose it necessary for peace that there should be no rigid insistence upon having particular Ordinations rectified to the prejudice of the Church in general, especially where the unfitness or unworthiness of the person is not easily demonstrated.

3. It seems right and just that no Ordination of this kind should establish an unworthy person in the Ministry, for that is not to be tolerated; although the presence of such a person is not a valid ground for continuing a division where his removal cannot be attained. And the most unquestionable Ordination as to its form cannot make someone a worthy Minister who otherwise is not a worthy person. In the conferences with the Donatists, the Catholics offered neither to challenge the Ordination of anyone among them who was otherwise worthy, nor to maintain anyone among themselves who was unworthy.

4. Yet union should not be suspended until this is done, but rather union is to be established so that it may be done, as in the instance formerly given. For, 1. this trial is the work of a united Church and will require joint strength and concurrence for carrying it out. 2. Union is a present duty, even though there should be some defect in such a trial; and a defect in that respect will not warrant division. 3. Union is not only a commanded duty but also a necessary means for promoting the trial and Censure of unworthy Ministers. For times of division are always times of greater liberty; Authority is thereby weakened, men are discouraged from pursuing such cases, and are otherwise diverted from them. 4. Division can never be regarded as the means of accomplishing that trial. Rather, it strengthens the person who is to be tried, lessens the number of zealous pursuers of such a design, and incapacitates men for this duty who otherwise might have been instrumental in it. 5. Besides, if the guilt is not so very obvious that it can be demonstrated concerning particular persons at such a time, it is safer to preserve certain peace in the Church than to hunt after an uncertain crime, as has often been said.

Fifthly, where a person’s remaining in a particular place is itself the ground of contention, and matters do not appear satisfactory in his conduct, even though gross misconduct cannot be demonstrated, we think it not unbecoming the Authority of Church Judicatories, which is given for edification, to appoint the removal of such a person from that place, as was formerly indicated. For it is a sad thing if a Minister’s being in one particular place should prove more obstructive to edification and the Church’s peace than if he were not a Minister at all.

And it well becomes that sincerity which a Minister ought to have in seeking the edification of the Church to yield to such advice and appointment, or willingly to propose the same himself. For Ministers are not to plead an interest in a Congregation simply as a man pleads his particular right. Everything of this kind ought to be done with respect to the edification of the body, the promotion of which ought to regulate both entries into and removals from particular places.

It is true that caution is necessary here, lest dangerous precedents be established. Yet, considering that a Minister who may somewhat peremptorily plead an interest, and that jure, in the Ministry itself cannot with the same strength of reason plead an interest in this or that particular Congregation; and considering also that it is a public good that is regarded, and not merely the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of some persons in a particular Congregation, we conceive that the preceding assertion cannot simply be denied.

Where there are contrary Ordinations, the matter is more difficult. Yet it should be considered that all these things of which we now speak are only particular matters. Therefore, although full satisfaction should not be obtained concerning them, they ought not to become stumbling blocks to the prejudice of union in general, in which the good of the Church is more eminently concerned, as has been said.

Yet where peace is sincerely intended, we suppose this difficulty may be overcome by one of those ways which have formerly been used in such cases.

1. Sometimes one person willingly yielded to another for the good of the Church. Thus Basil did in a case formerly mentioned, for which condescension he has always been highly commended. Neither can this be regarded as casting aside the care of such a people; rather, the contrary is true. It is more for their good that they should be united under one orthodox Minister, even though he is the weaker man, than that they should continue divided under two who are more able.

2. Sometimes, where there were two, it was thought good to unite them in their meetings and to agree that the one who lived longest should afterward be acknowledged alone, if no other occasion offered and neither was unworthy of the place, as in a case at Antioch formerly mentioned.

3. Sometimes both have been laid aside where neither was worthy, or where factions were strong for each party and the adherents of either side had developed deeply rooted prejudice against the other. This proposal was offered by Augustine to the Donatists for composing that difference arising from opposite Ordinations, which was frequent among them, almost every city having two Bishops. And this method has been followed in composing many schisms, even in later times.

4. Sometimes the party offended and wronged by an opposite Ordination has restrained the division to some degree by yielding, withdrawing, or suppressing the expression of his offense until some probable and regular remedy became available, choosing rather never to possess such a place than to obtain it by wronging the Church and maintaining an irregular schism when there was no orderly opportunity to remedy it.

Thus Eusebius, being offended that Lucifer had ordained Paulinus as a Bishop in Antioch over a party who rejected Eusebius and were called Eustathians, moderated his conduct and withdrew, waiting until a lawful decision might be obtained and resolving to submit himself to it.

Where men sincerely intend the good of the work, it is unlikely that some such way will not compose these difficulties. And if these means fail, we also find neighboring Bishops laboring to reconcile the parties; yea, sometimes men of Authority coming from very far away, and sometimes persons appointed by Civil Authority to negotiate concerning the matter, as occurred in the settlement of that schism at Antioch.

For schisms arising from such discontents are not ordinarily removed by mere Authority, because there is often something both of affection and conscience involved in the matter. There is therefore need of mutual and friendly conference, so that satisfaction may both be given and received.

CHAP. XVII. Remedies of divisions arising from the misapplication of power, in censuring, or sparing Ministers, reall or supposed.

Another part of the exercise of this power—which, when misapplied, or when it is thought to be misapplied, often becomes the ground of Church divisions—is the matter of Censuring and deposing Ministers, and that in two ways.

The first is when good men are deposed, or those who are supposed to be good, whereby persons who apprehend the injustice of the act disclaim such an exercise of power and adhere to the person notwithstanding. Thus the schism at Constantinople arose from the unjust deposition of Chrysostom, and his adherents were called Johannitae, as if they had been of another Religion. Such also was the division of the Eustathians at Antioch. These proceedings being carried against honest men, and there being no condescension—or what had once been conceded being afterward withdrawn—there was no stopping such divisions except in the manner formerly mentioned, and that only after the deaths of both parties.

In such cases extremes are to be avoided, for it is extremity that produces breaches: too little condescension upon the one side, and too much tenaciousness upon the other.

One extreme to be avoided is when Church Judicatories are too tenacious in maintaining a past Sentence, or some legal formality which appears to justify the Sentence. Thus, in the case of Chrysostom, almost all the weight at first was laid upon this: that he had refused to appear before them or acknowledge their Authority as they were then constituted. And although both the people and others adhered to him, there was no condescension, which occasioned a great schism and was exceedingly condemned by the generality of faithful men in those days.

Another extreme is upon the other side, when too little is yielded for the satisfaction of a Judicatory; or when, even supposing a Sentence to have been unjust, a schism is established to the hurt of the Church. In this case we may observe these things.

1. Sometimes the Judicatory has condescended to readmit a person who was otherwise highly esteemed, although possibly there had been some particular failing which in strict justice might have deserved the Sentence. This was so in the case of Hosius formerly cited. It is true that there is no mention of the cause for which the Synod of Spain deposed him, nor is it clear whether this was that famous Hosius whom the Arians deposed and whipped until he approved the deposition of Athanasius. Yet this is clear: being a man highly esteemed in the Church, though possibly through infirmity he had fallen into that fault, he was for the sake of concord restored, Sine detrimento honoris—without prejudice to his reputation.

2. Where men have been deposed because of some breach of legal formality or contempt of a Judicatory, if otherwise they have been men of gifts and approved integrity in the main, though possibly thought proud and rigid by others, as in the case of Chrysostom, they have again been received into the Church and the Sentences have by consent been laid aside.

This appears in the readmission of Chrysostom after his first deposition. Because there was no convincing evidence concerning the justice of his Sentence of deposition sufficient to satisfy the people, Severian, in preaching, said that Chrysostom’s pride was sufficient reason for it. His readmission for a time removed the division and brought a cheerful calmness, until shortly afterward his old enemies interrupted it and began a new process against him because he had reentered his Bishopric after having once been deposed by a Synod, without receiving their authorization to return. This proceeding was grounded even upon constitutions of Arian Councils. When this was pressed against him the second time, despite the entreaties and solemn appeals of many worthy Bishops and good people who adhered to him, it again renewed and fixed that schism.

3. When the men were otherwise corrupt, or were discovered to be gross and profane, although many other orthodox men interposed for them, their restoration was nevertheless resisted by all means, because it was still supposed that those worthy men who sided with them had been misinformed.

And it is observable that the most peaceable Synods, which did most for union—such as those in Africa and that of Spain, which had received Hosius because the Churches of France interposed for him, thereby preventing a schism—were nevertheless most resolute in this respect. They refused to receive Basilides and Martialis, just as the Council of Carthage refused to receive Apiarius, notwithstanding that Rome interposed for them. They gave this reason: there was a necessity that the Churches should be provided with faithful and holy Ministers.

4. Sometimes, and indeed often, men who had been Sentenced, though possibly with too much rigidity, if not injustice, nevertheless submitted out of respect for the Church’s peace. Sometimes they submitted entirely and upon that ground were afterward readmitted. At other times they submitted partially, abstaining from acting contrary to the Sentence, but out of reverence for it waiting for some lawful remedy, as frequently appears in history.

And it is fitting that it should be so in cases where the injury is particular and does not proceed from a general design to destroy all faithful Ministers. For creating a schism does more harm than contending for their particular Ministry does good in such a case. Therefore, sometimes, although men have been urged to disregard an unjust Sentence and continue to officiate notwithstanding it, yet out of respect for Church Authority and order they have refused to do so until they were regularly restored to the same.

Indeed, when the Arians pressed the deposition of their most eminent opponents, it was otherwise, because, as is noted in the Council of Sardica, in suppressing those men they sought to suppress the truth which those men maintained. But where the controversy is not of this sort, and the men upon both sides are orthodox and sound, although there may possibly be particular faults or mistakes, it is safer for either side to yield in part or entirely than to maintain a division. And we conceive that when one side will not yield, if the other should yield entirely, it would be most advantageous to their cause and would commend and strengthen their Authority in the Churches of Christ.

The other occasion of debate in such Church matters arises from a defect in discipline: that is, when some really are, or are thought to be, conniving at guilty men, or at least defective in bringing them to trial; while others, again, may be thought too forward and hasty in doing so. From this a difference arises, and if one will not yield to the other, it becomes an occasion of division, as may be seen in examples formerly given. Concerning this we say:

1. Men should remember that this is only one particular among many things that tend to the Church’s good, though indeed it is an important one. Therefore it ought not to become the origin of a division, nor a reason for continuing one, to the detriment of the Church’s peace in other matters. Rather, men ought sincerely to perform their own duty and rest satisfied in doing so, without partaking of the faults of others, whether those faults consist in deficiency or in excess in this matter. And seeing there may be no corrupt design in either of those who fall into these extremes, the fault upon either side ought not to be excessively aggravated.

2. We say that, as differences concerning this matter often produce divisions, so divisions in turn cause men to differ still more concerning it. Where division exists, it cannot be expected that men, being human and liable to bias, will be as impartial in receiving testimonies concerning the innocence of those who differ from them, or concerning the guilt of those who agree with them, as they would be if there were no division at all.

Again, where there is already a difference concerning some other matter, it is impossible for men readily to think that those who differ from them are as sincere and unbiased as they suppose themselves to be. Rather, they are continually ready to interpret the other party’s disagreement in this matter as arising from some former prejudice. For, as was said, division breeds jealousy, suspicion, and distrust among men.

And men are naturally inclined to suspect that others are pursuing a design of strengthening their own party by Sentencing such a person. They are thereby secretly induced, even without realizing it, to frustrate what they suppose to be such an improper design. This causes men upon both sides to suspect everything, dispute everything, and readily reject everything that comes from the other.

3. We say, therefore, that union should not be suspended until satisfaction is attained concerning this matter. Rather, union should be pressed so that satisfaction concerning it may afterward be attained. For satisfaction cannot be expected until there is mutual confidence in one another’s integrity; and until there is some walking together and further evidence of each other’s sincerity in the principal matters, this mutual confidence cannot be expected. Again, such confidence cannot be obtained without union. Consequently, union should be laid as a foundation for attaining satisfaction even concerning this matter.

4. It should be considered that often such apprehensions of extremes, when imputed to honest and zealous men, are largely groundless. Yet because there is something of human weakness in them, the other side, through secretly entertained jealousy, imagines the fault to be much greater than it actually is.

There was nothing more frequently charged against the Orthodox by the Novatians and Donatists than that they were defective in this matter, admitting to and retaining in the Ministry men who were corrupt. Yet after many trials they were never able to prove what they alleged concerning certain eminent persons when the matter actually came to trial, even though such allegations were generally accounted true among them. This should be carefully observed, so that every general rumor is not accounted a truth, especially in times of division; for otherwise few of the most eminent men upon either side would be innocent.

Again, on the other side, it occasioned much resentment against Chrysostom that he had Censured many of his Bishops and threatened many of his Clergy. This greatly provoked envy against him and caused such men to spread many slanders concerning him, which were given too much credit even by some orthodox and good men who differed from him upon another matter, as Epiphanius did concerning the writings of Origen.

Yet no history records that Chrysostom intended to Censure anyone unjustly, although he did Censure with the same natural vehemence with which he did everything else. Rather, the histories say that men spoke much about the number of those whom he Sentenced and the vehemence of his manner in reproving and Censuring their faults, which they interpreted as pride, without sufficiently considering the faults for which he Censured them. But men, having already conceived prejudice against him, were more ready to receive accusations from such persons as though Chrysostom had dealt unjustly with them; and from that same prejudice they were more inclined to restore those whom he had Sentenced.

5. It is also to be considered that zeal against those who are justly liable to Censure is entirely consistent with a spirit of union in the Church, as appears from the former examples of men who were most tender concerning union and yet most zealous in this matter. Yea, these two things go together, because zeal for the Church’s edification constrains men to seek union and also presses them to remove corrupt and unfaithful Ministers, which, next to division in a Church, is the greatest plague that can afflict a Church.

Therefore these things should be observed.

1. The purging of the Church from such persons and the work of union should be jointly regarded. Otherwise, if union is slighted, there is danger of falling too nearly into the schisms of the Novatians and Donatists, which have been so harmful to the Church.

2. When union comes into competition with the deposing of some unfaithful men, and both cannot be obtained together, union ought to be preferred. We see the Apostle doing this in 2 Corinthians 10:6, where he will not Censure in such a case lest he establish a schism. For the continuance of such men in a Church is indeed harmful, seeing they are useless and in great part hurtful; yet honest Ministers may still have opportunity to do good alongside them. But when schisms enter, the harm is more extensive, and they render the Ministry of both good and bad Ministers ineffective.

3. It should also be considered that, in the division here supposed, where men are orthodox and pious upon both sides, it is not greatly to be feared either that men palpably corrupt in doctrine or conduct will be maintained upon the one side, or that men useful in the Church and blameless in their conduct will be crushed upon the other.

4. It follows also that union should be no prejudice to ridding the Church of corrupt Ministers, but rather that this should be pursued wherever there is need. For zeal against corrupt men proceeds from the same spirit from which meekness and moderation toward those who are not corrupt proceed.

Therefore, if there is any proper object of such zeal, such as an unfaithful Minister—and it is unlikely that the Church ever has been or ever will be entirely free from such—then men ought faithfully to bestir themselves in removing such persons.

It is noted and commended in the Angel of Ephesus, Revelation 2:2–3, that he was eminent in patience and endurance, and yet so zealous in this matter that he could endure no unsent Minister, but tried those who called themselves Apostles, and so forth. This proper mixture and balance is exceedingly commended.

And with reference to our present purpose, zeal in this matter is not only a duty as at other times, but is also a special means having influence upon the procuring of union. For in this way one of the great stumbling blocks which has made the Ministry contemptible is removed, and practical evidence of men’s zeal is given, which tends to establish confidence in them in the hearts of others.

In this way also men are kept from falling under the temptation of lukewarmness and forgetting every duty except supporting their own side; or, at least, the accusation ordinarily made in such a case is removed. And by this means men also come to recognize the necessity of bearing with many things in others who may in the main be supposed to be honest.

However it may be, this is the way to be approved before God and to obtain a testimony in the consciences of others. All these things contribute exceedingly to union. On the contrary, a universal cessation from this duty, as though there were no such matter requiring attention, and formally, materially, or virtually obstructing anything relating to it, tends exceedingly to fix division and to cool the affections of many who look on; and without warm affections there is little opportunity for hearty union.

We say that this duty of purging the Church should not be pressed with the same vehemence either during a division or while union is not yet confirmed as it may be when a Church is in a healthy condition. For that would be like giving strong medicine to an unsettled and weakened body, which might stir up its disorders to the prejudice of the whole rather than remove them.

Therefore we conceive that sobriety and prudence should be exercised here, moderating the exercise of this duty until union is confirmed and, as it were, by preparatory measures the body is made ready for it. Therefore, if the faults are not gross, the evidence clear, and a person’s unfruitfulness or harmfulness demonstrable—in which cases no difference among such parties as are to be united need be feared—it is safer for the Church to abstain than to hazard reopening or disturbing a wound scarcely healed by the unseasonable pressing of such a duty.

The Apostle in several cases spares the Censure of unfaithful men out of respect for the Church’s good, as has formerly been indicated. And the judicious Divine Mr. Gillespie—who certainly cannot be charged with lukewarmness in this duty—in his Aaron’s Rod demonstrates this and gives examples of several cases in which such forbearance is called for.

In sum, we suppose that when dealing in such a case with such persons, it is safer for men to perform their own duty while preserving the peace of the Church, and to leave others to act according to the clearness of the circumstances, as they must answer before God concerning their seeking the good of His Church. And if this consideration will not prevail with such men to order them in their duty, will anyone think that maintaining or threatening division will prevail?

Lastly, it should be considered whether the ends which either side proposes, whether in retaining or purging out men who are respectively thought fit or unfit, can be attained as well without union as with it. Therefore, seeing this is a matter belonging to Government, and men are to be guided in such Acts by what most conduces to edification, when they cannot attain everything they desire—as we suppose men never shall in this matter of purging—they are then to walk by this rule: choosing that which comparatively is most edifying, as was formerly said.

Sometimes also there has been disagreement concerning the Excommunication of persons or their readmission to communion. But what concerns this may in some measure be understood from the preceding principles, in which extremes are to be avoided, while the Church’s peace and the Authority of the Ordinances are both to be regarded.

Besides, we have already, beyond our original purpose, become so lengthy—and possibly ad nauseam usque, even to the point of weariness—in other matters. We shall therefore refrain from descending particularly into this subject and proceed to the general matters proposed.

CHAP. XVIII. The fears of mis-government for the time to come, and remedies thereof.

This difference may be considered in two ways. 1. As it involves dissatisfaction with the persons who are to govern: some upon the one side thinking it unfit to join with profane men; and some upon the other disdaining to join with Schismatics.

The Fathers of the Council of Carthage were in this difficulty in their dealings with the Donatists. Some of the Donatists asserted, upon the one side, that there could be no union with persons such as the generality of the Catholics were; and Augustine often cites the words of Petilianus, given to them as an answer to the request for a Conference: Indignum est ut in unum conveniant filii Martyrum, & progenies traditorum; that is, It is a most unseemly thing that the sons of Martyrs and the offspring of Traditors should assemble together in one place.

On the other hand, the Catholics were pressed from Rome and the neighboring regions not to unite with those Schismatics, the Donatists, as may be seen in that Council. Yet they nevertheless found it their duty to seek union with them, and even to permit those among them who had formerly been put out of their Churches to be restored by the Cognitor who had been appointed and deputed by the Emperor in that Conference, Ut eo modo eos ad conferendum etiam beneficiis invitaret; that is, That in this way he might invite them to conference even by such benefits.

We suppose that this principle ought not, and will not, remain fixed in the hearts of such men in a case such as is here presupposed. For it leads to this general proposition: that there is no communion in Government to be maintained where, upon any of the former grounds, men are displeased with the persons who are joined with them in it. And although affection, and sometimes inclination stirred up by prejudice and discontent, will readily make practices which imply such a principle appear plausible, yet I suppose the principle itself will no more be maintained than such a ground would warrant Separation from any other Ordinance. The grounds formerly laid down in several parts of this discourse will not admit such a principle, which, if admitted, would exclude union forever. We shall therefore pass from this.

The second and principal difficulty, then, is how matters may be ordered for the time to come so that the ends both of union and Government may thereby be obtained, while nothing which may justly be feared by either side is altogether slighted.

In reference to this, it will not be expected that we should be particular or fully satisfying. Yet, so as not to leave the matter altogether incomplete, we shall, first, propose some general considerations to soften the sharpness of division upon this account; second, offer some general helps which may be considered in such cases; and third, lay down some cautions upon the supposition that full satisfaction is not obtained.

We propose these considerations concerning this matter:

1. In such a case it is impossible that men upon both sides, or even upon either side, can expect full satisfaction according to their own mind, or even simply according to their own light. For men do not have before them the simple question of what would be best for the Church in itself, but what is best comparatively and with respect to this particular set of circumstances. They must therefore resolve that regard must be had to the satisfaction of others as well as to their own. For it is not the satisfaction of one side that constitutes union, but the satisfaction of both.

It must therefore be resolved that the satisfaction given to both sides will be of such a kind that neither is fully and absolutely satisfied in everything. For that reason, it is not to be expected that in such a case every possible inconvenience can be satisfactorily prevented, or every question concerning such inconveniences answered. Indeed, I doubt whether in any case there will be full satisfaction concerning all these things.

2. Let it be considered whether abstaining from union will prevent these inconveniences upon either side, and whether it will not rather bring greater and more numerous inconveniences upon the Church. And if inconveniences are to have weight, those which are greater and more inevitable in the one case ought to have more weight than those which are lesser and more uncertain in the other. For it has already been presupposed that joining in union does not make one guilty of these inconveniences any more than abstaining from union does.

3. Yea, let it be considered whether, by continuing division, men do not necessarily become responsible for the inconveniences which follow from it; because, so to speak, they follow from division per se, or naturally and necessarily, whereas the other inconveniences follow upon union only accidentally at most. Other considerations formerly mentioned should also have weight and ought to be remembered here.

We come now to consider the helps which may in part be useful for preventing these fears. In reference to these, we would first consider that the matter feared is not the introduction of unsound doctrine in general, nor the alteration of practical rules so as to strengthen profanity. Rather, what is feared is the misapplication of good rules already established, especially concerning these things: 1. The admitting of unfit Officers into the Church. 2. The deposing of such as deserve deposition. 3. The deciding of particular differences which may occasionally arise in carrying on Church affairs, in which men may apprehend and fear partiality as such cases occur. These grounds of fear upon either side may be gathered from what has formerly been indicated.

Concerning the matter of deposition, we have already spoken and shall say no more. Concerning the other two points, we may consider them either as they concern matters which occurred during the division, before union is established, or as they relate to matters which may occasionally arise afterward.

Concerning what is past in such disputed particulars, we have already spoken; and it seems that one of these three ways must be followed concerning them.

1. Either such matters are to be waived, if they are of a kind that may be waived, so that without further insistence upon them they may be buried; or, by one party’s yielding; or, by mutual agreement, they may immediately be settled.

2. If that cannot be done, union is not to be suspended upon them. Rather, certain persons may by mutual agreement be appointed afterward to labor concerning them, so that by consent they may be brought to a conclusion. This is not to be regarded as hopeless merely because the matter cannot presently be settled. This method of mutual conference is natural, being an approved means for composing differences of every kind, in every place and at every time.

3. If that is not acceptable, or does not attain the desired end, the matter may amicably be referred to persons acceptable to both parties, who may be trusted with the ultimate decision of such particulars. Neither is it unbecoming Church Authority to condescend in this way, nor unbecoming Ministers to submit in such matters.

For, first, it is not a matter of Doctrine in which they are to decide, or in which either party is simply to acquiesce, but some particular practical matter.

Second, the submission is not concerning a difference between something sinful and something lawful, but between two things which are lawful, the question being which of them is comparatively most expedient for the Church in such a case. In this I conceive it would not be implicit or blind conduct for men to acquiesce in the judgment of others concerning such matters any more than to follow their own judgment.

Third, it would seem that the Apostle’s advice in 1 Corinthians 6—“Is there not a wise man among you?” and so forth—is proposed generally for preventing all such strife and contention as brings scandal with it, and therefore ought not to be excluded in this case. For there is a gift of prudence and wisdom given to the Church for governing herself, and this is more eminently given to one than to another, even as the gift of knowledge is given for Doctrine.

Therefore we conceive that in such cases such persons may warrantably be trusted with particular matters, seeing it may be expected that they will endeavor to make the best use of them for the Church’s good.

In that Conference with the Donatists, we find that the Donatists were requested to name one person for themselves who might join with the Cognitor appointed to judge such particulars and matters of fact as were disputed between the Catholics and them. Their refusal to do so was regarded as evidence that they did not desire an end to the controversy. Neither is it to be thought that Augustine and nearly three hundred Bishops with him, who yielded to this arrangement, undervalued the matters disputed between them, although they were willing that differences concerning matters of fact should be decided in this way.

We also find that, for removing almost all the formerly mentioned schisms, particular men were either deputed by Synods, commissioned by neighboring Churches, or called by the parties themselves, for amicably composing those practical differences which had occasioned their divisions. And possibly, if this method were more frequently used for composing Church differences, the height to which disputes over particular matters often rise might be prevented.

We do not think it fitting here that such matters should be decided by Church Judicatories by a merely authoritative decision. This is not from any disrespect toward Church Judicatories, but because, as was formerly indicated in the general principles, Church Judicatories are better suited for preventing such divisions than for removing them.

Further, a Church Judicatory being, in public divisions, itself regarded as a party, such a decision would appear more like submission—which men are not so easily induced to give—than union. Besides, such a method is more likely to breed resentment in matters which have formerly been subjects of controversy, and therefore is plainly in danger of unsettling a union scarcely begun.

Also, men will more easily accept a decision in which they themselves have some consent, though only indirectly by committing it to others, than one which rests solely upon the necessity of obeying, especially where such prejudice is conceived against the Judge as in the case supposed. This may become clearer from what may afterward be said.

For regulating matters which may occasionally arise in the future, we may propose these general helps for consideration.

1. There should be an abstaining, at least for a time, from whatever may readily become the occasion of a new difference. It is better to forbear many things than to unsettle union or grieve a party with whom we have united. Generally, it appears that pressing things, rather than forbearing them, breeds division, grieves men after union, and tempts them to regret having united.

Neither does this prevent anyone from performing a necessary duty. It only regulates men in the performance of necessary duties so that they may avoid the guilt of dividing the Church or grieving others; or, at most, it concerns only the timing, manner, or some other circumstance of a necessary duty.

Suppose, for example, that in the matter of planting a Church, a division appears likely to arise. It is more fitting that the matter should for a time be suspended and other endeavors used to facilitate it. Yea, before a breach occurs, even other persons should be sought out. For although it is a duty to plant the Church, and to plant it with none but worthy persons, it is not always a necessary duty to plant this particular Church at this particular time, in this particular manner, and with this particular worthy person.

Yea, it would be better for the Church, and bring greater peace to the person’s own mind, that such a particular place should remain vacant for several years than that the peace of the Church or the settled condition of her Judicatories should thereby be disturbed. And so it is in other matters where forbearance is called for.

2. In such a case, doubtful practices should be abstained from. Whatever course men choose in any particular matter that arises should be such, and should be carried out in such a manner, that it may convincingly appear approvable to persons upon either side. For it is often uncertain matters, or matters which are at least disputable, that breed differences among judicious and sober men.

Men should therefore in some measure confine themselves for a time to things that are unquestionable. They should have regard not only to their own consciences concerning such matters, and to what is right in itself, but also to others, who are not without their own suspicions and jealousies and who may by their actions either readily be tempted or grieved. Both of these they ought to avoid.

3. We conceive that at such a time it is useful to have frequent brotherly consultations and conferences concerning matters which may be proposed, so that things do not arise abruptly. Otherwise men may sometimes be surprised by something of which they have never heard and become jealous where there is no ground for jealousy.

It is also an evidence of respect to communicate one’s thoughts in this way, and by this means men may know what is fitting to be proposed and what is not. Otherwise men may readily become engaged in opposition to a proposal and afterward not be so easily brought away from that opposition.

This communication should not so much arise from the appointment of others as be voluntary, proceeding from mutual respect between particular persons. It should also be conducted with due respect toward the other person and with submission to his reason; that is, if he appears reasonably dissatisfied with the proposal and does not approve it, the proposal should be forborne, at least for a time, and the other person should be patiently waited for until he comes to agree with it, or at least is willing to tolerate it. This would breed confidence and make their designs joint. And this method, which ought to be followed when matters are first proposed, should also be continued as they are carried forward.

4. Matters of difficulty should rather be committed to deputed persons than immediately decided, especially in superior Judicatories. The reasons are:

1. Ordinarily, superior Judicatories cannot allow the time that agitated spirits will require in order to bring difficult matters to a cordial conclusion. 2. It appears respectful when such difficulties are given deliberate attention, and slighting when matters are hurried. 3. Nor are subsequent murmuring and resentment prevented when matters have not been fully heard. 4. Time may accomplish many things, and that which may shortly become easy is difficult now. 5. In such deputations there is greater opportunity to appoint those persons who may most probably accomplish the matter for the Church’s good.

And undoubtedly a Church Judicatory is to take the course which may accomplish the matter best, just as a particular person ought to do. Judicatories are to abstain from debatable matters and hasty conclusions just as particular persons are. Experience also frequently teaches that such Commissions accomplish many things which larger and more frequent Assemblies could not do so well.

Hence we find that in the primitive times it was ordinary upon such grounds to give Commissions to a few persons to perform particular tasks. In particular, that often-mentioned Council of Carthage thought it good to dissolve and to depute a certain number to decide those matters of discipline which the whole Council could not so well accomplish by itself.

5. We conceive also that it would not be unfitting in such cases, at least for a time, to have certain persons designated by mutual consent who might compose such occasional differences as might possibly arise, or who at least might have sufficient power to restrain them and prevent them from becoming a new ground of division in the Church or a cause of great grief to either party.

This is not to constitute a new Judicatory, but, according to the light of nature, to provide a means for maintaining order and preventing confusion when, because of the present disorder of men’s spirits, there is no possibility of attaining that end through the constituted Judicatory.

Nature in such a case teaches all men to seek order in every society. And supposing that there can be no joining in the ordinary Judicatories without such an arrangement, while union might be attained with it, it is difficult to think that something permitted to every other society should be denied to the Church; or that it could be maintained that it is better to have no union in Church Judicatories than to have union so qualified.

Certainly some Churches would consider it a great thing to attain even this degree of union, and indeed have done so, as appears from the many voluntary associations into which worthy men have entered for preserving order and attaining some union, while nevertheless remaining good friends to Church Government.

And the reason which warrants them in such conduct—namely, the necessity of union and order in the Church, together with the impossibility of attaining them by any further means—will warrant this practice in the case supposed. For the question is not simply, What is the best constituted Government of a Church when she is in a good condition? Rather, the question is whether a Government with such a qualification is better than no Government, or than a divided Government, it being supposed that no other arrangement can be attained in the particular circumstances.

It should also be considered that such a voluntary reference to these persons does not include Authority to ordain Ministers, depose them, and so forth. Rather, it concerns matters of fact, such as the fitness or unfitness of such a Church planting, such a Process, and the like, as was mentioned concerning past differences; for what was said there is also binding here.

Neither can this be regarded as any limitation or weakening of Church Authority and power.

1. It makes that Authority and power stronger than it formerly was without this arrangement in the particular circumstances supposed. The question is still to be considered not in thesi, but in hypothesi—not merely in the abstract, but in the particular case.

2. This arrangement is for the recovery and strengthening of an Authority which for the time is not fully in exercise, at least to its proper extent. It is, as it were, to give that Authority an effective existence again and bring it back to its former strength; just as a weak man might be led by another or given a staff to support himself until he recovers, or as a dislocated leg might be supported in a manner different from one that is sound, so that it may sooner become capable of walking without such assistance.

3. This is only a temporary and accessory help. It is not maintained to be an essential element of Government, but merely a lawful expedient when circumstances make it necessary.

4. It may also be considered that possibly there will be no need to use it at all, and if so, it can constitute no encroachment. But if there is need for it, so that matters cannot otherwise be cordially composed, is it not then expedient for preventing a greater inconvenience?

5. I suppose it is not considered inconsistent with Civil Authority when union is established between two Nations, or within the same Nation, especially where Authority has been unsettled, that certain persons should by joint consent be chosen to decide such matters as might occasion a new breach. There are many examples of this in history. For the existence of Authority adds to the means with which men are naturally furnished for preserving union and order, and therefore cannot exclude such prudential considerations.

Neither can this be thought inconsistent with the nature of Church Authority and Government.

1. If it is agreeable to the principles of nature and sound reason, it cannot be inconsistent with Church Government, which has its own polity grounded upon these. And although the form of Government is not to be gathered from these principles, nor the ends which Governors ought to seek, yet the manner in which such a Government is to attain those ends in positive matters is to be regulated by them. Hence sometimes men are to use entreaties and persuasions, and sometimes threatenings and authoritative means, according as the end may best be attained.

2. Although Church Government in general is determined, and men are not free simply to associate or not to associate, yet there is much concerning its exercise in association, and the particular manner mutually agreed upon may still regulate circumstances, although it cannot alter the nature of the thing itself.

3. It is not necessary that Church Authority should always be exercised in every matter. It is to be exercised only when it tends to the Church’s edification, for there is no legitimate exercise of Church Authority which does not edify. Therefore, if in such cases the interposing of Church Authority in the ultimate decision of particular matters would not be edifying, it is no encroachment upon that Authority to say that it should not be exercised in that particular case.

Thus, at most, what depends upon this reference is only prudentially to discern and judge whether, in such and such a case, it is fitting for the Church’s edification that Church Authority should decide that particular matter. In this, it is not the Authority or power itself, but the prudence, zeal, and faithfulness of the persons concerned that are to be regarded in seeking such forbearance.

4. We find the great Apostle frequently condescending to lay aside the exercise of his Authority and instead to entreat and beseech, especially in matters concerning union; and sometimes to advise, when he thought his entreaties might prevail more effectively, or when he thought his Authority might be questioned or his authoritative acting might endanger a schism. These grounds, being moral, may warrant a Church in such a case, to the end of the world, to follow his example.

5. Seeing union, while it is weak, is maintained by the same means by which it was begun—for union is not completed merely when some agreement has been concluded—and seeing, as we have said, an authoritative way is not the most suitable for conceiving and bringing forth union, neither will it be the most suitable for nursing and feeding it until it becomes able to bear stronger meat.

6. Seeing Church Authority is parental, and of the tenderest sort, it is not unbecoming for it to condescend even to the weakness and childish disorders of some members, supposing there are such who stand in need of this condescension. And if such condescension may bring them in and keep them in their proper place, and more effectually prevent their snares and misconduct than authoritative means which for the time are suspected by them, ought not such means to be followed?

And if they should continue in their infirmity so as to stumble at the peremptory use of authoritative means and at the refusal of such condescension, will that be thought a sufficient ground to clear men from having contributed to their fall? Or will such conduct resemble that tenderness and condescension which mothers and nurses ought to exercise toward children, even in their childish and unreasonable moods?

7. This also misstates the question, because what is to be considered here, as was said, is not simply the nature of Church Authority, but comparatively what is most suitable for procuring the edification of the Church and what may for a time serve as a means of recovering her to a full authoritative manner of acting, which is now supposed to have been unsettled.

Besides, if the recovery of Church Authority is a duty requiring means suitable to that end, then the use of this means must also be a duty, because, in the case supposed, it is the most probable means for attaining that end.

If it is said that it would be easier simply to acquiesce in the authoritative determination, and that it would be more fitting for men to submit to it, we answer: that supposes that there is no present disorder and therefore does not answer the case as stated, which proceeds upon the supposition that men will not do so.

The question is: Is not this course more suitable for present edification, and more likely eventually to attain a full authoritative manner of acting, than continuing a division because there is no condescension in this respect?

In the last place, it may also be considered that the exercise of Church Authority in particular cases, hic et nunc, is an affirmative precept and therefore does not bind ad semper, according to the common rule concerning affirmative precepts. It cannot therefore be inconsistent either with Church Authority or with the precepts by which it is commanded to add such qualifications as have been mentioned in the case presupposed.

CHAP. XIX. Some advertisements concerning the overtures proposed.

To come now to some cautions, according as we proposed, we must put them together briefly, lest we be too lengthy in everything.

1. First, it should be observed that none of the former helps or remedies is urged peremptorily; but if other means may be found more effective, all these are to give way. Only this is intended: that if no more probable and effective means can be found or applied, it is better, upon such grounds as these, to unite than to continue a division.

2. It should be observed that there may be, and ought to be, such condescension in concluding and settling upon the means—especially for the time to come—that, by specifying the time, manner, and other particular circumstances of things, the fears of both sides may in some measure be guarded against; and each, by showing respect to the other, may endeavor to remove their mutual jealousies. For, seeing jealousies are mutual, it will be too much for one side to expect the other wholly to trust them if there is no condescension on their part.

3. Although there may be fears that things will again break out, and that therefore it is to no purpose to undertake a way of union that is not in every respect satisfactory, yet it should be attempted. And if the Lord prevents the thing feared, such an objection is answered; if some interruption should again arise that threatens an outbreak, those who are responsible for it will be the more guilty, and others who are innocent in it may have more peace than if union had not been attempted.

4. If union cannot be completed in everything, then efforts should be made to establish it so far as is attainable, and to prevent the increase of division; so that, if there cannot be a positive union, at least a positive division and opposition may be avoided.

5. It should be endeavored that, notwithstanding such divisions, men may mutually cooperate in those things in which there is no division, for the edification of the Church. For division in one particular ought not, and cannot warrantably, hinder mutual action in other things where there is no division. For instance, if there is an interruption in carrying on the work of God jointly in Government because of some difference concerning it, yet if there is opportunity to promote the edification of the body by a united way of preaching, that is to be followed and improved, as we see is done in some places where Government is not permitted.

6. Whatever the case may be, we suppose it is a duty to make the best of it when men cannot attain the full extent of what they desire.

CHAP. XX. What is incumbent to Magistrates and People for remedying this evil.

It remains now that we should say something concerning what is incumbent upon Magistrates and People for remedying such an evil in the Church; but having been kept so long upon the former matters, we cannot enter fully upon this. We shall only lay down these few general considerations.

1. Neither of them ought to be offended or stumbled at such divisions, or thereby be brought to have less esteem either for the Gospel, the Ordinance of Government or Worship, or the Ministry and Ministers of Jesus Christ. Much less should there be any insulting over them, or advantage taken against them upon this occasion, as is recorded to the infamy of several persons. On the contrary, all should be affected by such divisions as by a most dangerous snare and fearful plague. And to this purpose Augustine earnestly presses Boniface, Governor of Africa, that he should not stumble at the divisions of the Church, particularly in Epistle 50.

2. All should search themselves to see whether they have had any sinful influence in bringing about such a stroke; for if it is a plague and woe to them, they should look back to its origin. Who knows but the sins of Magistrates or People—their fretting against the Ordinance of Government, despising the Ministry, not receiving the Word nor walking answerably to it, and such like—may have brought this division from the Lord as a judicial stroke upon them, to harden them in their former sin, and thereby to strengthen their temptation to despise all the Ordinances still more, to their own ruin, as may be gathered from what has formerly been said?

3. All should be careful to abstain from whatever may further or heighten the breach, and by all means endeavor not to become engaged in such party divisions; for that often encourages others, and increases and fixes a breach. And experience shows that those schisms have always been most dangerous and most difficult to remove in which the people became partisan and sided with opposite parties in the division. And seeing the Spirit in Scripture forbids People as well as Ministers to divide, this must be their duty: not to join in such a division.

Also, becoming involved in such divisions unfits them to receive good from Ministers, or to do good in removing a breach among them. And we are sure that, if doubtful disputations, vain wranglings, and similar questions which do not tend to edification are to be avoided by the People, then we conceive that the matters involved in the cases here presupposed may be regarded in the same way.

4. They are, by all appropriate means, earnestly to press for abstaining from and composing such differences, by seriously representing the evils of them and by exhortations, according to their respective places, that they may be remedied. And if it were more common among the People, when occasions arise and in a proper manner, to testify their sober concern over such evils in general, together with their desire for union and for such condescension as is fitting for attaining it, this would much better become the sobriety of tender Christians and would be much more effective for this end than heightening and aggravating the misconduct of one party against another, or carrying reports or information, whether true or false, which may kindle into a flame passions that are already hot and smoking.

It would affect the heart to hear the expressions of grief and earnest appeals of Constantine, Gratian, and others concerning the divisions of Churchmen in their times, together with their exhortations that these divisions should be remedied.

5. All sorts of persons should endeavor to be on good terms with God with respect to their own particular conditions; and when everything else fails, they should still be continually dealing with God by prayer for the healing of these divisions, accounting their continuance a great plague even upon themselves.

CHAP. XXI. The grounds and motives of the desired union.

This is Durham’s concluding appeal for union, moving from the special circumstances that make reconciliation particularly urgent to a series of questions addressed directly to the reader’s conscience. I’ve kept that cumulative, searching character rather than smoothing it into a modern essay. Pasted markdown

The last thing proposed to be spoken to was the grounds upon which union, upon such terms and in such cases, might be pressed. But seeing some things to this purpose have already been inserted here and there upon several occasions; and seeing those who are principally concerned in this are supposed to be most tenderly zealous for the Church’s good, and therefore not to stand greatly in need of many motives to persuade them to that which so nearly concerns it; and fearing to heap up too many words upon a matter so clear, we shall forbear to insist, and only propose some considerations to the conscience of the tender Reader, especially in reference to some particular circumstances which may sometimes occur in a case of division. And let God Himself, who is the God of peace, of love, and of order, press them upon consciences with a strong hand.

First, the conscientious Reader may consider, when all that has formerly been proposed is well weighed, together with whatever else may occur to himself, whether the pursuit of union is not a most necessary thing; and whether, without attempting these and similar means according to his interest and calling, he can have peace as being sufficiently cleared in the discharge of his duty with reference to this great end. And let him consider whether there can be solid peace of conscience in continuing division upon the grounds mentioned, and in slighting the pursuit of union, if it is attainable upon these or similar terms as have been proposed, especially in these and similar cases.

1. When a Church is under external crosses and afflictions, and by God’s dispensation is cast into the furnace, to be there struggling and wrestling with one another, and contending for matters of such importance as though it were a time of the Church’s greatest peace and calm—O how unsuitable this is! Though indeed condescension is called for at any time, certainly it is much more called for, and in a special manner, at such a time.

The judicious and great Divine Calvin, upon this account, exceedingly aggravates the divisions among some of the English at Frankfurt, who, having been banished in the days of Queen Mary for the same Religion, nevertheless contended even there over matters of little importance. This, he says in Epistle 200, was exceedingly intempestiva, or untimely, exceedingly offensive to the Church of Christ, and unbecoming their circumstances. And although he utterly disapproved of those ceremonies as unbecoming the Church of Christ, yet in Epistle 206 he presses moderation upon both sides, using these words: Sicuti autem eos qui à vobis dissentiebant hortatus sum, ut qua possent moderatione deflecterent; ita mihi displicuit, nihil vicissim parte vestra recedi vel remitti; that is, As I exhorted those who differed from you to accommodate themselves with all possible moderation, so it displeased me that, on the other hand, nothing was yielded or remitted by you.

The second case is when a Church, by division, is laid open to gross heretics who wait for the opportunity of such a division that they may, as it were, make an assault upon her. Division should be avoided at any time; but in such a case, union should be purchased at any cost of warrantable condescension.

In that difference between Eusebius and Basil, at first it was sufficient to avoid division; for which end, at Nazianzen’s request, Basil withdrew. But when the Arians appeared likely to take advantage of the division, he returned and by his condescension established a complete union, thereby shutting the door against the outbreak of error among that people. This action is always highly commended, especially because of its timeliness in relation to that temptation.

3. A third case in which union should especially be pursued is when there is little external help for sustaining the Government and order of the Church, and men in that respect have and take liberty to act as they please. For then union is the only wall; and if that falls, there is nothing left to guard the Church. Hence necessity, especially in such a case, has led men to consider associations and mutual bonds for establishing and confirming union.

4. Another case is when some of the Ordinances, especially the Ordinance of Government, are questioned, or when they are despised and in some measure made contemptible before men. In such cases, out of respect for the Ordinances of Christ, men ought to condescend to the utmost and endeavor to restore the Ordinances of Christ to their former beauty, which cannot be attained without this; because division makes them all appear contemptible.

5. Another case is when there appears to be some special turning point, critical moment, or crisis, so to speak; that is, when, unless there is a present uniting and taking hold of one another, the division and breach will in all probability grow greater and wider and become more difficult to remove.

In such a case men ought to stretch themselves with all the moderation possible, as Calvin expresses it, if they may now at least, through God’s good hand upon them, come to some agreement and take hold of one another while it is still possible. And if each of these considerations by itself strongly presses the pursuit of union beyond what is ordinarily required, O how strongly will all of them together press it! And how actively should men who are zealous for God and His precious Ordinances, and tender toward the edification of souls, bestir themselves to pursue peace in such an urgently pressing case?

The second thing that should be seriously considered and pondered is the possibility and feasibility of attaining such a desirable end. It is true that tenaciousness in some may make union impossible even in the smallest matters, especially when such a person, by his grace, gifts, reputation, or the dependence of others upon him because of these, has some special influence upon the matter. But the Reader should consider:

Whether the difficulty may not in some measure lie with himself, and whether there is not something possible for him to do with respect to union to which he has not yet condescended. For although he has no power over the wills of others, he does have power over his own.

Let him consider whether the evils that follow division are not great and certain; and, if so, whether stopping at any step of the condescension called for will sufficiently answer his conscience against the cries of so many reproaches cast upon the Ordinances by some; against the many challenges that will arise from the misconduct of others occasioned by such divisions; and against the impression which the burdening and saddening of many sincere hearts will one day have upon it. And let him consider whether he dares enter into judgment without fear of being found in some measure responsible for the foregoing evils, if his condescension, as called for, might have prevented them.

He should consider whether, at the appearing of Jesus Christ, when all such affections shall be laid aside, disputings will have no place, and recriminations will not be admitted, he may not have more peace from having condescended upon either side, as has been proposed, for the good of the Church, than from having refused such condescension and thereby continued the division.

It should be seriously pondered whether union by such condescension, or division without it, is likely to be most profitable and edifying to the Church; and whether any of these matters is of such consequence that it ought to stand in the way of the Church’s further edification.

The Reader may consider whether, either in the practice of the primitive times or in the writings of orthodox and sober Divines, ancient or modern, any division so circumstantiated will be found to be warrantable; or whether, apart from the heat of controversy, they would probably have insisted upon refusing any condescension such as is here required upon either side.

It may be considered whether, if all the present Reformed Churches were appealed to in such a case and were sincerely and impartially to give judgment concerning it, there could be any ground for thinking that they would judge such condescension unlawful upon either side, if by it, and by no other means, union could be attained.

It should be considered that, if all who have ever written upon this subject, ancient or modern, were consulted, then, so far as I know, it would be found that the condescension which they allow for attaining and preserving union in the Church extends further than anything required in this case. And I suppose it will hardly be found that such writings allow men to insist upon refusing anything such as is here proposed. And will it be safe, at once, to condemn so many?

The Reader may reflect upon himself and examine what his thoughts are concerning former divisions; whether he does not ordinarily approve those who were most peaceable, and always those who, in circumstances such as these, sought condescension; whether he does not judge within himself that it would have been more for the Church’s good if such divisions had been removed upon similar terms rather than continued; and whether there is not within him a kind of indignation against those who rigidly drove such a division forward. By this he may know and discern what is fitting to be done in the present case, if he were as impartial concerning it as he is concerning the former.

He may consider: if union is not established upon such or similar terms, and if upon other terms it is impossible, what will follow, or what ordinarily does follow in such cases? Does not bitterness grow to a great height among orthodox men, as though each were an enemy to the Truth of Christ and an enemy to the persons of the others?

Names also are often imposed by each upon the other, as though they were not both members of the same body, or as though it were good service to God and an advantage to the Truth, by such designations, to make one another odious, contemptible, and useless. Thus those who refused to join with the Church of Rome concerning Easter were called Quartodecimani.

From this follows abstaining from communion with one another; turning aside among some into error and novelty; indulgence toward, if not connivance at and compliance with, gross and corrupt men among others; coldness in zeal toward God and in love toward one another; a decline in the power and practice of godliness among all; and many similar woeful effects. And shall—alas, shall—the weight of all these sad and Religion-ruining consequences rest upon the refusal of such condescension as is here called for? God forbid.

It should be seriously considered what the thoughts of the succeeding generation may be. Shall such a division be handed down to them, and they be made heirs of it? Shall they not either continue miserably under such a condition, perhaps perpetually, with all those aggravating circumstances which cannot but follow? And can any candid Reader who has compassion for posterity think of this and not be affected by it?

Or else they must endeavor to recover union with much greater difficulty than would be required now. And if so, certainly that generation will be in danger of cursing those who went before them, who brought them forth under the necessity either of continuing under the sin, snare, and tormenting plague of divisions, or at least of being placed in greatly puzzling and perplexing difficulties before they can extricate themselves from them.

If the Reader is still not positively convinced that he should join in and further union in such a case, let him nevertheless consider whether he has sufficient clarity to oppose and condemn it as sinful; whether he has liberty and freedom to condemn all who have ever approved, or who now approve, the removal of a division upon such terms as those proposed; whether he dares, merely from his own particular dissatisfaction, confidently hinder such union among others; and whether he might not have greater freedom simply to stand aside and neither directly nor indirectly become the occasion of such an offense. Let him consider whether the Church might not have greater benefit, and he himself greater peace, by doing so.

And if he is satisfied concerning this, he may consider whether it would not be better to endeavor such a reconciliation, even to the dissatisfaction of some—who may possibly afterward lay aside their discontent—than, out of an ill-judged respect for them, to endanger the ruin of all. This would be like bringing a leaking ship to land in a storm, even though some of the company, through some mistake, oppose doing so.

Let him consider whether condescension in such matters has ever been observed to bring harm to the Church, whereas self-willedness—from which a Minister especially should be free—has always been dangerous. It is true that syncatabasis, or condescension, in fundamental points, such as that which Anastasius pressed, has been most zealously opposed as harmful, because thereby the foundation was struck at and error in fundamental things was given equal standing with Truth. But can this ever be said concerning such things as are presupposed in the case here laid down?

Lastly, the Reader may consider whether, in sobriety and in a detached manner, extra aestum disputationis—outside the heat of controversy—if he were giving his advice to a Church so divided, and immediately afterward were to enter into judgment, he would not readily incline to recommend union upon these or similar terms as necessary for the good of the Church, the reputation of the Ordinances, and the removal of stumbling blocks from before the people, especially in the cases formerly mentioned; and whether he might not have more peace in entering into judgment after giving such advice than if he had rigidly forbidden such condescension.

And we shall leave the judicious, conscientious, and tender Reader to answer these and many similar considerations to himself, and accordingly to act. And if any, out of prejudice—as we hope none will, and heartily wish none may—shall fail conscientiously to ponder these things, we leave him to consider that he must give an account to God for it.

We shall only solemnly appeal to him that he would have greater respect for the Church’s peace than for his own inclination; that he would at least attempt, by some other lawful, possible, and probable means, the removal, or at least the prevention of the growth, of such divisions; and that he would also judge charitably of the attempts of others, until we all come before the common Judge, who, we are persuaded, loves the Truth in peace and has joined these together, which therefore ought by no man to be put asunder.